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To my family and Valentina
“There is no harm in being sometimes wrong,
especially if one is promptly found out”
(John Maynard Keynes, 1883 - 1946)
“It is better to be vaguely right than exactly wrong”
(Carveth Read, 1848 - 1931)
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Preface
The behavior of banks and the determination of retail interest rates have taken a prominent
role after the recent financial crisis: high levels of the cost of credit and quantity rationing are
characterizing the actual economic environment. Monetary policy has sought to address the setting
of bank rates by continuous operations on the monetary policy rate. Nevertheless, the adjustment
of bank rates has not been complete.
The aim of this dissertation is to show that the incomplete pass-through of policy rate changes
on the loan rate may depend also on market frictions, in particular those existing in the credit
market. To this aim, we present three self-contained but highly correlated papers in which we
discuss the role of these frictions, and their interplay with those existing in the labor market, on
the size of the interest rate pass-through and its relevance in shaping business cycle dynamics. The
study of interest rate dynamics also allows us to focus on the cyclical behavior of the credit spread,
which is often used as a leading indicator of the economic activity. In order to shed light on these
issues, we employ a New Keynesian framework (Walsh, 2003) which offers a convenient setting for
monetary policy analysis. What is relevant in this model is the so-called “cost channel” that links
the current and the expected future real marginal costs of the productive sector of the economy
with inflation and then with the business cycle dynamics. If, as in this work, the loan interest rate
enters the definition of marginal costs, it can affect the dynamics of the main macroeconomic and
financial variables.
Theis dissertation is organized as follows.
In chapter 1, after reporting the empirical and theoretical literature on the interest rate pass-
through and the credit spread, we present a critical survey that uses Bayesian techniques to compare
models which explain the interest rate on loans on the basis of different theoretical mechanisms.
In particular, we propose a model - to be more detailed in chapter 2 - in which credit market
frictions are modeled by the search and matching technology. We conclude that the specification
which benefits from the most favorable evidence is one in which the banking lending rate depends
on its past value, as well as on credit market frictions.
In chapter 2 we describe a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the
credit market and we derive a definition of the banking lending rate which depends on the aggregate
credit market tightness. We estimate and simulate the model with respect to monetary, technology
and credit shocks and we highlight both the incompleteness of the interest rate pass-through and
the countercyclical behavior of the credit spread. We also show the importance of the bargaining
power of banks to explain the degree of (in)completeness of the interest rate adjustment, as well
as the (more or less) countercyclical behavior of the credit spread.
In chapter 3 we study the interplay of search and matching frictions in the labor and in the
credit markets, focusing on monetary policy disturbances. We confirm that the incompleteness of
the interest rate pass-through depends on some deep parameters, such as the relative bargaining
powers and the search costs of agents. By comparing the model outcomes with those which
obtain with parameter values generating a complete pass-through, we show that the transmission
of monetary policy shocks to output and inflation is more relevant than suggested by the recent
literature, even though the presence of credit market frictions has a moderation effect on the main
macroeconomic dynamics.

Chapter 1
Incomplete Pass Through from
Policy to Retail Interest Rates:
a Critical Survey†
Empirical evidence highlights an incomplete pass-through from policy to retail interest rates. In
particular the phenomena is relevant by comparing the dynamics of the policy and banking lending
rates. Further, it is observable a countercyclical behavior of the credit spread. However, some
disagreement still exists about the theoretical mechanism by which the interest rate on loans
is derived. In this chapter we survey and compare these theoretical devices into a basic New
Keynesian DSGE model. Furthermore, we employ a Bayesian VAR analysis that confirms the low
adjustment of the banking lending retail rate when a positive policy interest rate shock hits the
economy.
1.1 Introduction
The study of the business cycle has always been one of the main focus in the economic litera-
ture. The labor market analysis, through the introduction of different kinds of imperfections and
rigidities into New Keynesian (NK) Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models with
sticky prices and monopolistic competitive markets, is now a standard in this framework. Further,
in the recent years, the introduction of the banking sector in the basic model was growing. This
extension is receiving an increased attention since it helps to describe in a better way the dynamics
of the main financial variables and their relationships with the real economy. In particular, the
study of the (in)completeness of the banking (lending and deposit) interest rate pass-through to
change of the policy rate and the behavior of the credit spread over the cycle are two features on
which the literature is still facing.
Several empirical contributions which appeared before the recent financial crises provided con-
vincing evidence that shifts in policy rates were not completely passed through to retail (market)
banking lending rates.1 However, despite the large empirical evidence on the interest rate pass-
†We wish to thank P. Benigno, G. Ciccarone, F. Giuli, S. Neri, F. M. Signoretti and M. Tancioni. The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Italy.
1See the next section.
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through some disagreement still exists about the theoretical mechanism by which the interest rate
on loans is derived. Several explanations for the stickiness of the retail rates are been provided
by the literature on subject. One of the most common explanations refers to the bank’s collusive
behavior and the concentration in the financial market (Sander and Kleimer, 2004). In particular
Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) show that the competitive pressure is greater in the loan market
than in the deposits market such that banks under competition compensate the reduction of the
revenues in the loan market by lowering the deposit rates. Explanations of the incompleteness of
the interest rate pass-through also rely to the presence in the credit market of agency costs à la
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and customer switching costs à la Klemperer (1987). The former which
derive from the imperfect information which characterizes the financial market can provide credit
rationing effects; the latter include learning and transactions costs or any type of cost imposed by
firms. Further, fixed adjustment costs or menù costs can explain the sluggishness of the retail rates
(Hannan and Berger, 1991; Hofmann and Mizen, 2004). Close customer relationships developed
over time (Berger and Udell, 1992; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2011) can be relevant: banks with
close relationships to their customers may hold interest rates relatively constant despite variations
of the policy rate. Hannan and Berger (1991) also propose the so-called customer reaction hy-
pothesis linked to different clients’ reaction with respect to an upward or downward price change
and to the degree of the bargaining power of borrowers. The previous arguments are often used to
justify, from the theoretical point of view, the countercyclical behavior of the credit spread.
The aim of this study is contributing to this literature by proposing a theoretical assessment of
the main devices allowing to determine the banking lending rate. In particular, after the study of
a simple economy in which banking lending and policy (deposit) rates coincide, we analyze a NK
DSGE model where the policy rate and interest rate on loans can be different for the presence of an
interest rate mark-up, for the adding of a smoothness factor, for monopolistic competition in the
banking sector and a Calvo’s adjustment for the interest rates, or for a credit market characterized
by search and matching frictions. Furthermore, we estimate and select the previous models by
using the Bayesian procedures. Hence, the main goal of the chapter is selecting the model with
more evidence consistent with the data.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we report the empirical evidence
highlighting the existence of an incomplete interest rate pass-through and a countercyclical behav-
ior of the credit spread; we employ a Bayesian VAR analysis (BVAR) which confirms the limited
adjustment of the banking lending rate to variations of the policy rate. In section 1.3 we report
the main macroeconomic implications related to an incomplete interest rate pass-through and to
the countercyclical behavior of the credit spread. In section 1.4 we describe the model economy.
In section 1.5 we discuss our estimation and model selection strategy. In section 1.6 we present the
dynamic properties of the model and our results on interest rate pass-though and credit spread.
Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The Empirical Evidence
Figure 1.1 shows the dynamics of the quarterly policy rate and some quarterly retail rates of the
U.S. economy. In the top panel it is possible to observe that the bank prime loan rate (green
line) is shifted above the federal funds rate (blue line) over the whole sample. Further the spread
between the previous rates is increasing in recent years Conversely, the short (6 months’ duration)
dynamics of the deposit rates (certificate of deposit rate, treasury bill rate and Eurodollar deposit
rate, respectively red, sky-blue and violet lines) are very close to the policy rate. Hence, a low
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adjustment is mainly highlighted by the banking lending rates. The bottom panel of figure 1.1
provide for a more short sample period (1997:Q2 - 2011-Q4) the dynamics of the federal funds
rate (solid line), the bank prime loan rate (dashed line) and the weighted average effective loan
rate (dotted lines). We show that dynamics of the latter rate follows (and it is shifted) that of
(over) the federal funds rate but it is more volatile than the prime loan rate. In the following of
the chapter we will use the weighted average effective loan rate as the banking lending rate used
to estimate the model.2
Figure 1.1: Interest rates dynamics.
Empirical evidence also show as significant differences existed in the degree of incompleteness
which was experienced across countries. The phenomenon was particularly sharp in the Euro Area.3
During the financial crisis, the transmission of policy rate changes to retail rates has become less
efficient in this Area (Čihák, Harjes and Stavrev, 2009) where, however, the short-term rates has
been less affected than in the United States whereas the long-term rates has been heavily impaired
in both economies (IMF, 2008). The existence of an incomplete pass-through of policy rate changes
to the loan rates in the Euro Area and in the United States is confirmed by a recent study by
Karagiannis, Panagopoulos and Vlamis (2010).
The presence of several episodes of financial crisis may alter the speed and the degree of the
response of the banking lending rates to changes of the policy rate. Hence, nonlinearity in the
adjustment of the bank retail rates is tested by nonlinear VAR/VECM models that allow for
Markow switching regime. Fuertes, Hoffernan and Kalotychou (2010) focus on the speed, the
asymmetry and sign of the adjustment by employing a nonlinear ECM model for the U.K. by
using a broad disaggregated sample of credit and deposit products: they find that large changes in
the policy rate trigger faster bank retail rates responses than small variations and that for deposits
(banking lending) rates the adjustment is faster (slower) when the policy rate decreases (increases).
2The shape of the dynamics of the bank and intebank rates follow that of monetary policy whereas the behavior
of the corporate bonds rate is tied to the balance sheets and to the financial statements of the firms.
3See, e.g., De Bondt (2005); Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003); Gambacorta (2008); de Bondt, Mojon and
Valla (2005); Hofmann (2006).
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Further responses of the bank rates to a monetary policy change depends on the disequilibrium
gap of the models’ variables prevailing at the time of the policy action. Humala (2005) run a
Markov switching VAR model in order to analyze the Argentinian banking system. He shows that
under normal financial conditions the stickiness of the bank retail rates is larger for rates on loans
with higher credit risk whereas in a financial distress scenario characterized by high volatility the
transmission of impulses on money market rate to the retail rates increases. Banerjee, Bystrov and
Mizen (2010) examine the role of the forecasts of rates in determining the short and the long run
pass-through. After using a principal components method to extract the main factors explaining
market interest rate setting for European countries, they test different forecasting models. They
conclude that models which do not include forecasts of future rates are unspecified. Burgstaller
and Sharler (2010) examine the reaction of the banking lending rates to shifts in credit demand
by employing a Three Stage Least Squares estimation in the period 1999-2007 for the U.K. They
conclude that U.K. banks adjust their banking lending rates partially and accommodate variations
in credit demand by providing insurance to firms against liquidity shocks but potentially increasing
their overall riskiness as well as the business cycle volatility.
The literature on the credit spread is also relevant in order to explain business cycle dynamics
and volatility. Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajšek (2009) construct a credit spread portfolio by collect
information on senior unsecured corporate bonds treated in the secondary market issued by more
than 900 non financial firms in the sample 1990-2008: by employing a factor-augmented VAR
model they find that shocks to medium risk long maturity corporate credit spreads account for a
significant fraction of the variance in economic activity of the last 20 years. Similar evidence is
provided by Gilchrist, Ortiz and Zakrajšek (2009) by a Bayesian maximum likelihood estimation of
a DSGE model with the financial accelerator mechanism for the sample 1973-2008. Conversely, Lee
and Otsu (2011) estimate by the maximum likelihood method a DSGE model in which they show
that shocks to corporate credit spread are not too important in accounting for the U.S. business
cycle in the period 1990-2008. Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1989) show as the difference
between the average yields on BAA rated and AAA-rated corporate bonds rises during recessions
and fall during business cycle booms. Then, several authors argue that credit spread can be used
as leading indicator of the business cycle both in the short term (Stock and Watson, 1989) and
for long maturity (Guha and Hiris, 2002).
Furthermore, it is useful to note as movements in interest rate spreads can also be associated to
the literature concerning the banking markups. Hence, Dueker and Thornton (1997), by employing
a model with switching costs by which baking industry has some kind of market power, show
for the period 1973-1993 in U.S. a countercyclical behavior of the loan spread defined as the
difference between the commercial paper rate (prime lending rate) and the Treasury bill rate (180-
day certificates of deposit rate). Corvoisier and Gropp (2002), by using yearly data from 1995
and 1999 for 11 euro area countries finds a countercyclical movement of the difference between the
contractual loan and deposit rates. A recent contribution by Olivero (2010) proposes a two country,
two good RBC model with complete asset market and noncompetitive financial intermediation to
study the transmission of the productivity shock in an open economy. She finds a main role
of the countercyclical behavior of the loan margin in explaining the cross-country dynamics of
the principal macroeconomic variables. Moreover she confirms the countercyclical behavior of the
banking interest rate spread in U.S. by employing different methods. In particular after computing
raw correlations between the difference between the banking lending and deposit rate and the GDP
based on IFS data (for the period 1970-2008), she checks the result by employing a (bivariate and
multivariate) VAR analysis to study the cyclical behavior between banking margins and GDP
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at different business cycle frequencies. Finally she uses the VAR forecast errors to provide the
evidence on countercyclical credit spread.
In order to confirm the presence of incompleteness of the response of the banking lending
rate when a policy rate shock hits the economy we employ a BVAR model. For this scope we
use 6 observables for the U.S.: federal funds rate, weighted-average effective loan rate for all
commercial and industrial loans, real GDP, employment, real wage and inflation. We take raw
data: the implementation of the Bayesian techniques allow us to handle the over-fitting problem
and the nonstationarity due to possible unit roots of the macroeconomic series. We only consider a
seasonally adjustment. The optimal number of lags is chosen by the Bayesian information criteria:
we find p = 8. The sample period is 1997:Q2 - 2011:Q4.4
Consider the following matrix form of the VAR(p) model:
Y = XB + U
where
Y =
 y1...
yT
 X =
 y0 . . . y1−p 1... . . . ... ...
yT−1 . . . yT−p 1
 B =

β1
...
βp
α
 U =
 u1...
uT

where t = 1 . . . T is the time index, yt is a column vector of n endogenous variables, ut
i.i.d.∼ N (0,Σu)
is a column vector of the residuals, β1, β2, . . . , βp are n×n autoregressive matrices and α is a 1×n
matrix. Hence, Y and U have dimension T × n, X is a T × k matrix whereas B has dimension
k × n where k = np+ 1. Finally we can write U i.i.d.∼ N (0,Σ).
The implementation of the Bayesian procedures implies the use of prior distributions over the
parameters B and Σ.5 In the following description we use the symbols p and P to indicate the
notations related to the priors and the posteriors respectively. We estimate the BVAR model by
using a prior which is a combination of a diffuse and dummy observation (Minnesota) priors:
p(B,Σ) ∝ |Σ|− (df
p+n+1)
2 exp
{
−1
2
Tr(Σ−1Sp)
}
×
|Σ|− k2 exp
{
−1
2
Tr(Σ−1(B − Bˆp)′Xp′Xp(B − Bˆp))
}
(1.1)
where dfp, Sp, Bˆp and Xp depend on the dummy observations.6 From the prior (1.1) it is possible
to observe that (i) Σ is distributed according to an inverse-Wishart distribution, with dfp degrees
of freedom7 and parameter Sp and (ii) conditionally to Σ, matrix B is distributed according to a
matrix-normal distribution, with mean Bˆp and variance-covariance parameters Σ and (Xp′Xp)−1.
The likelihood of the VAR model and the marginal density are respectively:
4In order to obtain the optimal number of lags we employ the Schwartz Criterion. The same result is provided
by using the Akaike Information Criterion. The Bayesian VAR model is also simulated using the bank prime loan
rate for a longer period (1960:Q1-2011:Q4) with results qualitatively similar to those described in the text. In this
case the Bayesian information criteria provide p = 2.
5See Lubik and Schorfheide (2005).
6For a complete description of the BVAR construction see the technical appendix.
7The inverse-Wishart distribution requires the number of degrees of freedom to be greater or equal than the
number of variables, i.e. dfp ≥ n. See the technical appendix for more details.
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p(Y |B,Σ, X) = (2pi)−T ·n2 |Σ|T2 exp
{
−1
2
Tr(Σ−1(Y −XB)′(Y −XB))
}
(1.2)
p(Y |X) =
∫
p(Y |B,Σ, X)p(B,Σ)dBdΣ (1.3)
By using (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) in the Bayes theorem it is possible to derive the posterior distribution:
p(B,Σ|Y,X) ∝ |Σ|− (df
P+n+1)
2 exp
{
−1
2
Tr(Σ−1SP)
}
×
|Σ|− k2 exp
{
−1
2
Tr(Σ−1(B − BˆP)′XP′XP(B − BˆP))
}
(1.4)
where dfP , SP , XP and BˆP depend on prior observations. Similarly to the prior case, we can ob-
serve that the posterior density (1.4) is such that (i) Σ is distributed according to an inverse-Wishart
distribution, with dfP degrees of freedom and (ii) conditionally to Σ, matrix B is distributed ac-
cording to a matrix-normal distribution, with mean BˆP and variance-covariance parameters Σ and
(XP
′
XP)−1.
Figure 1.2 plots the Bayesian posterior impulse response functions of BVAR model for the
policy and retail rates with respect to a shock to the policy rate.8 We adopt the Cholesky’s
identification scheme: the order of the variables is that listed at beginning of this section. We ran
10,000 replications.
Figure 1.2: Bayesian VAR impulse response functions.
Figure 1.2 confirms the low adjustment of the loan retail interest rates when a positive policy
interest rate shock hits the economy: for both median and mean posterior IRFs at the impact
the weighted average effective loan rate increases less than the federal funds rate. Moreover the
8The result holds for different orders of the variables. A complete description of the Bayesian IRFs is available
upon request from the author.
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response function of the loan rate is persistently lower than that of the policy rate over the whole
simulation’s period.
1.3 Macroeconomics, Credit Spread and Interest Rate Pass-
Through
Several works show the existence of frictions in financial markets but disagreement exists about
their significance in the transmission of exogenous shocks to the economy. Traditional channels by
which credit frictions work and affect the real economy are the banking lending and the balance
sheet channels.9 Both mechanisms rely to the presence of asymmetric information in the credit
market: the former focuses on the different information between borrowers and lenders about
the characteristics of individual projects and the substitutability of the banks’ sources of funds;
the latter arises by the presence of financial frictions on the liability side of the bank’s balance
sheet. Furthermore, if the financial intermediaries hold capital, capital requirements may affect
the banks’ assets and hence the transmission of the monetary policy.10 Moreover, by focusing on
the borrowers’ balance sheet, we refer to the financial accelerator literature,11 where in presence
of asymmetric information, the amplification of the main macroeconomic variables depends on
firms’ ability to borrow linked to the market value of their net worth which is inversely related to
the external finance premium. It is useful to note that the definition of external finance premium
is different from that of corporate credit spread. The former is the wedge between the rate of
return on capital and the risk-free rate; the other one is the difference between the contractual
loan interest rate and the risk-free rate.12
Many authors analyze the role of the credit spread. Curdia and Woodford (2009, 2010) intro-
duce financial frictions into a standard NK DSGE model. They consider different shocks in an
economy in which spreads - defined as the difference between the logarithmic deviations of banking
lending and policy rates from their steady states - exist. In line with Lown and Morgan (2002)
they find that the credit spread is compressed during monetary policy tightenings. So, differently
from the works cited in the previous section, this means that the loan spread has a procyclical
behavior even though the interest rate pass-through is incomplete. Furthermore, they find that a
modified interest rate rule that reacts to the contemporaneous variation of the credit spread can
improve upon the standard Taylor rule by reducing distortions caused by some kind of disturbances
as variations of the risk of bad loans. However, the optimal degree of adjustment is not the same
for all shocks. Further, it is smaller than that proposed by McCulley and Toloui (2008) (100%
of the spread’s change) and depends on the degree of persistence of the disturbances.13 Agénor,
Bratsiotis and Pfajfar (2011) examine the impact of a monetary policy shock on the loan spread.
Under asymmetric information, they endogenously derive a default probability of the borrowers
that drives the loan spread. Since in their model the interest rate on loans is a direct function of
the probability of the default and since an increase of the banking lending rate rises the default
probability, then a policy rate increase determines further and continuing increases of the previous
variables such that the loan spread is amplified and a countercyclical risk premium is highlighted.
In the present work we do not consider a bond market and we do not model a default risk. Hence,
9Surveys on the credit channel literature can be found in Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Hubbard (1995).
10See Meh and Moran (2004) and Gerali et al. (2010).
11See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996, 1999), Calstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) for more details on quan-
titative analysis in partial and general equilibrium frameworks.
12See Levin, Natalucci and Zakrajšek (2004) for more details.
13See also Goodfriend and McCallum (2007).
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the interest rate spread we study is the simple difference between a banking lending interest rate
and a policy rate.14
The cost channel may be affected by the degree of incompleteness of the interest rate pass-
through. The relevance of this issue for New Keynesian DSGE models is testified by the literature
on the cost channel of monetary policy (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005; Ravenna
and Walsh, 2006): if the cost channel exists any exogenous shock to the economy generates the
stabilization trade-off for the monetary policy. Hence a limited pass-through also has macroeco-
nomic implications: the dynamics of the retail rates by affecting the cost channel may amplify or
moderate of output and inflation fluctuations. Sharler (2008) investigates on the previous point
by using a New Keynesian DSGE model; she finds that a more incomplete pass-through in the
long run reduces the output volatility at the cost of higher inflation volatility with respect to
a cost push shock. Hence, the incompleteness exacerbates the typical trade-off of the monetary
policy that results inefficient. A recent investigation on optimal monetary policy under imperfect
interest rate pass-through in an economy where retail banking lending rates are different across
regions because loan markets are geographically segmented and individual firms can borrow funds
only from the corresponding regional banks, which set loan rates according to a Calvo-type rule is
proposed by Kobayashi (2008). In this case the incompleteness of the interest rate pass-through
creates fluctuations in the average loan rate which, by the cost channel, determines an inefficient
allocation of worked hours. Hence, a Central Bank has to stabilize the loan rate when it determines
the optimal monetary policy. The previous stabilization involves in a more inertial response of the
policy rate in presence of technology and preference shock and in a more sharp response when an
exogenous shock directly push up the banking lending rates.
Hülsewig, Mayer and Wollmershäuser (2009) also explore the effects of the cost channel on
inflation’s dynamics that arise from the presence of an incomplete pass-through. They employ the
Calvo’ setup for the banking lending rate which allow them to study both the short and the long
run pass-through of a monetary policy shock to a interest rate on loans: a larger fraction of banks
which charge the last period rate on loans and a less competitiveness in the banking sector imply
a more incompleteness of the interest rate pass-through. The cost channel of the monetary policy
contributes to reproduce a delayed and inertial dynamics of the price inflation; the incomplete
interest rate pass-through attenuates the cost channel effect. Gerali et al. (2010) propose a New
Keynesian DSGE model with financial frictions in order to study the role of credit supply factors
in explaining the business cycles dynamics and in which banks face quadratic costs for adjusting
retail rates. Among other results, they find a definition of the interest rate on loans which, similarly
to the Calvo’s frictions, depends on its future and past values and on the policy rate: the model
estimation suggests the presence of an incomplete interest rate pass-through of policy rates to
retail rates which together the imperfect market competition in the banking sector do not only
mitigate the amplification of the dynamics of the real variables depending on the cost channel
effect as in Hülsewig, Mayer and Wollmershäuser (2009), but involve in an overall attenuator effect
of the real economy when a positive policy rate shock hits the economy.15 Güntner (2011) finds
that the degree of monopolistic competition affects the pass-through of policy rates to banking
lending rates in the short run. Specifically, when a monetary policy shock hits the economy, a less
14Differently from Curdia and Woodford (2009, 2010) our definition of credit spread also depends on the steady
states values of the banking lending and policy rate. See also the section (1.4.4).
15Goodfriend and McCallum (2007)’s model is able to highlight a banking attenuator effect if the monetary shock
has a very large volatility. Similarly to Gerali, Neri, Sessa and Signoretti (2010), the imperfect competition in the
financial intermediation sector produces attenuation in Andrés and Arce (2008) and Aslam and Santoro (2008)’s
models.
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competition among banks provides a financial accelerator effect by changes of deposit rates and an
attenuator effect by changes of the banking lending rates reducing the efficiency of the monetary
policy.
Finally, the interest rate pass-through can be relevant for the determinacy of the model’s
equilibrium. Kwapil and Sharler (2006) show that the standard Taylor principle is not sufficient
to avoid fluctuations due sunspot shocks: in presence of incomplete interest rate pass-through the
monetary policy rate have to rise more than the increase that would occur in the case of perfect
pass-through otherwise a no determinate equilibrium may be possible. Further, they also show
as a limited pass-through can help to stabilize the fluctuations arising from fundamental shocks.
This is especially true when the interest rate pass-through is incomplete in the long run and in
bank-based financial systems (Kwapil and Sharler, 2010).
1.4 The Basic NK Model
In this section we consider the basic NK model in which we nest five different ways to describe the
banking sector in line with the literature on the subject matter. Hence, after the basic assumption
that arbitrage condition holds (banking lending rate equal to deposit rate; Ravenna and Walsh,
2006), we compute the interest rate on loans as (i) a simple mark up of the policy rate (Chowdhury,
Hoffmann and Schabert, 2006), (ii) a value which depends on the policy rate as well as on a
persistence factor due to the past value of the loan rate (Kaufmann and Sharler, 2009), (iii)
the value set by banks when they maximize profits under monopolistic competition subject to a
Calvo’s rule (Hülsewig, Mayer and Wollmershäuser, 2009), and (iv) the rate determined by the
profit maximization of banks facing search and matching friction in the credit market (Wasmar
and Weil, 2004; and Becsi and Li, 2005).
1.4.1 Households
There exists a continuum of households of mass one maximizing the expected discounted value
of their utility. The preferences of the representative household are defined over a composite
consumption good, consisting of the differentiated goods produced by retail firms, and leisure. The
household enters each period with a given amount of nominal cash holdingMt and buy retail goods
using the money endowments and the wage income (PtwtNt) net of nominal deposits with banks
Dt. It follows that Mt +PtwtNt−Dt is spent to purchase consumption goods from retail firms, of
value PtCt. As in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), it is Ct =
(∫ 1
0
C
ε−1
ε
it di
) ε
ε−1
, where Cit = (PitPt )
−εCt and
ε > 1 is the parameter governing the elasticity of individual goods, which are indexed by i. The cost
of one unit of the consumption basket is given by the aggregation of the prices of the differentiated
products, Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−εit di
) 1
1−ε
. The purchase of consumption goods is subject to the cash in
advance (CIA) constraint: PtCt ≤ Mt + PtwtNt − Dt.16 At the end of the period households
receive retail firms’ and banks profits’ denoted by ΠFt and ΠBt , and obtain the reimbursement of
their deposits plus the interest on them: RDt Dt = (1 + rDt )Dt.17 It follows that the amount of
money carried over to the following period is: Mt+1 = Mt+PtwtNt−Dt−PtCt+ΠFt +ΠBt +RDt Dt.
Substituting the CIA constraint into this equation we get: Mt+1 = ΠFt + ΠBt +RDt Dt. Calculating
16The CIA constraint is always binding because the nominal interest rate is positive and agents choose their asset
(deposit) holdings after observing the current shock but before entering the good market (Lucas 1982).
17When we consider the model with search and matching frictions in the credit market, the firms’ profits include
both those of retail firms and of the specialized firm which post credit vacancies.
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this equation a period backward and substituting the result into the CIA constraint gives: PtCt =
PtwtNt + ΠFt−1 + Π
B
t−1 −Dt +RDt−1Dt−1. It can be expressed in real terms as:
Ct = wtNt +
ΠFt−1
Pt
+
ΠBt−1
Pt
− Dt
Pt
+RDt−1
Dt−1
Pt
(1.5)
This equation states that consumption and savings are financed by real labor income wtNt, the
sum generated by previous period deposits,
RDt−1Dt−1
Pt
, and profits from banks and retailers,
ΠFt−1 + Π
B
t−1
Pt
. The representative household hence solves the problem:
JHt = max
[
ϕtU(Ct, Nt) + βEtJHt+1
]
s.t. (1.5)
where β is the household’s subjective discount factor and ϕt is a preference shock on the wedge
between consumption and leisure whose stochastic process is ϕt = ϕ
ρϕ
t−1e
ϕt with ϕt
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2ϕ).
A CRRA specification for U(Ct, Nt) = Ct
1−σ
1−σ − ϑtϑ¯N
1+φ
t
1+φ provides the first order conditions which
lead to the standard Euler equation of the baseline New Keynesian model and to the definition of
the real wage equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure:
λt = RDt βEt
Pt
Pt+1
λt+1 (1.6)
wt = ϑtϑ¯
Nφt
C−σt
(1.7)
where λt = ϕtC−σt is the marginal utility of consumption, ϑ¯ is a constant term and ϑt is a
preference shock on leisure whose stochastic process is ϑt = ϑ
ρϑ
t−1e
ϑt with ϑt
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2ϑ). The
unemployment is Ut = 1−Nt.
1.4.2 Wholesale firms
There exists a continuum of wholesale firms in the unit interval producing homogenous goods in a
competitive sector. The production function of the representative wholesale firm is:
Y wt = AtN
α
t (1.8)
where At is a productivity shock with unit mean, Et(At) = 1, and whose stochastic stationary
first-order autoregressive process is At = A
ρA
t−1e
At with At
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2A). The representative firm
must determines the labor demand. Its profit maximization problem is:
max
Y wt
µt
− wtRLt Nt
s.t. (1.8)
where µt is the is the mark up of the retail sector over the price of the wholesale good, Pt/Pwt ,
and the costs depend on the repayment of the loans received by banks, equal to the wage bill to
grant to the households plus the interest on loans. The first order condition with respect to the
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employment yields:
1
µt
=
wtR
L
t
mplt
(1.9)
where mplt = αAtN
α−1
t is the labor marginal productivity. Since the competitiveness of the
wholesale sector, the mark up 1µt is equal to the real marginal cost paid by the retail firms to buy
the homogenous good. Then 1µt = mct. Hence, the real marginal cost of the firms is the usual
ratio between the labor cost, wtRLt , and the labor marginal productivity, mplt.
1.4.3 Retail firms
Retail firms purchase the goods produced by the wholesale sector and transform them into the
differentiated products purchased by households. Hence, each firm is a monopolist of its sector.
Firms set prices according to the Calvo (1983) rule. Each period a firm can adjust its price with
probability 1− ω. Furthermore, it is Cit = Yit and the aggregate resource constraint is Ct = Yt.18
Moreover, we have Y wt = Ytft. where ft =
∫ (
Pit
Pt
)−ε
di is a price dispersion factor which disappear
in the log linearization version of the model.19 Then, in a symmetric equilibrium all firms set the
price, P ∗t = Pit, so as to maximize the expected lifetime profits subject to the demand:
max Et
∞∑
l=0
ωlβl
λt+1
λt
[(
P ∗t
Pt+l
)
−mct+l
]
Yit+l
s.t. Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt
This provides the price equation:
P ∗t
Pt
= Θ
Et
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβlmct+l
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε
C1−σt+l
Et
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβl
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε−1
C1−σt+l
(1.10)
where: Θ = εε−1 . Under flexible prices, equation (1.10) reduces to the standard Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987) equation:
P ∗t
Pt
= Θmct (1.11)
From (1.10) the usual (log-linearized) New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) is obtained:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κm̂ct + ψˆt (1.12)
where κ = (1−βω)(1−ω)ω and ψˆt = ρ
ψψˆt−1 +
ψ
t with 
ψ
t
i.i.d.∼ N
(
0, σ2ψ
)
is the log linearized version of
the cost push shock process ψt = ψ
ρψ
t−1e
ψt . The symbol "hat" denotes the percentage deviation of
a variable from its steady state value. The NKPC (1.12) can be expressed in terms of the output
gap xt = Yˆt − Yˆ qft where Yˆ qft = 1+φ[1+φ+α(σ−1)] Aˆt represents the quasi flexible equilibrium output:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κ(RˆLt + ϑˆt) + κτxt + ψˆt (1.13)
18For all models of section (1.4.4) the equilibrium condition Ct = Yt holds.
19See Galì (2008).
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where τ = [1+φ+α(σ−1)]α .
1.4.4 Banks
In this part of the work we assume five versions of the banking sector that lead to different
definitions of the interest rate on loans. In the following we define the interest rate credit spread
as SPt = RLt −RDt and its log linearized version is ŜP t =
RLRˆLt −RDRˆDt
SP
. So, it is evident that
the dynamics of the credit spread depends on both dynamics and steady state values of the loan
and policy rates. Moreover the interest rate pass-through is defined as the percentage deviation
of the interest rate on loans from its steady state value, RˆLt , minus that of the policy rate from
own steady state, RˆDt . Hence we have a complete, incomplete or more than complete interest rate
pass-through if
∂RˆLt
∂RˆDt
is equal, less or greater than 1, respectively.
The pure credit economy à la Wicksell
In this section we consider the simplest modelling of the banking sector according to the Wicksell’s
(1936) pure credit economy. Then we assume that banks do not possess their own capital and
they do not hold reserve. Further we assume that each bank operates with no costs, no default
problems exist and whole deposits collected from the households are advanced to the firms. The
optimal value function of the representative bank is:
JBt = max
(
RLt
Lt
Pt
−RDt
Dt
Pt
+ βEt
λt+1
λt
JBt+1
)
s.t. Lt = Dt +Xt
where Lt and Xt = Mt+1−Mt represent the amount of nominal loans (equal to the wage bill) and
the net position on the money market (cash injection), respectively. In all models of this work we
assume that deposits and money are perfect substitutes for the firms’ financing. The bank chooses
Dt. Its decision yields the last condition of the Wickesellian pure credit economy, i.e., the rate of
interest on loans is equal to that on deposits:
RLt = R
D
t (1.14)
The latter condition is considered by Ravenna and Walsh (2006) which assume perfect pass-
through. Moreover, the steady state version of equation (1.14) is RL = RD. The log-linearized
version of the previous equation is:
RˆLt = Rˆ
D
t (1.15)
The price mark-up assumption
In order to show a simple way to insert a price mark up in the relationship between the interest
rate on loans and the policy rate, we follow Chowdhury et al. (2006). Instead of providing an
explicit microfoundation of the financial imperfection by which the effects of the policy rate on
the banking lending rate can be amplified, they consider a continuously differentiable function
Ψ(RDt ) ∈ (0, 1), that summarizes the effects of the policy rate on the return of the loans. Then,
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the optimal value function of the representative bank is:
JBt = max
(
RLt
[
1−Ψ(RDt )
] Lt
Pt
−RDt
Dt
Pt
+ βEt
λt+1
λt
JBt+1
)
s.t. Lt = Dt +Xt
Its decision yields:
RLt
[
1−Ψ(RDt )
]
= RDt (1.16)
The steady state version of equation (1.16) is RL =
1
1−ΨR
D; its log-linearized version is:
RˆLt = (1 + ΨR) Rˆ
D
t + υˆt (1.17)
where ΨR = Ψ
′RD
1−Ψ . Hence, 1 + ΨR can be smaller or larger than one, depending on the sign of
the term ΨR.20 When we estimate the model we use the functional form Ψt =
[
1−Ψ0
(
RDt
)κ]
with 0 < Ψ0 < 1 and κ > 0. Then Ψ′t = −Ψ0κ
(
RDt
)κ−1 whereas the steady state interest rate on
loans becomes RL =
1
Ψ0
(
RD
)1−κ . Then, ΨR = −κ and RˆLt = (1− κ) RˆDt + υˆt. Furthermore we
append the exogenous shock υˆt to the equation of the banking lending rate whose no log-linearized
stochastic process is υt = υ
ρυ
t−1e
υt with υt
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2υ).21
The interest rate smoothing assumption
In order to insert smoothness in the loan rate dynamics we follow Kaufmann and Sharler (2009)
by assuming that banks are able to create loans using deposits by a function depending on the
current and past values of the banking lending rate. In particular, financial intermediaries solve
the following problem:
JBt = max
(
RLt
Lt
Pt
−RDt
Dt
Pt
+ βEt
λt+1
λt
JBt+1
)
s.t. Lt = Σ0
[
RLt(
RLt−1
)ζ0
]ζ1
(Dt +Xt)
where Σ0 > 0 and ζ1 > 0. Their decision yields:(
RLt
)1+ζ1 Σ0 (RLt−1)−ζ0ζ1 = RDt (1.18)
The steady state version of equation (1.18) is RL = Σ1
(
RD
)Σ2 where Σ1 = ( 1Σ0
)Σ2
and Σ2 =
1
[1 + (1− ζ0) ζ1] . Furthermore, the log-linearized version of equation (1.18) provides:
RˆLt =
1
1 + ζ1
RˆDt +
ζ0ζ1
1 + ζ1
RˆLt−1 + υˆt (1.19)
20Chowdhury et al. (2006) insert in the profit function of the financial intermediaries a managing cost of the loans
that allows to obtain a negative value of the term ΨR.
21The same shock is appended to the banking lending rate equation of the models reported in the next subsections.
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The previous equation states that the banking lending rate depends on the policy rate as well as
on the persistence factor due its past value. It is useful to note that when ζ0 = 0 we obtain the
Chowdhury et al. (2006)’s version (1.17) whereas for ζ1 = 0 we obtain the simple case with no
mark-up (1.15).
Monopolistic competition and Calvo’s rule
In this section, following Hülsewig et al. (2009) we assume that each wholesale firm holds a loan
portfolio diversified over all types of loans k ∈ [0, 1] offered by a banking sector which advances
loans under a monopolistic competition’s regime. They are aggregated in the following way:
Lt =
[∫ 1
0
L
η−1
η
kt dk
] η
η−1
(1.20)
where η > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between the different types of loans k. Each
firm minimizes the reimbursement of the loans demanded to the each monopolist bank k, Lkt, plus
the related banking lending rate RLkt, subject to the demand for loans of the individual firm (1.20):
min
∫ 1
0
LktR
L
kt
s.t. (1.20)
The first order condition with respect to Lkt yields:
Lkt =
(
RLkt
RLt
)−η
Lt (1.21)
where the gross loan interest rate is given by the aggregation of the banking lending rates of loan
types k: RLt =
[∫ 1
0
(
RLkt
)1−η
dk
] 1
1−η
. Further in this setting we assume that banks face Calvo’s
frictions when they set their interest rate on loans. Hence, only a fraction of the banks, 1−χ, can
be adjust their prices each period t whereas the fraction χ maintain the gross banking lending rate
unchanged. Then the aggregate interest rate on loans can be rewritten as:
RLt =
[
(1− χ) (RLt ∗)1−η + χ (RLt−1)1−η] 11−η (1.22)
Given each bank k holds the balance sheet Lkt = Dkt +Xkt, in a symmetric equilibrium all banks
set the price, RLt ∗ = RLkt, so as to maximize the expected lifetime profits subject to the loan
demand of the firms:
max Et
∞∑
l=0
χlβl
λt+l
λt
(
RL∗t −RDt+l
) Lkt+l
Pt+l
s.t. (1.21)
This provides the gross interest rate on loans equation identical for all banks:
RL∗t = Ξ
Et
∑∞
l=0 χ
lβl λt+lλt R
D
t+l(R
L
t+l)
η (Lt+l/Pt+l)
Et
∑∞
l=0 χ
lβl λt+lλt (R
L
t+l)η (Lt+l/Pt+l)
(1.23)
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where: Ξ = ηη−1 . Under flexible prices equation (1.23) implies that the optimal interest rate on
loans is a mark-up over the policy rate as already seen in the previous section:
RL∗t = ΞR
D
t (1.24)
Furthermore the steady state version of equation (1.23) is RL = ΞRD. By log linearizing the
equations (1.22) and (1.23) we obtain:22
RˆLt =
βχ
1 + βχ2
EtRˆ
L
t+1 +
χ
1 + βχ2
RˆLt−1 +
(1− βχ)(1− χ)
1 + βχ2
RˆDt + υˆt (1.25)
The previous condition states that the interest rate on loans depends on the its backward and
future values and on the policy rate. Moreover if χ = 0 we obtain the equality between the
banking lending and the policy rates.
Search and matching frictions
In this set up in order to obtain a loan a credit relationship between firms and banks has to created.
Hence a credit relation arises by the matching between the number of credit vacancies chosen by
banks, V Bt , and the demand for lines of credit, represented by the number of wholesale firms
searching for a bank, sFt = 1− (1−ρB)LNt−1, where ρB ∈ [0, 1] represents the exogenous separation
rate between firms and banks in the credit market, and LNt is the number of credit lines chosen by
banks. Then the number of new matches in the credit market, which are immediately transformed
into lines of credit, are determined by the matching function Ht = ς(V Bt )ξ(sFt )1−ξ, which is
homogeneous of degree one and increasing in its arguments, where ς is the credit market efficiency
constant and ξ is the elasticity of financial matches. Further pBt = Ht/sFt is the probability that a
firm matches with a credit vacancy posted by bank, and qBt = Ht/V Bt is the probability for a bank
of filling a posted credit vacancy. Finally, θCt ≡ sFt /V Bt is the aggregate tightness in the credit
market from the viewpoint of the firm. The lines of credit financing firms evolve according to:
LNt = (1− ρB)LNt−1 +Ht (1.26)
Then, being Lt = Dt +Xt, the problem of the representative bank is:
JBt = max
[
(RLt −RDt )
Lt
Pt
− kBRDt V Bt +RDt
Xt
Pt
+ βEt
λt+1
λt
JBt+1
]
s.t. (1.26)
where kB is the real posting credit vacancy cost. By maximizing with respect to V Bt , by remem-
bering that
Lt
Pt
= wtNtLNt and by using the envelope theorem with respect to LNt−123 we get what
22See the technical appendix for more details.
23The bank’s profit at time t is given by revenues minus costs. Revenues are given by the repayment of the real
loans financing wages plus interest, RLt
(
wtNtLNt
)
. Costs are equal to the repayment of deposits and money plus
interest, RDt
Dt
Pt
+RDt
Xt
Pt
= RDt
(
wtNtLNt + k
BV Bt
)
. By using the bank’s balance sheet, stating that deposits and
money finance the loans provided to firms and the repayment of the credit vacancies,
Dt
Pt
+
Xt
Pt
=
Lt
Pt
+ kBV Bt , the
profit function of the bank is straightforwardly obtained.
24 Incomplete Pass Through from Policy to Retail Interest Rates: a Critical Survey
we interpret as the "credit creating condition":
kBRDt
qBt
= (RLt −RDt )wtNt + (1− ρB)βEt
λt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
qBt+1
(1.27)
The loan interest rate is determined by the maximization of the Nash product between the firm
and bank surplus:
max(SFt )
z(SBt )
1−z (1.28)
where z represents the bargaining power of firms and SFt and SBt represent the surpluses of the
bank and of the firm respectively:
SFt =
Y wt
µt
− wtRLt Nt + (1− ρB)βEt
λt+1
λt
(1− pBt+1)SFt+1 (1.29)
SBt =
kBRDt
qBt
(1.30)
The maximization of the Nash product yields the interest rate on loans bargained by banks and
firms:
RLt =
(1− z)
wtNt
Y wt
µt
+
z
wtNt
[
RDt wtNt − (1− ρB)βEt
λt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
θCt+1
]
(1.31)
The interest rate on loans turns out to be a weighted average of the firm’s revenues, on one side,
and the rate of interest on deposits net the banks’ future expected present saving from maintaining
a credit relation with a firm, on the other side. The weights are the relative bargaining powers of
the agents. If z = 1 firms are able to obtain a loan interest rate equal to deposit interest rate net
the banks’ saving; if z = 0 banks are able to set a loan interest equal to the firm’s marginal profit.
By using equations (1.6) and (1.9), the log linearized version of equation (1.31) can be written in
the following way:
RˆLt = Λ1Rˆ
D
t + Λ2
[
Etθˆ
C
t+1 − EtRˆDt+1 +
(
wˆt + Nˆt − Etpˆit+1
)]
+ υˆt (1.32)
The term Λ1 = αzRL(α−1+z)
[
RD + (1−ρ
B)pB
wN
kB
qB
]
represents the direct pass-through from the pol-
icy rate, RˆDt , to the retail banking lending rate, RˆLt , whereas the coefficient Λ2 =
αz
RL(α−1+z)
(1−ρB)pB
wN
kB
qB
represents the indirect pass-through due to the credit frictions depending on the expected credit
market tightness EtθˆCt+1 and the expected policy rate EtRˆDt+1, and on the nominal value of the
loan (equal to the wage bill) lent to the generic wholesale firm. It is useful to note that the steady
state banking lending interest rate can be written as RL = ΥRD where Υ =
z
{
1+
(1−ρB)βpB
[1−(1−ρB)β]
}
{
1− (1−z)α + z(1−ρ
B)βpB
[1−(1−ρB)β]
}
is the mark-up over the steady state policy rate.24 If kB = 0 then Λ2 = 0 and (1.32) reduces
to RˆLt =
αz
(α− 1 + z) Υ Rˆ
D
t (mark-up assumption) whereas if kB = 0 and z = 1 then RˆLt = RˆDt
(complete pass-through).
Finally, following Becsi, Li and Wang (2005), we can provide a steady state equilibrium condi-
24See the technical appendix for the computation of the surplus of the agents, for the log linearization of the
interest rate on loans equation and for derivation of its steady state version.
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tion for endogenous entry of firms:
pB =
c(1− β)(1− β + βρB)
β
[(
Y w
µ
− wRLN
)
− (1− β)(1− ρB)c
] (1.33)
where c is the firms’ entry cost.
1.4.5 Monetary authorities
A central bank employs the following monetary rule to set the policy rate, which we assume for
simplicity equal to the rate on deposits:
RDt = (R
D
t−1)
ρR
(
Pt
Pt−1
)(1−ρR)δpi
(xt)(1−ρ
R)δxνt (1.34)
where ρR is the degree of interest rate smoothing and δpi and δx are the weights assigned to the
targets of inflation (Pt/Pt−1) and output gap, respectively. The stochastic term νt = ν
ρν
t−1e
νt
denotes a stationary first-order autoregressive monetary policy shock with νt
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2ν).
1.5 Estimation and Model Comparison
In this section we provide the estimation of the models described above. In particular we use the
Bayesian Monte Carlo method which allows an empirical performance comparison of the models
according to the information arising from the marginal distributions of the models. The Bayes
rule allows to get the posterior distribution of the model parameters conditioning on the prior
assumptions on the vector parameters κ ∈ K, the model Mj and the sample information Yt =
{yt}Tt=1:
P (κ/YT ,Mj) =
P (YT /κ,Mj)P (κ,Mj)
P (YT ,Mj)
(1.35)
where P (κ,Mj) is the prior distribution, P (YT /κ,Mj) represents the conditional distribution and
P (κ/YT ,Mj) is the posterior density. The latter distribution is computed by the numerical in-
tegration which, operationally, is obtained by the Kalman smother in order to approximate the
conditional distribution and by the Metropolis Hastings algorithm to implement the Monte Carlo
integration.
Furthermore, Bayesian procedures can be used in order to compare alternative models. This
aim is achieved by comparing the Bayes factor, i.e. the ratio between the probabilities of having
observed the data conditional to two different models. Hence, by considering the Bayes theorem,
assuming that the all alternative models are true, the posterior density in terms of two models is:
P (Mj , YT ) =
P (YT /Mj)P (Mj)
P (YT /Mj)P (Mj) + P (YT /Ms)P (Ms)
(1.36)
where P (YT /Mj) =
∫
P (YT /κj ,Mj)P (κj ,Mj)dκj is the marginal density and j 6= s. By consid-
ering the ratio between the posterior distributions of two models we get the posterior odds ratio,
POj,s, which coincides with the Bayes factor, Bj,s, when we have no prior model preferences, i.e.
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P (Mj)
P (Ms)
= 1:
POj,s =
P (Mj , YT )
P (Ms, YT )
=
P (YT /Mj)
P (YT /Ms)
= Bj,s (1.37)
The Bayes factor is an index which indicates both the acceptance (or not) of a model and its
relative evidence compared to another one. Following Schorfheide (2000) we compute the posterior
(marginal) log-likelihood of the models by employing the Laplace approximation method. In order
to select the model which is more supported by the empirical evidence we employ the Jeffrey’s
(1961) method which scale the evidences provided by the log-Bayes factors of different models.25
In the following we compare the models which can generate an incompleteness of the interest
rate pass-through. Hence, we do not consider the pure credit economy scenario where, given the
assumptions, the incompleteness in the transmission of the monetary policy cannot exist; instead
we study the other four scenarios and we denote the model with the mark-up assumption as model
A, the model with the smoothness factor as model B, the model in which there is monopolistic
competition in the banking sector and where the pricing is subject to a Calvo’s rule as model C,
and the model which incorporates search and matching frictions in the credit market as model D.
1.5.1 Sensitivity Analysis: Mapping Stability
The prior assumptions have a relevant role in the Bayesian estimation procedure. As a matter
of fact, it is possible that some parameter values which are plausible for a model may not be
for another alternative model. Then we employ a stability mapping analysis which identifies the
stability domain of the models as well as the values of the parameters driving in indeterminacy and
instability. This procedure is helpful in order to choice in a better way the priors. In particular a
Monte Carlo simulation is performed in order to detect what parameters mostly drive the model
into a specific region.
According to Ratto (2008) we consider two regions: an acceptable stable region G satisfying the
standard Blanchard-Kahn rank condition and an unacceptable region G caused by the instability
and indeterminacy. Hence, in order to explore all the prior space we sample uniformly from the prior
distributions defined above and we categorize each parameter into the two alternative regions. The
sample is generated using a Sobol’s quasi Monte Carlo sequence of dimension N = 2048. Hence,
we get two subsets, (κs/G) of size n and
(
κs/G
)
of size n representing draws from the unknown
probability density functions fn (κs/G) and fn (κs/G) respectively, where κ is the vector of the
parameters, s is the parameter’s index and n+n = N . Finally the identification of the parameters
(and their relative values) driving in the (un)acceptable region is defined by the comparison of the
previous density functions by the two-sided Smirnov-Kolmogorov test:
dn,n = sup ||Fn (κs/G)− Fn (κs/G) ||
where Fn (κs/G) and Fn (κs/G) are the cumulative distribution functions (cdf) of the generic
parameter κs. Given the null hypothesis fn (κs/G) = fn (κs/G) and the significance level at which
it is rejected, if for a parameter κs the two distributions are significantly different (a larger dn,n),
it is possible define the parameter as a key driver of the model behavior as well as the values of
the parameter space leading in one region or in other one. Alternately, if the distance between the
distributions is not significant, κs is not important for the model’s dynamics and its values can
25Model j is supported if Bj,s ≥ 1. On the other hand, there are a slight, moderate, decisive or strong evidence
against the model j if 10−
1
2 ≤ Bj,s < 1, 10−1 ≤ Bj,s < 10−
1
2 , 10−2 ≤ Bj,s < 10−1 and Bj,s < 10−2 , respectively.
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belong, indifferently, either to G or G.
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Par. Stab Indet. Instab. Stab Indet. Instab. Stab Indet. Instab. Stab Indet. Instab.
φ 0.1500 0.0783 - - - 0.1610 0.0834 - - - 0.1510 0.0790 - - - 0.1170 0.0492 0.1720
δpi 0.8620 0.4510 - - - 0.8580 0.4440 - - - 0.8650 0.4520 - - - 0.5780 0.3040 0.4290
δx 0.0620 0.0324 - - - 0.0527 0.0272 - - - 0.0469 0.0245 - - - 0.0571 0.0292 0.0861
ρR 0.0499 0.0261 - - - 0.0518 0.0268 - - - 0.0398 0.0208 - - - 0.0482 0.0344 0.2440
κ 0.0136 0.0071 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ψ0 0.0110 0.0057 - - - - - - - - - - - -
ζ0 - - - 0.0200 0.0103 - - - - - - - - -
ζ1 - - - 0.0128 0.0066 - - - - - - - - -
Σ0 - - - 0.0216 0.0112 - - - - - - - - -
χ - - - - - - 0.0233 0.0122 - - - - - -
η - - - - - - 0.0264 0.0138 - - - - - -
ρB - - - - - - - - - 0.0711 0.0378 0.1380
ξ - - - - - - - - - 0.0264 0.0192 0.1630
z - - - - - - - - - 0.0426 0.0549 0.7040
kB - - - - - - - - - 0.0307 0.0141 0.0655
c - - - - - - - - - 0.1440 0.0936 0.4640
ρA 0.0126 0.0066 - - - 0.0096 0.0050 - - - 0.0136 0.0071 - - - 0.0247 0.0100 0.1130
ρν 0.0118 0.0062 - - - 0.0151 0.0078 - - - 0.0107 0.0056 - - - 0.0276 0.0125 0.1010
ρυ 0.0113 0.0059 - - - 0.0145 0.0075 - - - 0.0107 0.0056 - - - 0.0262 0.0130 0.0882
ρϕ 0.0101 0.0053 - - - 0.0114 0.0059 - - - 0.0091 0.0047 - - - 0.0261 0.0151 0.0934
ρϑ 0.0130 0.0068 - - - 0.0096 0.0050 - - - 0.0148 0.0077 - - - 0.0207 0.0121 0.1380
ρψ 0.0144 0.0075 - - - 0.0129 0.0066 - - - 0.0110 0.0057 - - - 0.0331 0.0137 0.0834
Table 1.1: Smirnov-Kolmogorov statistics in driving stability, indetrminacy and instability.
From the Monte Carlo filtering procedure we get that 52.3 percent, 51.7 percent, 52.2 percent
and 46 percent of the prior support is stable for model A, B, C and D respectively. The remaining
part gives indeterminacy (47.7 percent, 48.3 percent, 47.8 percent and 51.2 percent) and instability
(zero, zero, zero and 2.8 per cent). By running the Smirnov-Kolmogorov test we can highlight that,
in models A, B, C and D, indeterminacy is essentially driven by δpi. In particular, by comparing
the cdf of the sample producing indeterminacy with the cdf of the original prior sample we find that
small values of δpi drive to indeterminacy. Table 1.1 reports the detailed results of the Smirnov-
Kolmogorov tests.
1.5.2 Data
We use 6 observables for the U.S.: real GDP, employment, real wage, inflation, the federal funds
rate and the weighted average effective loan rate. For a description of the data, see the appendix.
The sample period is 1997:Q2 - 2011:Q4. We use the logarithmic transformation for the quarterly
interest rates, i.e. log(1 +
rjt
100
) where j = D,L whereas the inflation rate is computed as the
quarter on quarter logarithmic difference of nominal prices. All remaining data are transformed
by employing the logarithmic first difference operator. Figure 1.3 plots the transformed data.
1.5.3 Calibrated Parameters
In this section we set the values of the calibrated parameters of the model. Table 1.2 reports them.
Due to the large consensus on the quarterly value of the discount factor by the economic literature,
we impose β equal to 0.996 so as to obtain a quarterly real steady state rate on deposits RD =
1.0035 (de Walque, Pierrard and Rouabah, 2010). Further, we assume a logarithmic form for the
utility function over consumption (σ = 1). As widely accepted by the literature on the subject
matter we calibrate the sticky price parameter ω = 0.8. The previous impositions imply that the
coefficient attached to the real marginal costs into the equation (1.12) is κ = (1−βω)(1−ω)ω = 0.0507.
In line with the empirical observations we calibrate the elasticity of output to employment, α, equal
to 0.66. Finally, according to Ravenna and Walsh (2008) we set the steady state employment N
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Figure 1.3: Data.
equal to 0.95, and the elasticity of substitution of the individual goods ε equal to 6 such that the
mark-up of the retail sector over the price of the wholesale good is 20 per cent (µ =1.2).
Calibrated Parameter β σ ω α N ε
Value 0.996 1 0.8 0.66 0.95 6
Table 1.2: Calibrated Parameters.
1.5.4 Priors
In this section, based on the indications of the sensitivity analysis, we declare the prior distributions
of the remaining deep models’ parameters. The shape of the distributions is chosen according the
standard practise: for parameters defined in a [0 − 1] interval we assume the beta distribution
whereas for parameters which can take values over the whole support R we adopt the normal
distribution. For parameters assuming values over the [0 − ∞] interval we assume the gamma
distribution. Finally, the reference distribution for the structural shocks is the inverted gamma
which is defined over the range R+.
For the monetary policy rule parameters we employ values widely used by the literature. Hence,
for the coefficients attached to the expected inflation and output gap terms, δpi and δx respectively,
we assume a normal distribution with prior mean 2.0 and 0.1 and a standard error equal to 1.00
and 0.05 respectively; for the autoregressive coefficient ρR defining the degree of the interest rate
smoothness we assume a beta distribution with prior mean 0.5 and standard error 0.25. For the all
persistence parameters of the autoregressive stochastic processes of the model exogenous shocks,
we assume a beta distribution with prior mean of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.1. The inverse
labor supply Frish elasticity parameter φ is assumed normal distributed with prior mean equal to
0.5 and standard error equal to 0.25.
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Concerning the credit market parameters we have not many references on possible prior values.
Kaufmann and Sharler (2009) estimate for the U.S.
1
1 + ζ1
= 0.95 and
ζ0ζ1
1 + ζ1
= 0.03 from which
it is possible to get ζ1 = 0.0526 and ζ0 = 0.6, and by the steady state version of equation (1.18),
Σ0 = 0.98. Hence, we decide to use the previous estimates as prior means with ζ1 and Σ0 gamma
distributed with standard errors equal to 0.0263 and 0.49 respectively and ζ0 normal distributed
with standard error equal to 0.3. Furthermore, by using the identity principle of polynomials26
between the steady state versions of the banking lending rate by Kaufmann and Sharler (2009)
when ζ0 = 0 and by Chowdhury et al. (2006), we are able to derive the values of the parameters
which we use as prior means for the functional form of Ψt when the price mark-up assumption
is done. In particular, we assume a gamma distribution for κ and Ψ0, with prior mean equal
to 0.05 and 0.97 and standard error equal to 0.25 and 0.485, respectively. Under the scenario in
which there is monopolistic competition in the banking sector for the Calvo’s parameter describing
the share of banks that can adjust their banking lending rates, χ, we assume a uninformative
position by employing a beta distribution with prior mean equal to 0.5 and standard error equal to
0.25. Furthermore, for the elasticity of substitution between different loans η, we assume a gamma
distribution with mean 6 and standard error 3 subject to the requirement η > 1. Also for the
search and matching framework we have limited evidence. Hence, we adopt a gamma distribution
for the credit vacancy posting cost with mean value equal to its labor market counterpart, i.e.
kB = 0.1, and standard error equal to 0.05. The prior on the firm’s entry cost c is harder to set, so
we assume a rather widespread gamma distribution with a mean of 25 and a standard deviation
of 12.5. For the matching function elasticity ξ and for the firms’ bargaining power z we assume
an uninformative position by considering a beta distribution with prior mean equal to 0.5 and
standard error equal to 0.25 for both. Finally for the separation rate ρB we adopt the strategy
of setting its value between the minimal (0.07) and maximal (0.02) values of the bankruptcy rate
calibrated by Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (1998). As a consequence, the separation rate in the credit
market is assumed beta distributed with prior mean 0.05 and standard error equal to 0.025.
Finally, for all standard deviation of the exogenous shocks we use the inverted gamma distri-
bution as prior distribution with mean equal to 0.01 with two degrees of freedom.27
1.5.5 Posteriors Estimates
Table 1.3 summarizes the posterior mode and the posterior mean for the models’ parameters. The
panel also shows the 90 percent probability intervals for the models’ parameters and the relative
prior assumptions. Draws from the posterior distributions are obtained by running the random
walk version of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. We ran ten parallel chains, each with a length
of 100,000 replications.28
The posterior mean estimates of the credit market parameters are generally close to the respec-
tive modal values with the some exceptions. The model A highlights values of the parameters κ
26See the technical appendix.
27In order to simulate the model we add some measurement equations linking the log-levels of the variables with
their log-differences. We assume these equations contain a constant term that we estimate. Hence for these terms,
in the estimation phase, we assume a normal distribution and we adopt the strategy to set the prior mean equal
to the sample mean of the time series to which the constant refers, and a standard error which implies a prior
pseudo-t-value equal to 2. Table 1.3 does not report the constats’ estimates. More details are available from the
author upon request.
28The fraction of drops of the initial parameters vector is set at 20%. The calibration of the scale factor provides
acceptance rates between 30 and 45 percent for the ten blocks of the four models. For the application of the Bayesian
estimation and of the sensitivity analysis we employ the latest stable version (4.2.1) of the open-source software
Dynare.
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and Ψ which are larger than their modal values. Further, κ is smaller than its prior. The model
B shows values of the parameters ζ0 and ζ1 which are smaller and larger than their prior means,
respectively. The model C presents a value of the elasticity of substitution between the different
types of loans, η, which is larger then its modal value but close to its prior mean. Moreover, the
fraction of banks which cannot adjust their loan rate, χ, is very low. On other hand, the model D
gets a value of the entry cost c whose posterior mean is lower than the relative modal and prior
values. The estimates of the credit market parameters imply low values of the matching elasticity
ξ and of the bargaining power of banks 1− z. The estimates of the separation rate between firms
and banks ρB and of the posting cost kB are in line with their prior and modal values. For all
four models the estimates of the monetary policy parameters and of the inverse labor supply Frish
elasticity parameter are in line with the literature on the subject matter.
1.6 Simulation
In this section we plot the impulse response functions of the interest rates with respect to the policy
and technology shocks of the models described in section 1.4.4 in order to compare the degree of
the (in)completeness of the pass-through of the policy rate to the banking lending rate (Figure
1.4), and the dynamics of the credit spread when a productivity shock hits the economy (Figure
1.5).
1.6.1 Monetary Shock
With nominal rigidities on good prices, a monetary tightening implies an increase of the policy
rate that produces a higher real interest rate. This rise determines a substitution effect between
current and future consumption: households decrease current spending and both the output and
the output gap fall. The decrease in the demand of goods implies a lower labor demand by firms:
employment and wages fall and the rise in the marginal product of labor leads to lower real marginal
costs. By the NKPC, inflation goes down.
In the mark-up scenario the dynamics of the banking lending rate crucially depends on the
value of the parameter ΨR which reflects the competitiveness of the U.S. financial sector (system):
since its estimated value is close to 1 then the responses of the policy and banking lending rates are
almost identical. Only in the first three periods we can note a small difference between the interest
rates. The magnitude of the previous gap is basically the same if we add a persistence factor like
that of model B. Given the estimated value of the factor
ζ0ζ1
1 + ζ1
(0.03), in this case the banking
lending rate show a less reaction than that of the policy rate only in the first period. Of course,
the higher the value of the smoothness factor, the greater is the persistence of the dynamics of the
interest rate on loans.
Under the Calvo’s mechanism, by the nominal rigidities on the banking lending rates, only
a share of firms can modify the own interest rate on loans, and so the average interest banking
lending rate of the economy reacts less than the policy rate. Of course, the magnitude of these
reactions depends on the value of the fraction of banks χ that maintains the gross banking lending
rate unchanged: the higher the value of χ the greater the degree of incompleteness of the interest
rate pass through.
When search and matching frictions are present in the credit market, the decrease in the wage
bill attenuates the borrowing demand to the banks. The expected profits of banks decrease. Banks
try to reduce their vacancy posting activity such that the number of the new financial matches and
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of the lines of credit fall. Then the number of firms searching for a line of credit jumps up. As a
consequence a more congestion effect in the credit market is highlighted: the credit line finding rate
decreases, the credit vacancy filling rate increases and the credit market tightness goes up. The
latter dynamics, together the bargaining mechanism of the interest rate on loans affected by the
posting costs of the credit vacancies imply that the bargained banking lending rate rises slightly
less than the policy rate when a positive policy shock hits the economy. Hence, in the search and
matching model the values of the expected posting cost
kBRDt
qBt
and of the banks’ bargaining power
(1− z) affect the interest rate dynamics such that their larger values imply more incompleteness
of the interest rate pass-through.
Figure 1.4: IRFs with respect to a monetary shock.
1.6.2 Technology Shock
Due to the sticky prices and to the weak accommodation of the policy rule to the TFP shock,
the increase of the productivity implies an increase of the output supplied by firms less than
proportional of the increase of the TFP level (Galì and Rabanal, 2004). Since the potential output
augments more than the actual output, then the output gap declines. This implies a less labor
demand by firms: employment decreases as well as the marginal costs. As a matter of fact only
a fraction of the firms can adjust their prices in line with the decline of the marginal costs: if
this fraction is sufficiently small and if monetary policy does not strongly accommodate the shock,
then the price level of the economy will decrease and the more demand for goods will be satisfied
with a less labor input in line with the finding by Galì (1999) (productivity employment puzzle).
Finally the positive response of the real wage, by equation (1.7), depends on the income effect
(which affect the demand for goods) and the substitution effect (which affects the labor demand)
influenced by the price dynamics and by the set of parameters used to simulate the models.
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Figure 1.5 highlights the response of credit spread with respect to the TFP shock. Similarly to
the case in which the economy is hit by a policy rate shock, the dynamics of the Bayesian impulse
response function of the credit spread of models A and B are almost identical: a very slight gap
is highlighted. A similar dynamics is observable when we simulate a model with monopolistic
competition in the banking sector: in this case we obtain a small cushioned dynamics of the
interest rate on loans compared to that of the policy rate which determines a less countercyclical
behavior of the credit spread than models A and B.
A different evidence is observable by considering the scenario in which the search and matching
frictions affect the credit market. In this scheme, since firms do not have their own capital, they
must match with a bank in order to obtain a line of credit. The rise in the supply of goods implies
an increase in the expected profits of banks: the interest rate on loans depends both on the revenues
and on the wage bill of firms, so the larger is the firms’ surplus the higher is the interest rate on
loans that banks are trying to obtain from firms. As a consequence, there is a more intensive
credit vacancy posting activity: financial matches and lines of credit boost. This increase forces
the fall of the number of firms searching for a line of credit. In the credit market there is a lower
congestion effect from the point of view of firms: the credit vacancy filling rate goes down, the
credit line finding rate goes up and the credit market tightness drops. This implies a decrease of
the banking lending rate. In this case the interest rate spread becomes more countercyclical than
all other models. As a matter of fact, put in other terms, and by referring to Beaubrun-Diant
and Tripier (2009), in this scenario when a TFP shock hits the economy, the procyclical effect
due to the increase of the banks’ profits is more than offset by the countercyclical effect - which is
not present in the other three models - due to the modification of the external opportunities (by
changes of the threat points and values of matches) of firms which implies more ease of finding a
loan or a lower expected time to obtain a line of credit. Furthermore in this scenario the steady
state effect encapsuled in the value of RL has a more weight than the other models in the definition
of the magnitude of the credit spread.29
1.6.3 Bayesian Comparison
Finally, as anticipated in section (1.5), on the basis of the Bayesian model selection we are able to
compare the previous models. Considering the Laplace approximation, the posterior log-likelihoods
of models A, B, C and D are 1153.15, 1154.25, 1152.33 and 1150.29 respectively. The Bayes
factors are BA,B = e[logP (YT /MA)−logP (YT /MB)] = e−1.10, BA,C = e[logP (YT /MA)−logP (YT /MC)] =
e0.82, BA,D = e[logP (YT /MA)−logP (YT /MD)] = e2.86, BB,C = e[logP (YT /MB)−logP (YT /MC)] = e1.92,
BB,D = e[logP (YT /MB)−logP (YT /MD)] = e3.96 and BC,D = e[logP (YT /MC)−logP (YT /MD)] = e2.04. This
indicates, according to Jeffrey’s (1961) scale of equivalence, an evidence in favor of Model B.
Hence, a model in which the banking lending rate depends on its past value as well as on the
policy rate seems to be more supported than other models emphasizing the role assumed by the
past value of the banking lending rate in shaping the interest rate dynamics. Then, we modify the
search and matching framework by introducing a backward looking social norm for the banking
lending rate in a fashion similar to Christoffel and Linzert (2005) and Hall (2005) for the real wage.
We assume that the actual loan rate is equal to a weighted average of its past loan rate and the
equilibrium (bargained) loan rate, RˆLNt , defined by equation (1.32):
RˆLt = (1− %)RˆLNt + %RˆLt−1
29Beaubrun-Diant and Tripier (2009) show another countercyclical effect due to the modification of the idiosyn-
cratic productivity reservations of the agents. They conclude for an overall countercylical effect of the credit spread.
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Figure 1.5: IRFs with respect to a technology shock.
where % denotes the degree of the loan rate rigidity. Then we estimate the new model that we label
as E by considering the same priors assumed for the model D and by employing a beta distribution
with prior mean 0.5 and standard error 0.25 for the degree of loan rate rigidity %.30
The Bayesian estimation provides % = 0.65 showing a discrete dependence of the actual loan
rate on its past value. Figure 1.6 shows the comparison of posterior IRFs of models D and E.
In the top panel we can observe that when a positive interest rate shock hits the economy the
interest rate pass-through becomes more incomplete compared to the benchmark model whereas
the bottom panel shows that in presence of a positive TFP shock the credit spread is slightly
procyclical. The first result depends on the loan rate stickiness that adds persistence and on
the not optimal adjustment of the banking lending rate when search and matching frictions are
present in the credit market. The second finding is determined by a more weight of the procyclical
component due to the increase of the banks’ profits by the rise of the share of which banks can
appropriate given the more firms’ revenues.31 Furthermore, the posterior log-likelihood of model
E is 1156.98. Hence the new Bayes factors are: BA,E = e[logP (YT /MA)−logP (YT /ME)] = e−3.83,
BB,E = e[logP (YT /MB)−logP (YT /ME)] = e−2.73, BC,E = e[logP (YT /MC)−logP (YT /ME)] = e−4.65 and
BD,E = e[logP (YT /MD)−logP (YT /ME)] = e−6.43. Finally, the Bayesian model selection analysis allow
us to highlight a decisive evidence in favor of a model in which the loan rate depends, on one hand,
on the price bargained by firms and banks on the basis of their bargaining powers, and on the
other hand, on its past value.
30Similar results are obtained by fixing % = 0.5. It is useful to note that the steady state version of the model
does not change because RL = RLN .
31A complete description of the estimate of model E is available upon request from the author.
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Figure 1.6: Interest rate pass-through (monetary shock) and credit spread (TFP shock) under loan
rate rigidity.
1.7 Conclusions
The recent crises has shown that the reduction of the monetary policy rate by major Central Banks
has not been completely transmitted to the bank retail rates. In particular, the incompleteness of
this pass-through was more prominent in the loan market. So, understanding the causes of this
phenomena becomes relevant in order to address the monetary policy strategy.
This chapter helps to clear out the theoretical devices that allow to highlight an imperfect
adjustment of the loan rates to variations of policy rate. In particular, after providing a broad
description of the theoretical and empirical literature of the phenomenon confirmed by a Bayesian
VAR analysis, we survey the main theoretical mechanisms reported by the literature on the subject
matter.
By using the Bayesian procedures we estimate and compare four different models: one in which
the banking lending rate is a mark-up of the policy rate, one in which it depends on the policy
rate as well as on its past value, one characterized by monopolistic competition in the banking
sector and another one in which search and matching frictions are present in the credit market. In
particular the search and matching frictions’ model shows a degree of the incompleteness of interest
rate pass-through similar to that of the Calvo’s model. The simulation with respect to technology
shock provides a larger countercyclical credit spread in the search and matching framework than
that of the Calvo’s model.
Finally, the Bayesian comparison provides a positive evidence in favor of the models in which
the banking lending rate depends on its past value and on policy rate. According to this evidence
we employ a model in which the interest rate on loans is a weighted average between its past value
and a bargained interest rate on loans depending on search and matching frictions in the credit
market. This specification has the greatest favorable evidence among the models presented in this
36 Incomplete Pass Through from Policy to Retail Interest Rates: a Critical Survey
survey.
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Chapter 2
An Estimated DSGE Model with
Search and Matching Frictions in
the Credit Market†
Financial frictions have become fundamental to study the business cycle and the dynamics of the
credit market. This chapter improves this literature by introducing a search and matching scheme
in the financial market into a cash in advance New Keynesian DSGE theoretical model. We provide
an alternative explanation of the degree of incompleteness in the pass-through from policy rate
to loan rates depending on the credit market tightness, on the search costs sustained by banks,
and on the relative powers of the agents in the loan interest rate bargaining. The model is able to
reproduce the empirical evidence of a positive response of the real wages and the countercyclical
behavior of the credit spread with respect to a positive technology shock without the use of real or
nominal wage rigidities. Finally a scenario in which a credit shock hits the economy is proposed.
The model is estimated by using the Bayesian procedures.
2.1 Introduction
The recent financial crises has contributed to increase the attention to the credit market. In
particular, several works show the existence of frictions in financial markets but their significance
in the transmission of exogenous shocks to the economy is controversial. In the financial accelerator
literature,1 in presence of asymmetric information, the amplification of the main macroeconomic
variables depends on the firms’ ability to borrow, that is linked to a market value of their net
worth which is inversely related to the external finance premium.2 Other recent contributions
argue instead that financial frictions - in a modeling set up where the banking sector plays an
active role in the determination of the price of credit or the supply of financial assets - produce
†We wish to thank P. Benigno, G. Ciccarone, F. Giuli, S. Neri, F. M. Signoretti, M. Tancioni and the participants
in a seminar held at the Bank of Italy on 21st December 2011. The views expressed herein are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Italy.
1See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996, 1999), Calstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) for more details on quan-
titative analysis in partial and general equilibrium frameworks.
2The definition of external finance premium is different from that of corporate credit spread. The former is
the wedge between the rate of return on capital and the risk-free rate; the latter one is the difference between the
contractual loan interest rate and the risk-free rate. See Levin, Natalucci and Zakrajsek (2004) for more details.
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an attenuator effect, i.e., a moderation of the responses of the main macroeconomic variables to
expansionary shocks.3 Further, the experience of the recent financial turmoil has confirmed what a
strand of literature had argued before the crises, i.e., that shifts in policy rates were not completely
passed through to retail (market) banking lending rates, even though significant differences existed
in the degree of incompleteness which was experienced across countries. The phenomenon was
particularly sharp in the Euro Area.4 During the financial crisis, the transmission of policy rate
changes to retail rates has become less efficient in this Area (Čihák, Harjes and Stavrev, 2009).
The empirical literature also shows another important finding: the interest rate spread and the
banking markups are countercyclical and account for large fraction of the variance of the business
cycle fluctuations (Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajšek, 2009). Chen (1991) and Fama and French
(1989) show as the difference between the average yields on BAA rated and AAA-rated corporate
bonds rises during recessions and fall during business cycle booms. Corvoisier and Gropp (2002)
confirm the countercyclical movement of the credit spread for 11 European countries. The same
result is found by Olivero (2010) for the loan margin of many OECD and no OECD countries by
using different methods.5
By introducing search and matching frictions in the credit market into the standard New
Keynesian DSGE model without wage rigidities, the aim of this chapter is to better understand
the role of the financial frictions in shaping the business cycle. First of all we want to investigate
on the phenomenon of the interest rate pass-through. In particular we want to show how credit
matching frictions help to highlight the limited response of the loan rate charged by commercial
banks when a Central Bank modifies the policy rate. Second, we show how the search and matching
scheme is useful to study the cyclical behavior of the credit spread - that in this work we define
as the difference between the banking lending and the policy rates - with respect to a positive
technology shock.6 Then, we focus on the dynamics of the main macroeconomic variables when
positive technology and credit efficiency shocks hit the economy. In particular, we analyze the
response of the real wages, employment and inflation. Finally, the use of the Bayesian techniques
allow us to estimate some deep market parameters that can be useful for the study of credit and
financial markets. As a matter of fact, as stressed by Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (1998), the role
of these parameters for the credit market is relevant: they show that the bargaining power of
banks and the speeds at which new loans become available and at which banks recall existing
loans are fundamental in explaining the dynamic relationship between aggregate banking lending
and interest rate changes in a model where search and matching between banks and investors are
present. In our work, a special attention must be made on the estimated value of the bargaining
power of banks which plays a crucial role for the limited response of the banking lending rate to
policy rate shock.
In the present economy, before production begins, wholesale competitive firms producing a
homogeneous good search for lines of credit posted by banks. The firms matching with a credit
vacancy posted by banks obtain from them the advances necessary to pay households for the wage
3Goodfriend and McCallum (2007)’s model is able to highlight a banking attenuator effect if the monetary shock
has a very large volatility. Gerali, Neri, Sessa and Signoretti (2010) find that the sluggishness of the adjustment
of bank retes moderates the amplification effect of the financial frictions of their model. Similarly, the imperfect
competition in the financial intermediation sector produces attenuation in Andrés and Arce (2008) and Aslam and
Santoro (2008)’s models.
4See, e.g., de Bondt (2005); Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003); Gambacorta (2008); de Bondt, Mojon and
Valla (2005); Hofmann (2006). More details are provided by the empirical survey by Kwapail and Scharler (2006).
A recent review of the literature on the loan rate pass-through in the euro area is in Kobayashi (2008).
5See also Dueker and Thornton (1997) for the U.S.
6Beaubrun-Diant and Tripier (2009) study the cyclical behavior of the credit spread by using search and matching
frictions in the credit market in a partial equilibrium analysis.
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bill. Production can then start. At the end of the period wholesale production is sold to retail
firms transforming the homogeneous good into differentiated goods bought by households. Loans
are then repaid and households receive profit income from banks and firms, and the principal plus
interest on deposits from banks. A fraction of the wholesale firms producing in a given period -
determined on the basis of a exogenous separation rate specifying the fraction of credit matches
which are destroyed at the end of the production period - obtain loans also in the next period.
The other firms have to go afresh into the process of search in the credit market.
We are not the first to analyze the role of search and matching technology in the credit market.7
Along the lines of Diamond (1990), Becsi, Li and Wang (2005, 2009) introduce search and matching
frictions in a credit market where borrowers and lenders try to establish a credit relationship and
bargain over the interest rate consistent with the optimal loan contract. De Haan, Ramey and
Watson (2003) study the lenders-borrowers relationships in a search and matching framework
where the agents contract the liquidity allocation along with the entrepreneur’s effort choice.
Vesala (2007) applies the matching frictions by an "urn ball" process8 to the financial markets in
an economy with asymmetric information.9
This chapter differs from previous cited works on search and matching in the credit market
because we consider a general equilibrium model. Furthermore, differently from De Haan, Ramey
and Watson (2003), and Becsi, Li and Wang (2005) we disregard the heterogeneity of agents.
Moreover, in order to focus on the role of matching frictions, we do not consider the moral hazard
problem and the incentive frictions highlighted by Vesala (2007) and Becsi, Li and Wang (2005,
2009). We also depart from the previous contributions in other several aspects. First, whereas
in the De Haan, Ramey and Watson (2003)’s model the anticipation of the funds, in terms of
goods, is determined by a liquidity allocation rule, we adopt a cash in advance (CIA) setup which
requires banks to advance the funds necessary to pay for a variable wage bill depending on the real
wage and employment. Households choose consumption, employment and the level of deposits,
and the banking sector maximizes its profits with respect to the number of vacancies to post and
the lines of credit to offer.10 As in Becsi, Li and Wang (2005) we improve on the standard pairwise
matching model by Diamond (1990) by allowing for the endogenous entry of firms in the steady
state equilibrium. Finally, differently from all previous works, in our model the bargained interest
rate on loans depends on the policy (deposit) rate: this allows us to study how the monetary
7The search and matching scheme is also used to model other markets. In particular, this technology is widely
used to study the dynamics of the labor market where firms and workers bargain over the wage rate after obtaining a
match (Pissarides, 2000; Shimer, 2005; Gertler, Sala and Trigari, 2008). In housing market matching models, sellers
and buyers meet to sell and buy an house, respectively; the housing market price is the result of a bargaining process
(Weathon, 1990; Albrecht et al., 2007; Genesove and Han, 2010). Mathä and Pierrard (2011) propose a search and
matching scheme for the product market between the wholesale firms offering their products by adversiting and
marketing, and retail firms asking for wholesale products in order to refill their stores and enlarge their selection.
The trade price is subject to the bargaining mechanism. A first attempt to model the good market by introducing
search and matching frictions is in Diamond (1982b). A recent review of the literature on the search and matching
theory is provided by the the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences for the Prize in Economic Sciences 2010.
8As compared to the pairwise matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the "urn ball" process
allows for the possibility that entrepreneurs have multiple simultaneous contacts with different financiers. The price
formation is hence provided by an auction rather than a bargaining mechanism.
9Recent works employ models embedding search and matching frictions in several interdipendent markets. In-
teractions between the good and the labor market are studied by Lehmann and Van der Linden (2010); search
frictions in both the credit and labor market are analyzed by Wasmer and Weil (2004), Nicoletti and Pierrard
(2006), Beaubrun-Diant and Tripier (2009), Ernst and Semmler (2010) and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2010a);
a first attempt to study the simultaneos interdipendence of good, labor and credit market under search and matching
frictions is provided by Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2010b).
10In the De Haan, Ramey and Watson (2003)’s model there is only a good that can be consumed or invested
through lenders, whereas Becsi, Li and Wang (2005) assume lenders as a rudimetal moneyholders which are a fusion
of households and financial intermediaries.
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policy affects the determination of the banking lending rate and, by this rate, the dynamics of the
economic system.
This work contributes to highlight the effects of exogenous shocks on the economy by focusing on
the credit (liquidity) market. Our general conclusion is that financial frictions play an important
role in shaping the economy’s dynamics by the credit cost channel of monetary policy.11 As
compared to the previous work on search and matching frictions in the credit market, this chapter
also improves the literature of the degree of (in)completeness of the interest rate pass-through
of bank rates to changes of the policy rate. As a matter of fact the theoretical framework we
adopt proposes a new explanation of the sluggish adjustment of the banking lending rates to
modifications of the policy rate based on the search costs in the credit market and the bargaining
mechanism which determines the interest rate on loans.12 Second, we confirm the countercyclical
dynamics of the credit spread13 in presence of technology shocks depending on the modification
of the surplus of firms and banks which affects the bargained loan rate. Third, the response of
the model to a productivity shock reproduces the standard dynamics of the main macroeconomic
variables including the short run decline of the employment known as the productivity employment
puzzle. In particular a positive response of the real wage without the introduction of nominal or real
wage rigidities is highlighted.14 Further, we show that an exogenous credit efficiency shock - which
we can interpret as a cost push shock - hitting the economy determines, by the financial frictions,
a variation of the interest rate on loans such that the real marginal costs vary and then the real
activity is affected in a positive way. Finally, we are able to estimate some structural credit market
parameters, as the bargaining power of banks, the matching elasticity of the financial matching
function and posting cost of credit vacancies, which could help to better evaluate some credit
market dynamics and phenomena contributing to the literature on subject.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the model economy. In
section 2.3 we discuss the estimation methodology. In section 2.4 we present the dynamic properties
of the model. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model Economy
We introduce search and matching frictions in the financial market into a cash in advance New
Keynesian DSGE model with sticky prices. The economy is composed by four sets of agents:
households, firms, banks and a monetary authority. In order to pay the wage bill and produce,
firms that do not possess capital must obtain loans from banks. Hence, before production begins,
wholesale competitive firms search for lines of credit posted by banks, V Bt , which also collect
deposits, Dt, from households. A bank can match with several firms. Each realized match provides
the firm with the funds necessary to pay wages to the workers whose nominal value is PtwtNt where
Pt is the price index of the economy, wt is the real wage and Nt represents the household members
11See, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006).
12Traditional explanations refer to the banks’ collusive behavior and to concentration in the financial market
(Sander and Kleimeier, 2004; Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2008), agency costs á la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), customer
switching costs á la Klemperer (1987), fixed adjustment and menú costs depending on the temporal or permanent
nature of the policy rate changes, or to the so-called customer reaction hypothesis linked to the degree of the
bargaining power of borrowers (Hannan and Berger, 1991).
13It is useful to clarify that the interest rate spread highlighted in this work is the difference between the interest
rate on loans, which is bargained between banks and firms, and the policy rate. Hence, the absence of asymmetric
information, default probabilities and bankruptcy costs implies that the definition of the interest rate spread used
here is different from those of external financial premium and of corporate credit spread.
14See Blanchard and Galí (2010) and Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). For a critical survey on the role of the
real and nominal wage rigidities in the New Keynesian models see Riggi (2009).
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employed. After wages are paid production occurs. Monopolistic competitive retail firms transform
wholesale homogeneous goods into differentiated retail goods which are sold to households. At the
end of the period, banks receive from firms the principal plus interest on loans; households receive
profit income from financial intermediaries and firms, and the principal plus interest on deposits.
A fraction of the existing financial relationships between wholesale firms and banks is separated
in each period according to an exogenous separation rate. The firms that do separate from banks
obtain loans also in the next period. The monetary authority sets the rate of interest according to
a rule to be specified below.
2.2.1 Matching
In the credit market search frictions prevent some firms from obtaining the lines of credit necessary
to borrow funds, and some banks from filling all their posted lines of credit vacancies. Banks choose
the number of credit vacancies, V Bt , they want to post, whereas the demand for lines of credit is
represented by the number of wholesale firms searching for a bank, sFt . The number of new
matches in the credit market is determined by the matching function Ht = H(V Bt , sFt ), which is
homogeneous of degree one and increasing in its arguments. It follows that pBt = H(V Bt , sFt )/sFt is
the probability that a firm matches with a credit vacancy posted by bank (credit line finding rate),
and that qBt = H(V Bt , sFt )/V Bt is the probability for a bank of filling a posted credit vacancy (credit
vacancy filling rate). Then, in each period, it must be: H(V Bt , sFt ) = V Bt qBt = sFt pBt . As in existing
models with search and matching frictions, pBt = pB(θCt ), with pB
′
(θCt ) < 0, is a function of the
aggregate tightness in the credit market (from the viewpoint of the firm), θCt ≡ sFt /V Bt . It follows
that the matching probability qBt is also function of the credit market tightness: qBt = qB(θCt ),
with qB
′
(θCt ) > 0. It is possible to define the inverse of credit market tightness as an index of the
liquidity of the credit market (Wasmer and Weil, 2004).
In order to describe the matching process, we employ a Cobb-Douglas function for the matches
in the credit market: Ht = ςt(V Bt )ξ(sFt )1−ξ, where ςt represents a credit market efficiency shock
whose stochastic stationary first-order autoregressive process is ςt = ς
ρς
t−1e
ςt with ςt
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2ς ).
Hence, it is possible to specify the credit market probabilities as functions θCt in a form which
will be useful when analyzing steady states and log-linearizing the model: pBt = ςt(1/θCt )ξ or
pBt = ςt(V
B
t )
ξ(sFt )
−ξ and qBt = ςt(θCt )1−ξ or qBt = ςt(V Bt )ξ−1(sFt )1−ξ. It follows that: pBt = qBt /θCt .
If credit market tightness increases (because the number of firms searching for a line of credit goes
up, or because the number of credit vacancies posted by banks falls), the probability that a firm
matches with a line of credit posted by a bank, pBt , diminishes, whereas the probability that a
credit vacancy is filled, qBt , increases.
As in the search and matching models in the labor market, the elasticities with respect to
searchers and vacancies in the credit market measure externality effects. In particular: ξ represents
the positive externality (the liquidity market effect) caused by banks on searching firms; ξ − 1 is
the negative effect of the banks on the other financial intermediaries; −ξ represents the congestion
effect determined by the firms having a credit relationship with a bank on the firms which do not
have a financial relation; 1− ξ measures the positive externality from firms searching for a line of
credit to banks.
2.2.2 Households
There exists a continuum of households of mass one maximizing the expected discounted value
of their utility. The preferences of the representative household are defined over a composite
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consumption good, consisting of the differentiated goods produced by retail firms, and leisure. The
household enters each period with a given amount of nominal cash holdingMt and buy retail goods
using the money endowments and the wage income (PtwtNt) net of nominal deposits with banks
Dt. It follows that Mt + PtwtNt −Dt is spent to purchase consumption goods from retail firms,
of value PtCt. As in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), it is Ct =
(∫ 1
0
C
ε−1
ε
it di
) ε
ε−1
, where Cit = (PitPt )
−εCt
and ε > 1 is the parameter governing the elasticity of individual goods, which are indexed by
i. The cost of one unit of the consumption basket is given by the aggregation of the prices of
the differentiated products, Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−εit di
) 1
1−ε
. Hence, the purchase of consumption goods is
subject to the CIA constraint: PtCt ≤Mt + PtwtNt −Dt.15 At the end of the period households
receive retail firms’ and banks’ profits, denoted by ΠFt and ΠBt , and obtain the reimbursement of
their deposits plus the interest on them: RDt Dt = (1+rDt )Dt. It follows that the amount of money
carried over to the following period is: Mt+1 = Mt+PtwtNt−Dt−PtCt+ΠFt +ΠBt +RDt Dt.16 By
substituting the CIA constraint into this equation we get: Mt+1 = ΠFt + ΠBt +RDt Dt. Calculating
this equation a period backward and substituting the result into the CIA constraint gives: PtCt =
PtwtNt + ΠFt−1 + Π
B
t−1 −Dt +RDt−1Dt−1, which can be expressed in real terms as:
Ct = wtNt +
ΠFt−1
Pt
+
ΠBt−1
Pt
− Dt
Pt
+RDt−1
Dt−1
Pt
(2.1)
This equation states that consumption and savings are financed by real labor income wtNt, the
sum generated by previous period deposits,
RDt−1Dt−1
Pt
, and profits from banks and retailers,
ΠFt−1 + Π
B
t−1
Pt
. The representative household hence solves the problem:
JHt = max
[
ϕtU(Ct, Nt) + βEtJHt+1
]
s.t. (2.1)
where β is the household’s subjective discount factor and ϕt is a preference shock on the wedge
between consumption and leisure whose stochastic process is ϕt = ϕ
ρϕ
t−1e
ϕt with ϕt
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2ϕ).
A CRRA specification for U(Ct, Nt) = Ct
1−σ
1−σ − ϑtϑ¯N
1+φ
t
1+φ provides the first order conditions which
lead to the standard Euler equation of the baseline New Keynesian model and to the definition of
the real wage equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure:
λt = RDt βEt
Pt
Pt+1
λt+1 (2.2)
wt = ϑtϑ¯
Nφt
C−σt
(2.3)
where λt = ϕtC−σt is the marginal utility of consumption, ϑ¯ is a constant term, and ϑt is a
preference shock on leisure whose stochastic process is ϑt = ϑ
ρϑ
t−1e
ϑt with ϑt
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2ϑ). The
unemployment is Ut = 1−Nt.
15The CIA constraint is always binding because the nominal interest rate is positive and agents choose their asset
(deposit) holdings after observing the current shock but before entering the good market (Lucas 1982).
16The firms’ profits are the sum of those of retail and specialized firms. See section (2.2.8).
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2.2.3 Wholesale firms
There exists a continuum of wholesale firms in the unit interval producing homogenous goods in a
competitive sector. The production function of the representative wholesale firm is:
Y wt = AtN
α
t (2.4)
where At is a productivity shock with unit mean, Et(At) = 1, and whose stochastic stationary
first-order autoregressive process is At = A
ρA
t−1e
At with At
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2A). The representative firm
must determine the labor demand. Its profit maximization problem is:
max
Y wt
µt
− wtRLt Nt
s.t. (2.4)
where µt is the is the mark-up of the retail sector over the price of the wholesale good, Pt/Pwt ,
and the costs depend on the repayment of the loans received by banks (the wage bill granted to
households plus the interest on loans). The first order condition with respect to the employment
yields:
1
µt
=
wtR
L
t
mplt
(2.5)
where mplt = αAtN
α−1
t is the labor marginal productivity. Given the competitiveness of the
wholesale sector, the mark-up 1µt is equal to the real marginal cost paid by the retail firms to buy
the homogenous good. It is thus 1µt = mct, i.e., the firms’ real marginal cost is equal to the usual
ratio between the labor cost, wtRLt , and the labor marginal productivity, mplt.
2.2.4 Retail firms
Retail firms purchase the goods produced by the wholesale sector and transform them into the
differentiated products purchased by households. Each firm, which is a monopolist in its sector sets
prices according to the Calvo (1983) rule, adjusting its price with probability 1 − ω. We assume
that credit vacancy posting is "produced" at no cost by a specialized firm. Vacancies are costs
for banks and proceeds for the specialized firm which enter aggregate profits that can be spent by
households on the basis of the consumption demand for the individual good. This allows us to
write Cit = Yit, or in aggregate terms, Ct = Yt.17 Then, in a symmetric equilibrium, all firms set
the price P ∗t = Pit, so as to maximize the expected lifetime profits subject to the demand:
max Et
∞∑
l=0
ωlβl
λt+1
λt
[(
P ∗t
Pt+l
)
−mct+l
]
Yit+l
s.t. Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt
17See the section (2.2.8)
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This provides the price equation:
P ∗t
Pt
= Θ
Et
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβlmct+l
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε
C1−σt+l
Et
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβl
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε−1
C1−σt+l
(2.6)
where: Θ = εε−1 . Under flexible prices, equation (2.6) reduces to the standard Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987) equation:
P ∗t
Pt
= Θmct (2.7)
From (2.6) the usual (log-linearized) New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) is obtained:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κm̂ct + ψˆt (2.8)
where κ = (1−βω)(1−ω)ω and ψˆt = ρ
ψψˆt−1 + 
ψ
t with 
ψ
t
i.i.d.∼ N
(
0, σ2ψ
)
is the log-linearized version
of the cost push shock process ψt = ψ
ρψ
t−1e
ψt . The symbol "hat" denotes the percentage deviation
of a variable from its steady state value. The NKPC (2.8) can be expressed in terms of the output
gap xt = Yˆt− Yˆ qft where Yˆ qft = 1+φ[1+φ+α(σ−1)] Aˆt represents the quasi flexible equilibrium output:18
pit = βEtpit+1 + κ(RˆLt + ϑˆt) + κτxt + ψˆt (2.9)
where τ = [1+φ+α(σ−1)]α .
2.2.5 Banks
Each match in the credit market provides firms with the funds necessary to pay the wage bill to
the households. Production then starts, the proceeds from sales allow firms to repay the loans
and to pay the charged interest to the bank. In the following period, if a separation does not
occur, each of these firms will continue to have their wage bill financed by banks. The exogenous
separation rate in the credit market is denoted ρB ∈ [0, 1]. We make the timing assumption that
the new matches in the credit market are transformed into lines of credit immediately. Given these
assumptions, the lines of credit financing firms evolve according to:
LNt = (1− ρB)LNt−1 + qBt V Bt (2.10)
Assuming that the atomistic wholesale firms have unit mass, the previous equation contributes to
determine the fraction of those searching for credit:
sFt = 1− (1− ρB)LNt−1 (2.11)
18The detailed derivation of the model is provided in a technical appendix available from the authors upon request.
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The optimal value function of the representative bank is:19
JBt = max
[
(RLt −RDt )wtNtLNt −RDt kBV Bt +RDt
Xt
Pt
+ βEt
λt+1
λt
JBt+1
]
(2.12)
where kB is the real cost of posting a credit vacancy and Xt = Mt+1 −Mt is the cash injection
from the monetary authority. The bank chooses V Bt by maximizing (2.12) subject to (2.10). Its
decision yields:
kBRDt
qBt
− (RLt −RDt )wtNt = βEt
λt+1
λt
∂JBt+1
∂LNt
(2.13)
By using the envelope theorem we obtain:
∂JBt
∂LNt−1
= (1− ρB)(RLt −RDt )wtNt + β(1− ρB)Et
λt+1
λt
∂JBt+1
∂LNt
(2.14)
Combining equations (2.13) and (2.14) we get what we interpret as the "credit creating condition":
kBRDt
qBt
= (RLt −RDt )wtNt + (1− ρB)βEt
λt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
qBt+1
(2.15)
The condition to offer a new line of credit depends on the bank’s discounted stream of earnings
and of savings on credit vacancy posting. In particular, the expected cost of financing a matched
firm, k
BRDt
qBt
, is equal to the marginal profits that bank obtains from the loan advanced to a matched
firm plus the expected saving the following period of not having to create a new match. Note that
if kB = 0, then it must be RLt = RDt .
2.2.6 Loan interest rate bargaining
The rate of interest on loans is negotiated by banks and firms through a Nash bargaining. The
value of an unfilled credit vacancy is:
But = −kBRDt + qBt Bmt + (1− qBt )βEt
λt+1
λt
But+1 (2.16)
The value of an unfilled credit vacancy is provided by the cost incurrence kBRDt and by the bank
current and (discounted) future values, Bmt and But+1 which a bank gets if a credit match is obtained
(with probability qBt ) or not (with probability 1 − qBt ), respectively. Banks open vacancies until
it is profitable to do so. Given the free entry condition But = 0 ∀ t, the value of a filled credit
vacancy is Bmt =
kBRDt
qBt
and the bank’s surplus, SBt = Bmt −But , is:
SBt =
kBRDt
qBt
(2.17)
19The bank’s profit at time t is given by revenues minus costs. Revenues are given by the repayment of the real
loans financing wages plus interest, RLt
(
wtNtLNt
)
. Costs are equal to the repayment of deposits and money plus
interest, RDt
Dt
Pt
+RDt
Xt
Pt
= RDt
(
wtNtLNt + k
BV Bt
)
. By using the bank’s balance sheet, stating that deposits and
money finance the loans provided to firms and the repayment of the credit vacancies,
Dt
Pt
+
Xt
Pt
=
Lt
Pt
+ kBV Bt , the
profit function of the bank is straightforwardly obtained. It is useful to note as the nominal cost of posting credit
vacancies is kBPt.
52 An Estimated DSGE Model with Search and Matching Frictions in the Credit Market
or, from condition (2.15), SBt = (RLt −RDt )wtNt + (1− ρB)βEt
λt+1
λt
kBRDt
qBt+1
.
The surplus of a firm is the difference between the value of the firm if a match is obtained, Fmt ,
and if it is not obtained, Fut . Fmt is equal to the current profits of the firms plus the expected
value in the following period. In period t+ 1 the firm will have a value equal to Fmt+1 if it does not
experience a separation with the bank (1− ρB) or if a separation occurs and it finds a new match
in the credit market (ρBpBt+1). The firm’s value will be equal to Fut+1 if it does not realize a match
in the credit market after a separation, ρB(1 − pBt+1). If a firm in period t does not find a match
with a bank it does not obtain the funds necessary to start production, its current profits are zero
and its current value depends only on its expected value: if in the period t+ 1 it finds a match the
value will be Fmt+1; it will be Fut+1 otherwise. So the values of the generic firm are:
Fmt =
Y wt
µt
− wtRLt Nt + βEt
λt+1
λt
[
(1− ρB + ρBpBt+1)Fmt+1 + ρB(1− pBt+1)Fut+1
]
(2.18)
Fut = βEt
λt+1
λt
[
pBt+1F
m
t+1 + (1− pBt+1)Fut+1
]
(2.19)
and the firm’ surplus is:
SFt = F
m
t − Fut =
Y wt
µt
− wtRLt Nt + (1− ρB)βEt
λt+1
λt
(1− pBt+1)SFt+1 (2.20)
The loan interest rate is determined by the maximization of the Nash product:
max(SFt )
z(SBt )
1−z (2.21)
where z represents the bargaining power of firms. The optimal condition is:
(1− z)γBt SFt + zγFt SBt = 0 (2.22)
where γBt =
∂SBt
RLt
= wtNt and γFt =
∂SFt
RLt
= −wtNt are the marginal effects of the loan interest
rate on the surplus of the agents. Then the optimal condition is reduced to (1− z)SFt = zSBt . By
using the definition of the bank’s surplus it is possible to write:
SFt =
z
(1− z)
kBRDt
qBt
. (2.23)
By using the credit creating condition (2.15) and the definitions of bank’ surplus (2.17) and of
firm’ surplus (2.20) it is possible to obtain the bargained loan interest rate:
RLt =
(1− z)
wtNt
Y wt
µt
+
z
wtNt
[
RDt wtNt − (1− ρB)βEt
λt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
θCt+1
]
(2.24)
The interest rate on loans turns out to be a weighted average of the firm’s revenues, on one
side, and the rate of interest on deposits net of the banks’ future expected present saving from
maintaining a credit relation with a firm, on the other side. The weights are the relative bargaining
powers of the agents. If z = 1 firms are able to obtain a loan interest rate equal to to the deposit
interest rate net the bank’ saving; if z = 0 banks are able to set a loan interest equal to the firm’s
marginal profit.
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The interest rate pass-through is defined as the percentage deviation of the interest rate on
loans from its steady state value, RˆLt , minus that of the policy rate from own steady state, RˆDt .
Hence we have a complete, incomplete or more than complete interest rate pass-through if
∂RˆLt
∂RˆDt
is equal, less or greater than 1, respectively. Hence, in order to highlight the degree of the interest
rate pass-through,20 by using equations (2.2) and (2.5), the log-linearized version of equation (2.24)
can be written in the following way:
RˆLt = Λ1Rˆ
D
t + Λ2
[
Etθˆ
C
t+1 − EtRˆDt+1 +
(
wˆt + Nˆt − Etpˆit+1
)]
+ υˆt (2.25)
where the stochastic term υˆt= ρυυˆt−1+υt with υt
i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2υ) denotes the log-linearized version
of the stochastic stationary first-order autoregressive process of the exogenous shock υt = υ
ρυ
t−1e
υt
appended to the bargained interest rate on loans equation to estimate the model. The term Λ1 =
αz
RL(α−1+z)
[
RD + (1−ρ
B)pB
wN
kB
qB
]
represents the direct pass-through from the policy rate, RˆDt , to the
retail banking lending rate, RˆLt , whereas the coefficient Λ2 =
αz
RL(α−1+z)
(1−ρB)pB
wN
kB
qB
represents the
indirect pass-through due to the credit frictions depending on the expected credit market tightness
Etθˆ
C
t+1 and the expected policy rate EtRˆDt+1, and on the nominal value of the loan (equal to the
wage bill) lent to the generic wholesale firm. It is useful to note that the steady state banking
lending interest rate can be written as RL = ΥRD where Υ =
z
{
1+
(1−ρB)βpB
[1−(1−ρB)β]
}
{
1− (1−z)α + z(1−ρ
B)βpB
[1−(1−ρB)β]
} is the mark-up
over the steady state policy rate.21
By observing equation (2.25) we get the following points:
Proposition 1 If banks have no bargaining power, i.e. z = 1, then Υ = 1 and RL = RD, the direct
pass-through is more than complete, i.e. Λ1 > 1, and the degree of the interest rate pass-through
depends on the credit frictions measured by Λ2.
When banks have no bargaining power, firms are able to obtain a banking lending interest rate which
differs from the policy rate only for the presence of the banks’ saving. Hence, in this case, the posting
costs are paid period by period from banks and they do not affect the steady state interest rate on loans.
Proposition 2 If the posting cost kB = 0 the indirect pass-through is Λ2 = 0 and the pass-through
reduces to the direct pass-through Λ1 =
αz
(α− 1 + z) Υ .
When the posting activity is free there are not expected saving in the following period of not creating a
new match: search and matching credit frictions do not matter and the banking lending rate is the result
of a more simplified weighted average of the current revenues of the firms and the policy rate. The degree
of the interest rate pass-through depends on the value of the bargaining power z.
Proposition 3 If the z = 1 and kB = 0 then Υ = 1, Λ2 = 0 and Λ1 = 1: the pass-through is
perfectly complete and RL = RD.
When the posting activity is free there and banks have no bargaining power credit frictions do not matter
and the firms are able to impose to the banks a lending rate equal to the policy rate both in the short run
20We refer to the short run interest rate pass-through.
21See the technical appendix for the log-linearization of the interest rate on loans equation and for derivation of
its steady state version.
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and in the steady state. Hence the interest rate pass-through is perfectly complete.
The other measure we use in the following of the chapter is the interest rate credit spread
which we define as SPt = RLt −RDt where its log linearized version is ŜP t =
RLRˆLt −RDRˆDt
SP
. So,
it is evident that the dynamics of the credit spread depends on both dynamics and steady state
values of the loan and policy rates.
Differently from the standard literature on search and matching with a bargaining mechanism,
and following Becsi, Li and Wang (2005), we assume a steady state equilibrium condition for the
endogenous entry of firms. We suppose that the unmatched value of firms is not zero, but that
it can be thought of as the firm’s reservation value which is associated to a flow entry cost. This
allows us to determine the endogenous credit line finding rate of firms.22 Firms will search for a
line of credit as long as their unmatched value exceeds their entry cost, c. By contrast, firms do
not enter the credit market if the entry cost is larger than the unmatched value. Hence, the entry
competition among the atomistic wholesale firms implies, in equilibrium, the steady state condition
Fu = c. By using the steady state version of equations (2.18) and (2.19), and by imposing Fu = c,
we obtain the zero profit condition:
pB =
c(1− β)(1− β + βρB)
β
[(
Y
µ
− wRLN
)
− (1− β)(1− ρB)c
] (2.26)
Consistently with the Becsi, Li and Wang (2005) findings, this condition states that the credit
line finding rate satisfying the zero profit condition increases with the entry cost, c, the interest
rate on loans, RL, and the exogenous separation rate, ρB , and decreases with the productivity
level, A.23 Given the inverse relationship between the net profits of firms and their probability
of obtaining a line of credit, it is possible to highlight the congestion effect in the credit market.
As the firms’ (expected) profits rise, more firms look for a line of credit in the financial market,
the probability to find a line of credit falls and the (extra)profits are reset. Furthermore we can
observe that:
Proposition 4 If kB → 0 then qB → 0 and k
B
a
kBb
=
qBa
qBb
such that the expected posting cost
kB
qB
is constant where a and b indicate two different scenarios. Then variations of the degree of the
interest rate pass-through depend on changes of the expected posting cost, i.e. ∆
(
kB
qB
)
. Moreover
since the expected firms entry cost can be rewritten as
c
pB
=
kBRD
qB
(1− z)(1− β)
zβ
, variations of
kB do not modify the ratio
c
pB
.
Proof. The steady state version of equation (2.15) yields qB = k
BRD[1− (1− ρ)β]
(RL −RD)wN . Given ρ
B , N and β,
and since RL, RD and w are not affected by changes of kB , if in the scenario a kB = kBa yields qB = qBa ,
22In the present work this issue is implemented only to find a steady state version of the credit line finding rate,
pB , depending on the entry cost c¯. As a matter of fact our firms’ population is normalized to 1 and the number of
firms searching for a relationship with a bank depends on the state variable LNt .
23It is useful to note that a larger separation rate increases the credit line finding rate if β
(
Y
µ
− wRLN
)
>
(1− β)(1− β + β2)c holds.
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and in the scenario b kB = kBb yields q
B = qBb , then we always get
kBa
qBa
=
kBb
qBb
=
(RL −RD)wN
RD[1− (1− ρ)β] con-
stant. Moreover, given Fu = c, the steady state version of the equation (2.19) provides SF =
1− β
β
c
pB
whereas that of equation (2.23) is SF =
z
1− z
kBRD
qB
. By equating the previous two definitions we get
c
pB
=
kBRD
qB
(1− z)(1− β)
zβ
.24
The previous propositions highlights as the bargaining power z and the expected posting cost
kB
qB
are the determinants of the degree of the pass-through in the short run as well as of the value
of the steady state banking lending rate.
2.2.7 Monetary authorities
A central bank employs the following (log-linearized) monetary rule to set the policy rate, which
we assume for simplicity equal to the rate on deposits:
RˆDt = ρ
RRˆDt−1 + (1− ρR) [δpipˆit + δxxt] + νˆt (2.27)
where ρR is the degree of interest rate smoothing and δpi and δx are the weights assigned to the
inflation pˆit and output gap xt, respectively. The stochastic term νˆt = ρν νˆt−1 + νt with νt
i.i.d.∼
N
(
0, σ2ν
)
denotes the log-linearized version of the stochastic stationary first-order autoregressive
process of the monetary policy shock νt = ν
ρν
t−1e
νt .
2.2.8 Market clearing
The aggregate resource constraint (ARC) is derived from the aggregate money carried over to the
following period in real terms. In particular, being the total labor demand
∫
LNjtNtdj = L
N
t Nt (the
labor demand of the LNt financed firms which have a relationship with a bank) and the total firms’
profits the sum of those obtained by retail
(
ΠRt
Pt
)
and specialized firms
(
ΠSPt
Pt
)
the ARC becomes:
Xt
Pt
= wtNtLNt −
Dt
Pt
− Ct +RDt
Dt
Pt
+
ΠRt
Pt
+
ΠBt
Pt
+
ΠSPt
Pt
(2.28)
The aggregate banks’ balance sheet and profit function are
Dt
Pt
+
Xt
Pt
= wtNtLNt + k
BV Bt and
ΠBt
Pt
= RLt wtNtL
N
t −RDt wtNtLNt −RDt kBV Bt +RDt
Xt
Pt
respectively. By replacing them into equation
(2.28) and by remembering that
ΠSPt
Pt
= kBV Bt we have:
Ct =
ΠRt
Pt
+RLt wtNtL
N
t (2.29)
24For a complete explanation of the relationship between the expected entry cost and the expected posting cost
see the the technical appendix.
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The total real aggregate wholesale production is
∫
LNjtY
w
t
Pwt
Pt
dj = Y wt
Pwt
Pt
∫
LNjtdj = L
N
t
Y wt P
w
t
Pt
.
Then the real profits of retail firms are
ΠRt
Pt
= Y dt − LNt
YtP
w
t
Pt
where Y dt is the aggregate demand
for goods. Further the equilibrium in the good market implies Y dt = Yt. Then the ARC becomes:
Ct = Yt − LNt
YtP
w
t
Pt
+RLt wtNtL
N
t (2.30)
Since its competitiveness the wholesale sector do zero profits. Then it must be: LNt
YtP
w
t
Pt
=
LNt R
L
t wtNt By replacing the latter condition into (2.30) we finally have:
Ct = Yt (2.31)
Furthermore the wholesale production is linked to the aggregate demand by the following expres-
sion:
Y wt = Ytft (2.32)
where ft =
∫ (
Pit
Pt
)−ε
di is a factor of price dispersion. As shown by Galí (2008) this factor is equal
to zero up to a first order approximation when we linearized the model in a neighborhood of zero
inflation steady state.
2.3 Estimation
The model is estimated by Bayesian methods. In this section, we first discuss the data, the
calibrated parameters and the priors, and then we report the parameter estimates. In particular,
we estimate the structural credit market and agents’ preferences parameters driving the model
dynamics and allowing to compute the steady state version of the model. Further we employ a
sensitivity analysis in order to identify the stability domain of the model.
2.3.1 Data
We use 7 observables for the U.S.: real GDP, employment, real wage, inflation, the federal funds
rate, the weighted average effective loan rate and an index of the credit market tightness. For
a description of the data, see the technical appendix. The sample period is 1997:Q2 - 2011:Q4.
We use the logarithmic transformation for the quarterly interest rates, i.e. log(1 +
rjt
100
) where
j = D,L whereas the credit market tightness index is demeaned and the inflation rate is computed
as the quarter on quarter log difference of nominal prices. All remaining data are transformed by
employing the logarithmic first difference operator. Figure 2.1 plots the transformed data.
2.3.2 Calibrated Parameters
In this section we set the values of the calibrated parameters of the model. Table 2.1 reports them.
Due to the large consensus on the quarterly value of the discount factor by the economic literature,
we impose β equal to 0.996 so as to obtain a quarterly real steady state rate on deposits RD =
1.0035 (de Walque, Pierrard and Rouabah, 2010). Further, we assume a logarithmic form for the
utility function over consumption (σ = 1). As widely accepted by the literature on the subject
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Figure 2.1: Data
matter we calibrate the sticky price parameter ω = 0.8. The previous impositions imply that the
coefficient attached to the real marginal costs into the equation (2.8) is κ = (1−βω)(1−ω)ω = 0.0507.
In line with the empirical observations we calibrate the elasticity of output to employment, α, equal
to 0.66. Finally, according to Ravenna and Walsh (2008) we set the steady state employment N
equal to 0.95, and the elasticity of substitution of the individual goods ε equal to 6 such that the
mark-up of the retail sector over the price of the wholesale good is 20 per cent (µ =1.2).
Calibrated Parameter β σ ω α N ε
Value 0.996 1 0.8 0.66 0.95 6
Table 2.1: Calibrated Parameters.
2.3.3 Priors
In this section we declare the prior distributions of the remaining deep parameters of the model.
The shape of the distributions is chosen according to the standard practise: for parameters defined
in a [0− 1] interval we assume the beta distribution whereas for parameters which can take values
over the whole support R we adopt the normal distribution. For parameters assuming values over
the [0−∞] interval we assume the gamma distribution. Finally, the reference distribution for the
structural shocks is the inverted gamma which is defined over the range R+.
For the monetary policy rule parameters we employ values widely used by the literature. Hence,
for the coefficients attached to the expected inflation and output gap terms, δpi and δx respectively,
we assume a normal distribution with prior mean 2.0 and 0.1 and a standard error equal to 1.00
and 0.05 respectively; for the autoregressive coefficient ρR defining the degree of the interest rate
smoothness we assume a beta distribution with prior mean 0.5 and standard error 0.25. For the
58 An Estimated DSGE Model with Search and Matching Frictions in the Credit Market
all persistence parameters of the autoregressive stochastic processes of the exogenous shocks, we
assume a beta distribution with prior mean of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.1. The inverse labor
supply Frish elasticity parameter φ is assumed normal distributed with prior mean equal to 0.5
and standard error equal to 0.25.
Concerning the credit market parameters we have not references on possible prior values.25
Then, we adopt a gamma distribution for the credit vacancy posting cost with mean value equal
to its labor market counterpart,26 i.e. kB = 0.1 and standard error equal to 0.05. The prior on
the firm’s entry cost c is harder to set, so we assume a rather widespread gamma distribution
with a mean of 25 and a standard deviation of 12.5. For the matching function elasticity ξ and
for the firms’ bargaining power z we assume an uninformative position by considering a beta
distribution with prior mean equal to 0.5 and standard error equal to 0.25 for both. Finally, for
the separation rate ρB we adopt the strategy of setting its value between the minimal (0.07) and
the maximum (0.02) values of the bankruptcy rate calibrated by Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (1998).
As a consequence the separation rate in the credit market is assumed beta distributed with prior
mean 0.05 and standard error equal to 0.025.
Finally, for all standard deviation of the exogenous shocks we use the inverted gamma distri-
bution as prior distribution with mean equal to 0.01 with two degrees of freedom.27
2.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis: Mapping Stability
In this section we identify the stability domain of the model. A Monte Carlo simulation is performed
in order to detect what parameters mostly drive the model into a specific region.
According to Ratto (2008) we consider two regions: an acceptable stable region G satisfying the
standard Blanchard-Kahn rank condition and an unacceptable region G caused by the instability
and indeterminacy of the model. Hence, in order to explore all the prior space we sample uniformly
from the prior distributions defined above and we categorize each parameter into the two alternative
regions. The sample is generated using a Sobol’s quasi Monte Carlo sequence of dimension N =
2048. Hence, we get two subsets, ($s/G) of size n and
(
$s/G
)
of size n, representing draws
from the unknown probability density functions fn ($s/G) and fn ($s/G) where $ is the vector
of the parameters, s is the parameter’s index and n + n = N . Finally the identification of the
parameters (and relative values) driving in the (un)acceptable region is defined by the comparison
of the previous density functions by the two-sided Smirnov-Kolmogorov test:
dn,n = sup ||Fn ($s/G)− Fn ($s/G) ||
where Fn ($s/G) and Fn ($s/G) are the cumulative distribution functions (cdf) of the generic
parameter $s. Given the null hypothesis fn ($s/G) = fn ($s/G) and the significance level at
which it is rejected, if for a parameter $s the two distributions are significantly different (a larger
25The only work reporting values for the search and matching credit market parameters is Petrosky-Nadeau and
Wasmer (2010a). They employ a trembling hand calibration method by an iterating perturbation of the set of
parameters by a random shock drawn from a normal distribution in the space of the parameters to calibrate. See
also the section (2.3.5).
26The values of posting cost employed by the literature on search and matching frictions in the labor market
range between 0.01 (Hairault, 2002; Walsh, 2005) and 0.213 (Shimer, 2005).
27In order to simulate the model we add some measurement equations linking the log-levels of the variables with
their differences. We assume these equations contain a constant term that we estimate. Hence for these terms,
in the estimation phase, we assume a normal distribution and we adopt the strategy to set the prior mean equal
to the sample mean of the time series to which the constant refers, and a standard error which implies a prior
pseudo-t-value (the ratio between the prior mean and the prior standard deviation) equal to 2. Table 2.3 does not
report the constants’ estimates. More details are available from the authors upon request.
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dn,n), it is possible define the parameter as a key driver of the model behavior as well the values of
the parameter space leading in one region or in other one. Alternatively, if the distance between
the distributions is not significant, $s is not important for the model’s dynamics and its values
can belong, indifferently, either to G or G.
From the Monte Carlo filtering procedure we get that the 46 per cent of the prior support is
stable. The remaining part gives indeterminacy (51.3 percent) and instability (2.7 percent). By
running the Smirnov-Kolmogorov test we can highlight that indeterminacy is essentially driven by
δpi. In particular, by comparing the cdf of the sample producing indeterminacy with the cdf of the
original prior sample we find that small values of δpi drive to indeterminacy. Table 2.2 reports the
detailed results of the Smirnov-Kolmogorov tests.
Parameter Stab. Indet. Instab. Parameter Stab. Indet. Instab.
φ 0.1170 0.0504 0.1550 ρR 0.0482 0.0333 0.2340
δpi 0.5780 0.3020 0.4290 ρA 0.0247 0.0104 0.0841
δx 0.0571 0.0295 0.0105 ρν 0.0276 0.0126 0.1070
ρB 0.0711 0.0368 0.1240 ρς 0.0207 0.0102 0.1320
ξ 0.0264 0.0186 0.1620 ρϕ 0.0262 0.0129 0.0912
z 0.0426 0.0543 0.7190 ρϑ 0.0261 0.0146 0.0878
kB 0.0307 0.0126 0.0856 ρψ 0.0331 0.0149 0.1520
c 0.1440 0.0935 0.4800 ρυ 0.0272 0.0177 0.0873
Table 2.2: Smirnov-Komlogorov statistics in driving stability, indeterminacy and instability.
2.3.5 Posteriors estimates
Table 2.3 summarizes the posterior mode and the posterior mean for the model’s parameters. The
panel also shows the 90 percent probability intervals for the model parameters and the relative
prior assumptions. Draws from the posterior distributions are obtained by running the random
walk version of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. We ran ten parallel chains, each with a length
of 100,000 replications.28
The posterior mean estimates are generally close to the respective modal values. The estimates
of the credit market parameters imply low values of the matching elasticity ξ and of the bargaining
power of banks 1 − z, and a large value of the separation rate between firms and banks ρB . The
latter estimate confirms the high mismatch between the financial and productive sectors of the
economy experienced in the recent years. The importance of search and matching credit market
parameters is stressed by Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (1998). Moreover, the values assumed by
the bargaining power as well as by the matching elasticity and posting costs are relevant in the
credit market in a fashion similar to that assumed by the search and matching model in the labor
market (Cooley and Quadrini, 1999; Hagerdon and Manovskii, 2008). Our estimate of the banks’
bargaining power is 0.13, a low value similar to that found by Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer
(2010b) (0.27) in a model with good, labor and financial frictions to accommodate a targeted
share of the financial sector in GDP and lower than the value estimated by Petrosky-Nadeau and
28The fraction of drops of the initial parameters vector is set at 20%. The calibration of the scale factor provides
acceptance rates around 37 percent for the ten blocks. For the application of the Bayesian estimation and of the
sensitivity analysis we employ the latest stable version (4.2.1) of the open-source software Dynare.
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Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Parameter Distribution Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Mode
(Std. Dev.)
Mean 5% 95%
φ N 0.500
(0.250)
0.4805
(0.1184)
0.5231 0.3043 0.7380
δpi N 2.000
(1.000)
2.3170
(0.4779)
2.5376 1.6024 3.4222
δx N 0.100
(0.050)
0.1890
(0.0488)
0.1852 0.1044 0.2674
ρR B 0.500
(0.250)
0.7600
(0.0461)
0.7482 0.6664 0.8353
ρB B 0.050
(0.025)
0.0754
(0.0313)
0.0996 0.0439 0.1538
ξ B 0.500
(0.250)
0.0635
(0.0851)
0.1293 0.0016 0.2576
z B 0.500
(0.250)
0.9013
(0.0256)
0.8663 0.8119 0.9221
kB G 0.100
(0.050)
0.0750
(0.0433)
0.0984 0.0235 0.1699
c G 25.00
(12.50)
25.100
(13.205)
15.820 3.643 27.250
ρA B 0.500
(0.100)
0.8679
(0.0324)
0.8643 0.8112 0.9185
ρν B 0.500
(0.100)
0.5022
(0.0638)
0.5299 0.3837 0.6445
ρς B 0.500
(0.100)
0.7983
(0.0469)
0.7841 0.7099 0.8596
ρϕ B 0.500
(0.100)
0.8931
(0.0207)
0.8847 0.8477 0.9287
ρϑ B 0.500
(0.100)
0.6035
(0.0719)
0.6218 0.5047 0.7441
ρψ B 0.500
(0.100)
0.6394
(0.0712)
0.6273 0.5137 0.7445
ρυ B 0.500
(0.100)
0.9329
(0.0176)
0.9297 0.9093 0.9528
σA IG 0.010
(2)
0.0058
(0.0005)
0.0060 0.0050 0.0069
σν IG 0.010
(2)
0.0057
(0.0008)
0.0063 0.0045 0.0079
σς IG 0.010
(2)
0.1101
(0.0139)
0.1066 0.0829 0.1309
σϕ IG 0.010
(2)
0.0569
(0.0098)
0.0598 0.0429 0.0761
σϑ IG 0.010
(2)
0.0098
(0.0009)
0.0102 0.0086 0.0118
σψ IG 0.010
(2)
0.0039
(0.0006)
0.0040 0.0030 0.0052
συ IG 0.010
(2)
0.0033
(0.0005)
0.0033 0.0026 0.0039
Table 2.3: Posterior Estimates: Structural and Shock Process Parameters.
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Wasmer (2010a) (0.92) by using a "trembling hand" calibration method in a model with search
and matching frictions in labor and credit markets.
The posting cost kB and the matching elasticity ξ are larger and lower than the values found
by Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2010a) respectively. The estimates of the monetary policy
parameters and of the inverse labor supply Frish elasticity parameter are in line with the literature
on the subject matter.29
2.4 Dynamic properties of the model
In order to focus on the issues of interest rate pass-though and credit spread as well as of the role
of the credit market frictions on the real economy, in this chapter we focus on the dynamics of
the model variables with respect to a negative interest rate shock and a positive technology shock.
Finally we propose an exercise in which the economy is hit by an exogenous credit market shock.
2.4.1 The monetary policy shock and the interest rate pass-through
Figure 2.2 shows the impulse response functions (IRFs) regarding the main macroeconomic and
credit market variables. With nominal rigidities (on good prices), a monetary easing implies a
decrease of the policy rate that produces a lower real interest rate. This reduction determines a
substitution effect between current and future consumption: households increase current spending
and both the output and the output gap rise. The increase in the demand of goods implies a greater
labor demand by firms: employment and wages increase and the fall in the marginal product of
labor leads to higher real marginal costs. By the NKPC, inflation goes up.
The increase in the wage bill expands the borrowing demand to the banks and their expected
profits rise. Banks try to increase the number of firms to finance by opening new lines of credit and
their vacancy posting jumps up. Then the new credit matches improve and lines of credit increase.
By equation (2.11) the number of firms searching for a line of credit falls starting from the next
period.30 As a consequence in the credit market there is a less congestion effect: the credit line
finding rate increases, the credit vacancy filling rate falls and the credit market tightness decreases.
In order to highlight the response of the banking lending rate we can observe equation (2.24)
which shows that banks aspire to capture a value equal to the marginal revenues of the firms,
whereas firms want set a loan rate lower than the policy rate by trying to appropriate of the banks’
saving. Then, the determination of the cost of credit depends on the dynamics and the steady state
effects of the model’s variables as well as on the distribution of the joint surplus by the relative
bargaining power of the agents. Hence, on one hand, the fall in the labor marginal productivity
and the increase in real wages contribute to the negative dynamics of the firms revenues and, on
the other hand, even though the decrease in the credit market tightness is milder than the increase
in the wage bill, by the steady state value of the banks’ saving, we obtain a decrease of the value
of which firms want seize. Furthermore, by considering the bargaining power of the agents it is
possible to observe a dampening effect (from the estimation we obtain that the banks’ bargaining
power, 1 − z = 0.13, is smaller than that of the firms, z = 0.87) such that the log-linearization
version of the term (1 − z) (1−z)wtNt Ytµt decreases less than z
[
RDt − (1− ρB)βEt λt+1λt
kBRDt+1
wtNtθCt+1
]
. Since
29The estimation values reported in table 2.3 imply the following realistic and acceptable steady state values: pB
= 0.03, qB = 0.30, RL = 1.07, w = 0.52 and LN = 0.21. For a description of the steady state version of the model
see the technical appendix.
30Since the number of searching of firms at time t depends on the lines of credit at time t−1, the impact response
of sFt is always zero.
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Figure 2.2: IRFs with respect to a monetary shock
both the previous values fall less than the policy rate, the banking lending rate also drops less the
policy rate and firms are willing to accept a higher banking lending rate than they would like. This
is shown in figure 2.2. Put in other words, given the estimated values of the model’s parameters it
is possible to observe that the coefficient Λ1 of equation (2.25) is greater than 1. This means that
the incompleteness of the pass-through depends on the term Λ2 which measures the indirect effect
due to the presence of credit frictions.
Bargaining power of banks and interest rate pass-through
In this section we analyze the scenario in which the banking sector has a different market power in
the negotiation of the loan interest rate. We simulate the model when z decreases whereas all other
deep parameters remain equal to their estimated values. The variations of the IRFs compared to
the benchmark model are minimal. Then we focus on the degree of the interest rate pass-through.
A lower bargaining power of firms (or a higher bargaining power of banks) produces a lower
fall of the banking lending rate due to the change of the steady state values of the variables and to
the distribution effect of the agents’ joint surplus. These effects imply a decrease of the linearized
version of the term (1 − z) (1−z)wtNt
Y wt
µt
which is relatively smaller than the fall of the linearized ver-
sion of the factor z
[
RDt − (1− ρB)βEt λt+1λt
kBRDt+1
wtNtθCt+1
]
. As a matter of fact when banks have more
bargaining power they have more possibilities to appropriate of firms’ profits, so their expected
profits increase boosting the credit vacancy posting, the financial matches and the lines of credit.
Equation (2.11) determines a lower reduction in the number of firms searching for a line of credit.
Hence, the credit vacancy filling rate decreases more, the credit line finding rate rises more and
the credit market tightness from the firms point of view falls more than the benchmark model.
This changes feed back, by equation (2.24), on the determination of the loan interest rate, which
decreases less than the benchmark model implying a more incomplete interest rate pass-through
(figure 2.3). Further, the variation of the banking lending rate is such that it is not sufficient to
significantly influence the real marginal costs and inflation does not vary. Since the policy rate
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is set by the Taylor’s rule (2.27), the not significant variation of the inflation’s response implies a
very small variation of RDt . No substitution effect between current and future households’ spend-
ing hence arises and output (and output gap) does not exhibits significant differences as compared
to the benchmark case. The constancy of the output gap and of inflation feed back, by equation
(2.27), on the policy rate. Finally it is possible to observe as small variations of z determines large
modifications of the loan rate response that may even lead to its overshooting. The opposite chain
of effects is produced by an increase in the firms’ bargaining power.
Proposition 5 When 0 < z < 1 and kB > 0, the greater is the banks’ bargaining power, (1− z),
the more incomplete is the interest rate pass-through.
Figure 2.3: Interest rate pass-through with respect a monetary shock
2.4.2 The technology shock: credit spread and real wages’ dynamics
Figure 2.4 shows the IRFs of the main macroeconomic and credit market variables with respect to
a positive TFP shock. An increase in productivity implies an increase in the supply of goods by
firms. This implies a rise of the firms revenues: the larger is the firms’ surplus the higher is the
interest rate on loans that banks will try to obtain from firms. Then the banks’ expected profits
boost. As a matter of fact, as stressed by Galì and Rabanal (2004) in presence of staggered prices
and weak accommodation of the policy rule to the TFP shock, the potential output increases
more than the actual output.31 This implies a less use of the labor input which determines a
first reduction of the firms marginal costs. However, only a share of firms can lower their prices
such that the aggregate price level decreases in a not optimal way. Then the increase in aggregate
demand is less than proportional to that of the productivity and hence it will be satisfied with
lower employment (productivity employment puzzle), in line with the evidence proposed by a recent
31They consider a model where the Taylor rule depends on the level of the output.
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strand of the literature (Basu, Fernald and Kimball 2006, Galí 1999). Moreover, they show that
the effect on the real wage is ambiguous because depends on the relative strength of the income and
substitution effects as well as on the set of model parameters. In this chapter by the households’
first order condition (2.3), the real wage increases. Thus, the characteristics of the present model
allow for a positive response of the real wages without making use of wage rigidities. Although
the fall of the employment, the increase in real wage is such that the wage bill soars as well as the
banks’ expected profits. As a consequence, there is a more intense credit vacancy posting activity:
financial matches and lines of credit boost. This increase, by equation (2.11), forces the number
of firms searching for a line of credit to fall. In the credit market there is a lower congestion effect
from the point of view of firms: the credit vacancy filling rate goes down, the credit line finding rate
goes up and the credit market tightness drops determining a diminishing of the banking lending
rate which together the increase of the labor marginal productivity further lower the real marginal
costs, and so the inflation. The latter decrease together the fall of the output gap lower the policy
rate by the NKPC.
The credit market frictions contribute to produce countercyclical dynamics of the spread be-
tween the banking lending rate and the policy (deposit) rate which are similarly to those observed
by the literature (see figure 2.5). Put in other terms, and by referring to Beaubrun-Diant and
Tripier (2009), in the previous scenario when a TFP shock hits the economy, the procyclical ef-
fect due to the increase of the banks’ profits is more than offset by the countercyclical effect due
to the modification of the external opportunities (by changes of the threat points and values of
matches) of firms which implies more ease of finding funding.32 In order to clarify the previous
considerations we can rewrite the credit spread by using equation (2.24):
SPt =
(1− z)
wtNt
Y wt
µt
− (1− z)RDt −
z(1− ρB)β
wtNt
Et
λt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
θCt+1
(2.33)
The previous equation points out that the credit spread depends on three terms: the first two
are procyclical, the other one is countercyclical. As in Beaubrun-Diant and Tripier (2009) the
term
(1− z)
wtNt
Y wt
µt
increases when a positive TFP shock hits the economy: even though the wage
bill rises, the fall in real marginal costs and the increase of output improve the firms’ revenues.
Hence, for a given ρB , when banks have a positive bargaining power (z < 1) they can obtain
a higher interest rate on loans such that the credit spread rises. Differently to Beaubrun-Diant
and Tripier (2009) we can observe another procyclical effect due to the term −(1− z)RDt : in our
general equilibrium model an increase in productivity provokes a fall in output gap and inflation
such that, by the Taylor’s rule (2.27), the policy rate decreases by widening the credit spread.
Finally, as described above, a positive technological shock improves the expected profits of banks
causing a less congestion effect in the credit market for firms. Hence, by observing the term
−z(1− ρ
B)β
wtNt
Et
λt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
θCt+1
, even though the wage bill and the real interest rate rise the fall of
the credit market tightness implies more external opportunities for firms and a lower expected time
to obtain a line of credit. Then firms can negotiate a lower banking lending rate tightening the
credit spread. Finally, it is useful to note that, as clarified in section (2.2.6), the magnitude of the
response of the percent deviation of the credit spread from its steady state crucially depends on
the steady state value of
1
SP
. The overall countercyclical dynamics of the credit spread indicates
32Beaubrun-Diant and Tripier (2009) show another countercyclical effect due to the modification of the idiosyn-
cratic productivity reservations of the agents. They conclude for an overall countercylical effect of the credit spread.
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that the countercyclical effect depending on the search and matching frictions is stronger than
those procyclical due to the profits of firms and to the policy rate.
Figure 2.4: IRFs with respect to a technology shock
Bargaining power of banks and credit spread
As in section (2.4.1) we analyze the scenario in which the banking sector has a more bargaining
power in the negotiation of the loan interest rate in order to understand how changes the cyclical
behavior of the credit spread. Also in this case the magnitude of the IRFs of the main macroeco-
nomic and credit market variables do not change significantly Then modification of the behavior
of the credit spread is attributable to the variation of the sharing of the total surplus of the credit
match.
A more bargaining power of banks amplifies the magnitude of the procyclical effects analyzed
in the previous section by improving the share of firms’ revenues of which the lenders may ap-
propriate. Further it mitigates the countercyclical role of the credit market frictions. However,
all these effects are smaller than the benchmark model because a decrease of z, by augmenting
the steady state banking lending rate RL, lowers the scale factor
1
SP
. Hence, as shown by figure
2.5 the final effect is a more diminishing of the credit spread compared to the benchmark model.
Moreover, it is useful to note as, differently to the policy rate shock case, small variations of z
implies small changes in the credit spread.
Proposition 6 When 0 < z < 1 and kB > 0, in presence of exogenous positive productivity shock,
the greater is the banks’ bargaining power, (1− z), the more countercyclical is the credit spread.
2.4.3 The credit shock
In this section we study the IRFs produced by the model when a credit efficiency shock hits the
credit market (figure 2.6). An increase in the efficacy of the credit market can be thought as
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Figure 2.5: Credit spread with respect to a technology shock
an improvement of the structural and technology reforms of the financial market. As Becsi, Li
and Wang (2005) argue, a positive shock to ςt may represents a better efficiency of the financial
intermediation arising from being to identify easier banking lending and borrowing opportunities.
At the same time this kind of shock can be interpreted as a cost push shock which affects the real
marginal costs, and so inflation, by the credit market tightness channel.
The first consequence of this shock is an increase in the number of financial matches. Then,
by equation (2.10), the number of lines of credit rises. This improvement determines a fall in the
number of firms searching for a line of credit (sFt ): the credit line finding rate goes up. At the
same time, the increase of the lines of credit determines a rise in the banks’ expected profits (see
equation 2.12) and so a more intensive vacancy posting activity. This increases, however, less than
financial matches. As a consequence, the credit vacancy filling rate rises less than the credit line
finding rate so that the credit market tightness falls,33 the interest rate on loans decreases (see
equation 2.24), real marginal costs and inflation go down. Since the inverse of the credit market
tightness is an index of the liquidity of the credit market (Wasmer and Weil, 2004), according to
Becsi, Li and Wang (2005), we obtain that an improvement in the matching efficiency generates
more matches increasing the market liquidity. By the monetary rule, the policy rate decreases such
that the real interest rate falls: current and future spending (output and output gap) rises and
drops, respectively. The increase in the demand for goods requires more labor input: employment
and the real wages rise. Finally it is useful to note as the initial rise of the inflation due to the
increase of the financial matches is more than offset by the decrease of the inflation due to the fall
of the credit market tightness.
33It is useful to note that the usual dynamics of the matching probabilities which depend on the sign of the credit
market tightness change by the magnitude of the credit effciency shock and the value of the externality ξ. As a
matter of fact the matching probabilities can be rewritten as pˆBt = ςˆt − ξθˆCt and qˆBt = ςˆt + (1− ξ) θˆCt . In our case
since the increase of the ςˆt is greater than the decrease of (1− ξ) θˆCt the dynamics of the credit vacancy filling rate
is increasing and not decreasing.
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Figure 2.6: IRFs with respect to a credit shock
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have introduced search and matching frictions in the credit market into a cash
in advance New Keynesian DSGE theoretical model with sticky prices. In this economy households
are depicted in a standard fashion, and so are retail firms producing under monopolistic competition
differentiated goods consumed by households. Before starting production, wholesale competitive
firms, producing a homogeneous good, search for credit offered by banks posting lines of credit. The
firms obtaining loans pay the wage to workers and production can start. At the end of the period
their production is sold to retail firms, loans are repaid and households receive profit income from
financial intermediaries and firms, and the principal plus interest on deposits. The interest rate on
loans is determined according to a Nash bargaining procedure. A fraction of the wholesale firms
producing in a given period - determined on the basis of an exogenous separation rate specifying
the fraction of credit matches which is destructed at the end of the production period - obtains
loans also in the next period.
The model is estimated by using the Bayesian methods. Given prior assumptions on the
model’s parameters in line with the empirical literature, in order to run the estimation we use
seven observed series in the sample 1997:Q2-2011:Q4. Further, we identify the stability domain of
the model by the two-sided Smirnov-Kolmogorov test.
The dynamic properties of our model are consistent with the main cyclical evidence reported
in the NK DSGE literature, but the model provides some main new findings. First, it is able to
highlight an incomplete pass-through of policy rate changes to the interest rate on loans. Second,
when the model is hit by a positive technology shock it provides a response of the real wages which
is in line with the empirical evidence, without having to rely on any real or nominal wage rigidity.
Furthermore the model confirms the countercyclical behavior of the credit spread with respect
positive technology shocks. All the previous findings depend on the search and matching frictions
in the credit market and on the bargaining mechanism over the loan interest rate, which affect the
responses of the main real macroeconomic variables to expansionary shocks. In particular a more
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banks’ bargaining power in the setting of the banking lending rate exacerbates the incompleteness
of the adjustment of the loan rate to variation of the policy rate and provides a more countercyclical
behavior of the credit spread with respect to a positive technology shock. Moreover, by using the
Bayesian techniques, we provide the estimated values of some structural parameters of the credit
market useful to the study of the financial markets. Finally, a simple exercise in which the economy
is hit by an exogenous credit shock confirms the importance of the channel represented by the credit
market tightness in the determination of a banking lending rate affecting the market liquidity and
the dynamics of the main real macroeconomic variables.
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Chapter 3
Incomplete interest rate pass-through
under credit and labor market
frictions†
By introducing search and matching frictions in both the labor and the credit markets into a
cash in advance New Keynesian DSGE model, we provide a novel explanation of the incomplete
pass-through from policy rates to loan rates. We show that this phenomenon is ineradicable if
banks possess some power in the bargaining over the loan rate of interest, if the cost of posting job
vacancies is positive and if firms and banks sustain costs when searching for lines of credit and when
posting credit vacancies, respectively. We also show that the presence of credit market frictions
moderates the reactions of output and wages to a monetary shock, and that the transmission
of monetary policy shocks to output and inflation is more relevant than suggested by the recent
literature.
3.1 Introduction
Several empirical contributions that appeared before the recent financial crises provided convincing
evidence that shifts in policy rates were not completely passed through to retail (market) banking
lending rates, even though significant differences existed in the degree of incompleteness which
was experienced across countries.1 According to this evidence, the phenomenon was particularly
sharp in the Euro Area.2 During the financial crisis, the transmission of policy rate changes to
retail rates has become less efficient in this Area (Čihák, Harjes and Stavrev, 2009). The interest
rate pass-through to the short-term rates has been however less affected than in the United States,
†This chapter is a joint work with Giuseppe Ciccarone (Sapienza University of Rome) and Francesco Giuli
(University of Rome 3). We wish to thank P. Benigno, E. Marchetti, M. Tancioni, R. Tilli, the participants in a
seminar held at the Bank of Italy on 14th December 2010 and an anonymus referee for comments and suggestions.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of
Italy.
1The literature is wide. Recent contributions are, e.g., Angeloni and Ehrmann, (2003); Sander and Kleimeier
(2004); Hofmann (2006); Égert, Crespo-Cuaresma and Reininger (2007); Fourcans and Vranceanu (2007).
2See, e.g., Mojon (2000); Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003); Gambacorta (2008); de Bondt, Mojon and Valla
(2005); Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006); Gropp, Kok Sørensen, and Lichtenberger (2007). A recent review of the
literature on the loan rate pass-through in the euro area is in Kobayashi (2008, section 2).
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whereas that to the long-term rates has been heavily impaired in both economies (IMF, 2008).
The existence of an incomplete pass-through of policy rate changes to the loan rates in the Euro
Area and in the United States is confirmed by a recent study by Karagiannis, Panagopoulos and
Vlamis (2010).
The theoretical relevance of the issue for New Keynesian DSGE models is demonstrated, e.g., by
the changes in the optimal monetary policy which are produced by the presence of an incomplete
interest rate pass-through (Chowdhury et al., 2006; Kobayashi, 2008). The relevance of this
incompleteness is however especially important from an empirical viewpoint in the presence of
a cost channel of monetary policy (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005; Ravenna and
Walsh, 2006). The existence of an incomplete interest rate pass-through may in fact mitigate
the strength of the cost channel as banks shelter firms from monetary policy shocks. Yet, while
confirming this intuition, recent contributions based on a not-fully microfounded model, suggest
that an incomplete loan interest rate pass-through produces limited effects on the transmission of
monetary policy shocks to output and inflation (Hülsewig et al. 2009; Kaufmann and Scharler,
2009).
The goal of this chapter is to understand whether an incomplete interest rate pass-through has
also limited effects on the transmission of monetary policy shocks in a fully microfounded New
Keynesian DSGE model economy with sticky prices and search and matching frictions in both the
labor and the credit market. This allows us to provide a novel explanation of the incomplete loan
rate pass-through in an economy where the main explanations of this phenomenon which have been
provided so far are ruled out by hypothesis. First of all, we do not rely either on exogenous cost
functions associated with changes in retail interest rates (Chowdhury et al., 2006; Scharler, 2008;
Kaufmann and Scharler, 2009), or on monopolistically competitive retail market where regional
banks set loan rates according to a Calvo-type rule (Kobayashi, 2008). Further, by assuming
perfect competition in the credit sector, we exclude the possibility of banks’ collusive behavior and
concentration in the financial market (Sander and Kleimeier, 2004; Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2008).
Finally, agency costs à la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and customer switching costs à la Klemperer
(1987) are absent, banks face no fixed costs when changing their loan rates and borrowers do not
strongly react to rate changes in the way suggested by the customer reaction hypothesis (Hannan
and Berger, 1991).
In our economy, before production begins, wholesale competitive firms producing a homoge-
neous good search for lines of credit posted by banks; the firms that have lines of credit granted
may then post vacancies in the labor market, where unemployed workers are searching for jobs.
The firms matching with workers obtain from banks the advances necessary to pay for the wage
bill. Those that obtain the loans financing job vacancy posting but that are unable to match
with workers cannot start production and cannot repay their debt with the banks. At the end of
the period, wholesale production is sold to retail firms transforming the homogeneous good into
differentiated goods bought by households. Loans are then repaid and households receive profit
income from banks and firms, and the principal plus interest on deposits from banks. A fraction of
the wholesale firms producing in a given period - determined on the basis of exogenous separation
rates specifying the fractions of labor matches and of credit matches which are destroyed at the
end of the production period - obtain loans also in the next period. The other firms have to go
afresh into the whole process of search, starting from the credit market.
This model economy shares similarities with some recent attempts that extended the labor
market matching framework to financial markets (e.g., Wasmer and Weil, 2004; Nicoletti and
Pierrard, 2006; Ernst and Semmler, 2010; Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer, 2010), but we depart
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from these contributions in several respects. First, our setting requires that banks advance the
funds necessary to pay for both the cost of the job vacancies and for the wage bill, whereas in
Nicoletti and Pierrard (2006), Wasmer and Weil (2004) and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2010)
the wage bill is not borrowed from the banks but is paid post factum by the firms. Second, firms
demand a variable quantity of loans, rather than looking for a match with only one bank, as it is
instead assumed in those three contributions. Third, we assume that firms produce a quantity of
output which depends on total hours worked, while Nicoletti and Pierrard (2006) assume that firms
produce a unit of output with one worker and one unit of capital provided by banks, even though
capital plays a rather artificial role, as it is necessary to look for a worker but it does not enter
the production function. Ernst and Semmler (2010) assume that the firm needs external finance
to increase its capital stock, but the financial sector is represented by a bond market. Fourth,
the wage and the interest rate on loans are determined according to a sequential Nash bargaining
framework, a procedure which is present in Wasmer and Weil (2004), but it is absent in the more
recent modelling attempts.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, the transmission of monetary policy
shocks to output and inflation is more relevant than suggested by the recent literature, involving
significant reactions in labor and credit markets, the magnitudes of which depend on several
parameters’ values. Second, imperfection in the pass-through from policy rates to loan rates is an
inner and ineradicable feature of any economy where matching frictions exist in labor and credit
markets, as it depends on the endogenous reaction of several variables to the monetary policy
shock. A first group of variables is related to the amount of loans borrowed by firms; a second
group concerns the size of surplus generated by the existence of a productive credit relation, which
affects the bargaining between the firm and the bank over the loan interest rate. The degree of
incompleteness depends on the value of some key parameters such as the cost of posting labor
vacancies (which influences also the cost that banks sustain in order to finance producing firms),
the firm’s bargaining powers in the labor and in the credit markets, and the costs that firms have to
bear in order to look for lines of credit and that banks sustain in order to post their credit vacancies.
These conclusions contribute to better understand the effects produced in New Keynesian DSGE
models by the interplay of imperfections in several markets, a field where contributions are limited
and the joint effects of labor and financial markets imperfections remain a mostly unexplored
frontier of research.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the model economy. In
section 3.3 we discuss our calibration strategy. In section 3.4 we present the dynamic properties of
the benchmark model and we compare them with those which obtain when search and matching
frictions are present only in the labor market and the interest rate pass-through is complete.
In section 3.5 we discuss the effects on the model dynamics produced by changes in the main
parameters influencing the degree of the loan interest rate pass-through. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model Economy
Building on the original intuition by Wasmer and Weil (2004), we introduce search and matching
frictions in both the labor and the credit markets into a cash in advance New Keynesian DSGE
model with sticky prices. The economy is composed of four sets of agents: households, firms,
banks and a monetary authority. Since firms do not possess their own cash, in order to produce
they must obtain loans from banks that allow them to pay for the cost of job vacancy posting and
for the wage bill. Before production begins, wholesale competitive firms, in order to finance their
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labor vacancy posting, hence search in the credit market for lines of credit vacancies
(
V Bt
)
posted
by banks. Each realized match between a firm and a bank provides the firm with one line of credit
of real value kF , which is also the cost that must be sustained in order to post one vacancy in the
labour market, where unemployed workers are searching for jobs. As a bank can provide several
lines of credit to a firm, in each period t, the total number of matched credit lines which finance
job vacancies (Ht) is equal to the total number of job vacancies posted by firms
(
V Ft
)
. If the firm
which has matched with a bank does not find a match in the labor market, it will be unable to
produce and it will have to start, in the next period, the searching process afresh. A job vacancy
which is not filled thus produces a default on the corresponding line of credit. We assume that the
cost of default is borne by the banks, which also collect deposits (Dt) from households. Finally,
the producing firm obtains from the bank LNt lines of credit which allow it to pay the nominal
wage Wtht to Nt workers, where ht is the number of hours worked and Wt is the nominal hourly
wage.
After wages are paid the wholesale production occurs. Monopolistic competitive retail firms
then transform the wholesale homogeneous goods into differentiated retail goods which are sold to
households. At the end of the period, banks receive from firms the principal plus interest on loans
and households receive profit income from financial intermediaries and firms, and the principal plus
interest on deposits. A fraction of the wholesale firms that produce in a given period obtain loans
also in the next period. This fraction is determined by exogenous separation rates specifying the
fraction of labor matches and of credit matches which are destroyed at the end of the production
period. The monetary authority sets the rate of interest according to a rule to be specified below.
3.2.1 Matching
In the labor market, the search for workers is costly and the existence of search frictions prevents
some workers from finding jobs and some posted job vacancies from being filled. Similarly, search
frictions in the credit market prevent some firms from obtaining lines of credit and some banks from
filling all their posted credit vacancies. Banks and wholesale firms choose the number of vacancies
they want to post (V Bt and V Ft , respectively). Denoting sFt and sWt the demand for lines of credit
by firms and the fraction of workers searching for jobs, respectively, the number of new matches
in the markets for labor and for lines of credit are determined by the Cobb-Douglas matching
functions Mt = η(V Ft )ξ(sWt )1−ξ and Ht = υ(V Bt )ζ(sFt )1−ζ , where η and υ are scale parameters.
pBt = Ht/s
F
t is the probability that a line of credit demanded by a firm matches with a credit
vacancy posted by a bank, qFt = Mt/V Ft is the probability that a firm matches with a worker.
By defining θLt = V Ft /sWt and θCt = sFt /V Bt as the aggregate labor and credit market tightnesses
(from the firm’s viewpoint), respectively, it follows that the probability that a worker matches
with a firm is pFt = θLt qFt and that the probability for a bank of filling a posted credit vacancy is
qBt = θ
C
t p
B
t . In each period it must hence be: Mt = sWt pFt = V Ft qFt and Ht = V Bt qBt = sFt pBt .
If θLt increases, qFt diminishes and pFt increases. If θCt increases, pBt falls and qBt increases. It is
worth noticing here that the four matching probabilities (the two markets) are interdependent, as
we shall obtain that V Ft = sFt pBt .
3.2.2 Households
There exists a continuum of households of mass one maximizing the expected discounted value
of their utility. The preferences of the representative household are defined over leisure and a
composite consumption good Ct =
[∫ 1
0
C
ε−1
ε
it di
] ε
ε−1
, consisting of the differentiated goods (Cit)
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produced by retail firms. As usual, it is Cit = (PitPt )
−εCt, where ε > 1 is the parameter governing
the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods, which are indexed by i. The cost of
one unit of the consumption basket is given by the aggregation of the prices of the differentiated
products, Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−εit di
] 1
1−ε
. Household members can be either employed (Nt) in a labor match
with wholesale firms, earning the efficiently bargained real wage wt = Wt/Pt, or unemployed
(1−Nt), enjoying a fixed amount of benefits, wu, paid by lump sum taxes on banks’ and retailers’
profits. The employed worker works ht hours (intensive margin), where ht is determined by the
efficient Nash bargaining to be described below. The separability of the utility function allows us
to make the usual assumption that consumption risks are fully pooled within the household. All
households hence solve the same problem:
Gt = max
Ct,Dt
[
C1−σt
1− σ − ϑ
h1+φt
1 + φ
+βEtGt+1
]
s.t. Ct = wthtNt + (1−Nt)wu +
ΠFt−1
Pt
+
ΠSt−1
Pt
+
ΠBt−1
Pt
− Dt
Pt
+RDt−1
Dt−1
Pt
The constraint is obtained by taking into account the CIA constraint, PtCt ≤ Bt + WthtNt +
(1 − Nt)wuPt − Dt, where Bt is nominal cash holding (“bank notes”), and the amount of money
carried over to the following period, Bt+1 = Bt + WthtNt + (1 − Nt)wuPt − Dt − PtCt + ΠBt +
ΠSt + Π
F
t + R
D
t Dt.3 Consumption and savings are hence financed by: real labor income, wthtNt;
unemployment benefits, (1−Nt)wu; the sum generated by previous period deposits, RDt−1Dt−1 =
(1 + rDt−1)Dt−1 , where rDt is the rate of interest on deposits; profits from banks, the specialized
firm posting the wholesale firms’ vacancies and retailers, net of lump-sum government taxes used
to pay unemployment benefits, ΠFt , ΠSt and ΠBt . β is the household’s subjective discount factor
and ϑ is a scale parameter. The solution of this problem leads to the standard Euler equation:
λt = RDt βEt
Pt
Pt+1
λt+1 (3.1)
where λt = C−σt is the marginal utility of consumption. The aggregate dynamics of employment
is described by:
Nt = (1− ρ)Nt−1 + pFt sWt (3.2)
where sWt = 1− (1− ρ)Nt−1. The exogenous separation rates relative to the firm-worker4 and the
firm-bank relations are ρF ∈ [0, 1] and ρB ∈ [0, 1], respectively. We assume that separation in one
market (labor or credit) implies also separation in the other one. If one separation occurs, the firm
will have to go once again through all the matching phases, starting from the demand for lines of
credit. It follows that ρ = ρF +ρB −ρF ρB . The first term on the right hand side of equation (3.2)
hence represents the number of workers who have not separated from firms that were producing
in the previous period and that maintain the lines of credit allowing them to finance the wages to
be paid to those workers. The second term represents the new matches in the labor market, to be
further analyzed below. Unemployment is determined ex post as: Ut = 1−Nt.
3The constraint is obtained by substituting the CIA constraint into the equation for Bt+1, calculating it a period
backward and substituting the result back into the CIA constraint expressed in real terms. The detailed derivation
and the linearization of the model are provided in a technical appendix available from the authors upon request.
4Hall (2005) documented that the separation rate does not vary considerably along the business cycle.
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3.2.3 Wholesale firms
A continuum of competitive wholesale firms of mass one produce an homogenous good. The
production function of the representative firm is:
Y wt = Ah
α
t Nt (3.3)
where A is the productivity factor.
The representative firm must determine the optimal number of job vacancies to post. Vacancies
are costs for producing firms and proceeds for a specialized firm “producing” posting at no costs.
These proceeds enter aggregate profits that can be spent by households. The number of job
vacancies posted by each firm at time t is equal to the realized matches in the credit market. We
make the timing assumption that credit lines are transformed into job vacancies immediately (e.g.,
Ravenna and Walsh, 2008; Gertler, Sala and Trigari, 2008):
V Ft = p
B
t s
F
t (3.4)
The number of workers available for production in each firm at time t is:
Nt = (1− ρ)Nt−1 +Mt (3.5)
where Mt = qFt V Ft are the labor matches, given by the vacancies posted by the firm (that has
obtained the necessary credit lines) multiplied by the probability that a vacancy is filled. The
value of the firm, Ft, is:
Ft = −ftsFt +
Yt
µt
−RLt wthtNt −RLt kF qFt V Ft + βEt
λt+1
λt
Ft+1 (3.6)
where ft = f/λt denotes a utility unit cost born by the firm and kF is the financial cost (in real
terms) of posting a job vacancy financed after the credit match. As wholesale firms sell goods
at the competitive price Pwt , the real value of a firm’s output expressed in terms of consumption
goods is Pwt Y wt /Pt = Y wt /µt, where µt = Pt/Pwt is the mark up of the retail sector over the price
of the wholesale good. Recalling that the representative wholesale firm borrows from the bank,
at the nominal interest rate factor on loans RLt , the funds necessary to post its vacancies and to
hire workers, (RLt wthtNt +RLt kF qFt V Ft ) represents the firm’s real repayment to the bank. Finally,
βEt
λt+1
λt
is the firm’s discount rate.
At any time, the firm chooses V Ft by setting sFt so as to maximize (3.6) subject to (3.3), (3.4)
and (3.5). By using the envelope theorem we get the firm’s job creating condition:
ft
qFt p
B
t
+RLt k
F =
Ahαt
µt
−RLt wtht + (1− ρ)βEt
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)
(3.7)
Equation (3.7) shows that the condition to demand a new line of credit at time t depends on the
firm’s stream of present earnings and of discounted future savings on job vacancy posting. The
term ft/
(
qFt p
B
t
)
represents the time it takes for a firm to become active (i.e., to find a match with
a bank as well as with a worker) and RLt kF is the financial cost of the line of credit obtained for
job vacancy posting.
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3.2.4 Wage and hours bargaining
The real wage, determined by an efficient Nash bargaining between the firm and the worker, is
obtained by maximizing (SFt )1−d(SWt )d with respect to wt, where d represents the bargaining
power of the worker and (1− d) that of the firm, SFt is the firm’s surplus (the difference between
the firms’ values if a match is obtained and if a match is not obtained) and SWt is the worker’s
surplus (the value the worker enjoys when being matched relative to not being matched). The free
entry condition and equation (3.7) allow us to write:5
SFt =
ft
qFt p
B
t
+RLt k
F (3.8)
The worker surplus is:
SWt =
(
wtht − g(ht)
λt
− wu
)
+ (1− ρ)βEtλt+1
λt
(1− pFt+1)SWt+1 (3.9)
and the optimality condition of the Nash bargaining is:
(1− d)δFt SWt + dδWt SFt = 0 (3.10)
where δFt =
∂SFt
∂wt
= −RLt ht and δWt =
∂SWt
∂wt
= ht. By substituting (3.8) and (3.9) into (3.10), and
using (3.7), we get the wage equation,
wt = (1− d)
(
mrst
1 + φ
+
wu
ht
)
+ (3.11)
+
d
RLt
[
mplt
αµt
+
(1− ρ)β
ht
Et
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)(
1− R
L
t (1− pFt+1)
RLt+1
)]
where mrst = ϑ
hφt
λt
is the worker’s marginal rate of substitution and mplt =
∂Ahαt
∂ht
= Aαhα−1t
is the marginal product of labor (hours) per worker. Equation (3.11) depicts that real wage is a
weighted average of the worker’s disutility from supplying hours of work plus the foregone flow
benefit from unemployment, and the firm’s revenues plus the future expected net present value
when remaining in the match in the following period.
Hours worked are also determined by an efficient bargaining. The optimality condition is:
(1− d)τFt SWt + dτWt SFt = 0 (3.12)
Being τFt = ∂SFt /∂ht =
(
mplt/µt − wtRLt
)
and τWt = ∂SWt /∂ht = (wt−mrst), and using equation
(3.10), optimal hours are obtained from the condition mplt/
(
µtR
L
t
)
= mrst, that is:
ht =
(
ϑµtR
L
t
αAλt
) 1
α−1−φ
(3.13)
5Recall that the defaulting firm leaves the market at no cost.
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3.2.5 Retail firms
Retail firms purchase the goods produced by the wholesale sector and transform them by a one-
to-one technology, into the differentiated products purchased by households. Cost minimization
provides the condition that the retail firm’s nominal marginal cost (mcnt ) be equal to the price
charged by the wholesale firm for its product Pwt . In this sector prices are adjusted according
to the Calvo rule, so that in each period a firm can adjust its price with probability 1 − ω. In a
symmetric equilibrium all firms set the price so as to maximize the expected lifetime profits subject
to demand and this provides the standard New Keynesian price equation:
P ∗t
Pt
=
ε
ε− 1
Et
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβlmct+l
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε
C1−σt+l
Et
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβl
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε−1
C1−σt+l
(3.14)
3.2.6 Banks
The representative bank, operating in a competitive market, collects deposits from households
at the interest rate on deposits rDt , posts credit vacancies in the credit market sustaining the
utility unit cost bt = b/λt and provides wholesale firms with the loans upon which the interest
rate rLt is charged. Each match in the credit market (their total number being equal to qBt V Bt )
provides firms with the funds necessary to post one vacancy in the labor market (their total number
being equal to kFV Ft ) and matched credit lines are immediately transformed into lines of credit
financing labor vacancies, only a share of which finds a match with workers. Each of these realized
matches provides the lines of credit which allow the firm to pay the wage (wtht) to be anticipated
to matched workers. The proceeds from sales allow the firm to repay the loans and to pay the
interest to the bank. In the following period, each of these firms will continue to have their wage bill
financed by banks, unless a separation occurs in at least one market. Given these assumptions, the
lines of credit financing vacancies (credit matches) and those financing wages evolve, respectively,
according to:
Ht = qBt V
B
t (3.15)
LNt = (1− ρ)LNt−1 + qFt Ht (3.16)
Recalling that the funded credit lines for labour vacancy posting that are not transformed into
labor matches are destroyed and that in this case the bank looses the anticipated funds and the
interest on this amount, the value of the representative bank, Jt, can be written as:6
Jt = (RLt −RDt )wthtLNt + (RLt qFt −RDt )kFHt +RDt
Xt
Pt
− btV Bt + βEt
λt+1
λt
Jt+1 (3.17)
where Xt/Pt =
Bt+1 −Bt
Pt
. At any time, the bank chooses Ht by setting V Bt in order to maximize
(3.17) subject to (3.15) and (3.16). By using the envelope theorem we get the bank’s “credit
6The bank’s profit at time t is given by revenues minus costs. Revenues are given by the sum of: (i) the repayment
of the loans financing wages plus interest, RLt
(
wthtLNt
)
; (ii) the repayment of the loans financing the posting of job
vacancies, which depends on the probability that the firm fills a labor vacancy, plus interest, RLt
(
qFt k
FHt
)
. Costs
are equal to the sum of: (a) the repayment of real deposits plus interest, RDt Dt/Pt; (b) the sweat cost related to the
posting of credit vacancies, btV Bt . By using the bank’s balance sheet, stating that real deposits and money growth,
Xt/Pt,finance the loans provided to firms, Dt/Pt +Xt/Pt = wthtLNt + k
FHt, equation (3.17) is straightforwardly
obtained.
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creating condition”:
bt
qFt q
B
t
− (RLt qFt −RDt )
kF
qFt
= (RLt −RDt )wtht + (3.18)
+(1− ρ)βEtλt+1
λt
[
bt+1
qFt+1q
B
t+1
−
(
RLt+1 −
RDt+1
qFt+1
)
kF
]
Similar to the firm’s case, the condition to offer a new line of credit at time t depends on the
bank’s stream of present earnings and of discounted future savings on credit vacancy posting and
on defaults.
3.2.7 Loan Rate Bargaining
In line with Wasmer and Weil (2004), we assume a sequential bargaining framework: the rate of
interest on loans is first negotiated by banks and firms; workers and firms then bargain over the
wage and hours. We hence solve the problem backward, taking into account the effect of RLt on
wt and on ht.
The bank’s surplus, SBt = SCt −SV Bt , is equal to the value the bank enjoys if a match with the
firm is realized, SCt = ∂Jt/∂LNt , less the value which obtains if a match is not generated, which is
SV Bt = 0 for the free entry condition. We hence obtain:
SBt = (R
L
t −RDt )wtht + (1− ρ)βEt
λt+1
λt
[
bt+1
qFt+1q
B
t+1
− (RLt+1qFt+1 −RDt+1)
kF
qFt+1
]
(3.19)
The interest rate on loans is obtained by maximizing the Nash product (SBt )1−z(SFt )z. The
optimality condition is:
(1− z)γBt SFt + zγFt SBt = 0 (3.20)
where z and (1− z) are the bargaining powers of firms and of banks, respectively, γBt = ∂SBt /∂RLt
and γFt = ∂SFt /∂RLt , and where both coefficients depend on Wt =
∂wt
∂RLt
and Ht =
∂ht
∂RLt
.7 Substi-
tuting (3.8) and (3.19) into (3.20) we get:
RLt =
ψt
wt
[
mplt
αµt
+
(1− ρ)β
ht
Et
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)]
+ (3.21)
+
(1− ψt)
wt
{
wtR
D
t −
(1− ρ)β
ht
Et
λt+1
λt
[
bt+1
qFt+1q
B
t+1
−
(
RLt+1 −
RDt+1
qFt+1
)
kF
]}
where ψt =
[(1− z)γBt ]
[(1− z)γBt − zγFt ]
.
The interest rate on loans is a weighted average of the firm’s revenues plus future expected net
present value from entering a credit relation, on the one side, and the rate of interest on deposits
plus the bank’s future expected net present value from entering a credit relation, on the other side.
7It is straightforward to compute:
γBt = wtht + (R
L
t −RDt )
(
Wt ht + 
H
t wt
)
γFt =
mplt
µt
Ht − wtht −RLt
(
Wt ht + 
H
t wt
)
where:
Wt =
∂wt
∂RLt
= − d
(RLt )
2
[
mplt
αµt
+ (1− ρ)β 1
ht
Et
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)]
Ht =
∂ht
∂RLt
= 1
α−1−φ
ht
RLt
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The weights depend not only on the relative bargaining power z, but also on γBt and γFt , which
encapsulate wage relative allocational effect and the influence of worked hours ht.
Equation (3.21) allows us to write the interest rate spread in terms of the market tightnesses:
RLt −RDt =
ψt
wt
mpltαµt − wtRDt + (1− ρ)βht Etλt+1λt
 ft+1θCt+1
ηυ
(θCt+1)
1−ζ
(θLt+1)
1−ξ
+RLt+1k
F

+
− (1− ψt)
wt

(1− ρ)β
ht
Et
λt+1
λt
 bt+1
ηυ
(θCt+1)
1−ζ
(θLt+1)
1−ξ
−
RLt+1 − RDt+1
η
(
1
θLt+1
)1−ξ
 kF

 (3.22)
This equation clarifies that if kF = b = 0 and the firm has the maximum bargaining power (ψt = 0,
i.e., z = 1) in our model the rate of interest on loans is equal to that on deposits (the interest rate
spread is zero) and the economy collapses to a standard frictionless cost channel model with labor
market frictions, as in Ravenna and Walsh (2006), where the banking system can be conceived
as a “veil”.8 The interest rate pass-through, defined as the percentage deviation of the loan rate
of interest from its steady state value (rˆLt ) minus that of the rate on deposits from its steady
state (rˆDt ), is in this case complete, i.e., ∂rˆLt /∂rˆDt = 1, where the hatted variables denote percent
deviations from steady state values.
If there exist no search costs (kF = b = f = 0) but the bank has some bargaining power, the
loan rate of interest becomes equal to a weighted average depending on the firm’s revenues and
the interest rate on deposits: RLt = ψt
mplt
wtαµt
+ (1− ψt)RDt . The interest rate spread, RLt −RDt =
ψt
wt
(
mplt
αµt
− wtRDt
)
, can then be equal to zero, and the pass-through can be complete, only if the
firm’s revenue is exactly equal to the wage cost (wage plus interest to be paid to the bank). This
implies that the wage is exactly equal to the minimum amount that can be accepted by the worker,
wt =
(
mrst
1+φ +
wu
ht
)
, so that the bargaining powers in both the labor and the credit markets do not
play any role. If the the firm’s revenue is greater than the wage cost, the intermediary can obtain
a rate of interest on loans greater than that on deposits according to its bargaining power. In this
case, the pass-through will not generally turn out to be complete, as the derivative ∂rˆLt /∂rˆDt is
determined by a complicated convolution of steady state values which can be equal to one only
by chance. The conclusion is the same when costs are introduced into labor and credit markets.
The sharing rule now becomes more complex because search and matching creates surpluses to be
shared between the bank and the firm and the interest rate spread increases with the share of the
firm’s savings on future costs that the bank aspires to obtain and decreases with the bank’s savings
on future costs that the firm is not willing to correspond to the bank. The interest rate spread
can hence be equal to zero only if the share of the firm’s surplus of an existing match the bank is
capturing (net of the wage cost) is exactly equal to the share of the bank’s savings on future costs
that is appropriated by the firm. If this is not the case, the derivative ∂rˆLt /∂rˆDt , which is now
determined by an even more complicated convolution of steady state values, is generally different
from one.
Finally, equation (3.22) highlights that the interest rate spread depends on the interplay of the
existing imperfections in both markets, as it depends also on the relative values of the credit and
8This is Wicksell’s (1936, chapter 9, section B) pure credit economy, where the description of the banking system
is based on four fundamental assumptions: (a) banks do not possess their own capital; (b) they do not hold reserve
assets; (c) their operating costs are zero; (d) the rate of interest on loans is equal to that on deposits.
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the labour market tightness via their effects on the firm’s surplus that the bank aims to capture
(which increases with the credit and the labor market tightnesses), the bank’s savings on future
posting that the firm does not want to correspond to the bank (which decreases with the weighted
ratio of the credit market tightness to the labor market tightness) and the expected savings on
screening cost that the bank sustains in order to give credit to producing firms (which increases
with the labor market tightness).
3.2.8 Monetary authorities
As usual in the literature, we assume that the policy rate is equal to the rate on deposits and that
the central bank employs the following monetary rule:
RDt = (R
D
t−1)
ρR
(
Pt
Pt−1
)(1−ρR)δpi
(Yt)(1−ρR)δY νt (3.23)
where ρR is the degree of interest rate smoothing; δpi and δY are the weights assigned to the
targets of inflation (Pt/Pt−1) and output, respectively. The stochastic term νt = ν
ρν
t−1e
ενt denotes
a stationary first-order autoregressive monetary policy shock.
3.2.9 Market clearing
The aggregate resource constraint is derived from the aggregate money carried over to the fol-
lowing period in real terms, taking into account the government budget constraint. Substitut-
ing into this equation the profits of the specialized firm, of the retail firms and of the banks,
taking into account the bank balance sheet, it is straightforward to obtain: Ct = Yt − Y
w
t
µt
+
RLt
(
wthtL
N
t + q
F
t k
FHt
)
+ (wtht)
(
Nt − LNt
)
. Since wholesale firms make zero profits, it is possi-
ble to write Y
w
t
µt
= RLt
(
wthtNt + qFt k
FV Ft
)
. Using this equation and recalling the good market
equilibrium, Yt = Y dt , and that Ht = V Ft , we obtain:
Ct = Yt +
(
1−RLt
)
wtht
(
Nt − LNt
)
Using the lag operator Γ, equations (3.5) and (3.16) can be written as: Nt = [1− (1− ρ)Γ]−1 qFt V Ft
=
∑∞
i=0(1 − ρ)iqFt−iV Ft−i and LNt = [1− (1− ρ)Γ]−1 qFt V Ft =
∑∞
i=0(1 − ρ)iqFt−iV Ft−i. This shows
that Nt = LNt . It follows that the aggregate resource constraint is:
Ct = Yt
Furthermore the wholesale production is linked to the aggregate demand by the following expres-
sion:
Y wt = Ytvt (3.24)
where vt =
∫ (
Pit
Pt
)−ε
di is a factor of price dispersion. As shown by Galí (2008) this factor is equal
to zero up to a first order approximation when we linearized the model in a neighborhood of zero
inflation steady state.
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3.3 Benchmark parametrization
In order to focus on the interest rate pass-through, we limit our attention to the response of the
model’s variables to a negative interest rate shock. We aim to show that the general dynamic
properties of the model are fully coherent with those of new Keynesian DSGE models with search
and matching frictions only in the labor market, and to highlight the role played by credit market
variables in influencing the economy’s dynamics. To this aim, we linearize the model’s equations
around the steady state values and assign to some model’s parameters the most recent values
employed in the literature. The other coefficients are obtained from steady state conditions (see
the technical appendix). In particular, since there exists very limited evidence on players’ relative
power in interest rate bargaining and on the (utility) cost borne by banks and by firms when
offering and demanding credit, we solve the system of steady state equations so as to endogenously
determine the values of z, f and b.
In the exercise we present here, we use the log version of the utility function by assuming σ = 1.
In this model the elasticity of output to hours does not correspond to the labor share as it depends
on the outcome of the bargaining process. Then, in our benchmark calibration we choose to set
α = 0.75 such that the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale with respect to
the intensive margin, and which is between the values 0.66 proposed by Christoffel, Kuester and
Linzert (2009) and 0.99 used by Christoffel et al. (2009). We set the quarterly discount factor
(β = 0.996) so as to obtain a quarterly real steady state rate of interest on deposits RD = 1.0035
as in de Walque, Pierrard and Rouabah, (2010). The firm’s bargaining power over the rate of
interest (z = 0.92) is set so as to target a steady state value of the interest rate on loans equal to
RL = 1.016 (de Walque, Pierrard and Rouabah, 2010).
Steady state output is normalized to one (Y = 1) and the TFP steady state level is set
accordingly. The steady state employment rate N is calibrated at 0.8, a value lower than in the
data because we interpret the unmatched workers as being both unemployed and partly out of the
labor force, in line with the abstraction we made from labor force participation decisions (Trigari,
2006). The elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods is conventionally set at ε = 6,
which implies a 20 per cent retail mark-up on wholesale prices (e.g., Ravenna and Walsh, 2008).
We impose that the cost of posting a labor vacancy is kF = 0.07 (Ernst and Semmler, 2010). The
replacement rate is set at $ = 0.54, which is between the values of 0.4 proposed by Shimer (2005)
and 0.85 used by Hall (2009), the latter being based on a broader interpretation that permits
utility from leisure and from home production. Firm’s probability of not adjusting prices is the
conventional value ω = 0.75.
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution in the supply of hours is equal to 1/φ. In the
face of the existing controversy on the value of this coefficient, we follow the standard business
cycle literature and set φ equal to one. As for the policy rule, we set the interest rate smoothing
coefficient, ρR, equal to 0.65 and the parameters attached to inflation, δpi, and to output, δY , equal
to 2.5 and to 0.25, respectively. As for the autoregressive coefficient of the monetary policy shock,
we set ρν = 0.5. Finally, we normalize the value of the time spent working in the steady state, h,
to 1 and obtain the value of ϑ (the coefficient multiplying the CRRA equations for hours) which
is coherent with this normalization. Whereas the literature has usually adopted the conventional
value d = 0.5, we set d = 0.15, in line with the recent estimates suggesting a much lower value of
the workers’ bargaining power (e.g., Cooley and Quadrini, 1999; Hagerdon and Manovskii, 2008).
As for the credit parameters for which we have limited evidence, we set their values equal to
their labor market counterparts. We hence calibrate the separation rates in both the labor and the
credit market at 0.05, so as to obtain ρ = 0.097, which is close the value 0.1 chosen by Ravenna
3.4. Dynamic properties of the model and the interest rate pass-through 87
and Walsh (2008). We set the elasticity of matches to labor market searchers according to the
evidence provided by Hagerdon and Manovskii (2008), which is also the midpoint of the evidence
typically cited in the literature (Gertler, Sala and Trigari, 2008), and we do the same for credit
market matches, so as to calibrate ξ = ζ = 0.5. The steady state job vacancy filling rate is taken as
a summary from wide evidence, and the same value is used also for its credit market counterpart:
qF = qB = 0.7. The steady state probability that a firm matches with a bank is also set at
pB = 0.7.
The efficiency of matching in both markets (η and ν) are endogenously determined so as to
assure coherence between the matches obtained using the given probabilities with those obtained
with the matching functions. With this baseline parameterization, we endogenously obtain the
steady state values of the real wage (w = 0.94) and the values of the utility costs borne in the
credit market by firms (f = 0.36) and banks (b = 0.04).
We discuss below the way the model dynamics change when the key exogenous parameters vary
and all the other ones remain constant, including f , b and z.9
3.4 Dynamic properties of the model and the interest rate
pass-through
3.4.1 The dynamic behavior of the benchmark model
Figure 3.1 shows that the main impulse response functions (IRFs) regarding the macroeconomic
variables which we obtain by employing the baseline calibration (solid lines) are in line with the
existing New Keynesian DSGE models with search and matching frictions in the labor market. An
expansionary monetary shock increases output, employment, hours worked, the wage, the marginal
cost and inflation.
Figure 3.1: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock.
9The new values which we obtain for the steady state variables are specified below, case by case.
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Figure 3.1 summarizes also the main IRFs regarding the matching processes. In the labor
market the dynamics of posted vacancies, labor matches (hiring), searchers, the job finding rate,
the job vacancy filling rate and the labor market tightness are also coherent with the existing New
Keynesian DSGE models with search and matching frictions. The explanation of labor market
dynamics is standard. With nominal rigidities a reduction in the policy interest rate produces a
lower real interest rate; this induces households to increase consumption. The consequent increase
in production requires additional labor input. The response of employment (the extensive margin)
is lower and more persistent than the response of hours worked per employee (the intensive margin)
because firms can immediately adjust hours without sustaining any cost in response to the increase
in the demand for output. Yet, the rise in demand also stimulates wholesale firms’ expected
profits and this boosts job vacancy posting. Since there is more hiring, the number of searchers
(determined by the dynamics of employment) falls. As a consequence, the job vacancy filling rate
decreases whereas the job finding rate and the labor market tightness go up. In anticipation of
a tighter labor market and higher profits the value of an existing match increases; together with
greater disutility from supplying hours of work, this allows workers to negotiate higher wages. The
raise in wages and the fall in the marginal product of labor lead to higher marginal costs and
inflation.
Figure 3.2: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock.
As for the credit market, in our model firms choose labor vacancies by setting the demand
for credit. It follows that the increase in job vacancy posting requires that firms expand their
demand for lines of credit, as shown in Figure 3.2. With our benchmark parametrization, banks’
supply of lines of credit increases.10 The overall effect is an increase in credit matches, the credit
vacancy filling rate and the credit market tightness (from the point of view of firms), whereas the
10The two matching functions present an important difference. In the labor market the dynamics of searchers
is guided by a state variable (employment) and by the exogenous separation rate, whereas in the credit market
the state variable plays no role in determining credit vacancies which are chosen by banks by equalizing costs and
benefits of marginal posting. Depending on the model’s parametrization, and in particular on the utility cost b,
banks’ optimal reaction to an increase in credit demand can be to vary their (costly) vacancy posting more or less
than demand.
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credit line finding rate and the inverse of the tightness, what Wasmer and Weil (2004) define the
liquidity of the credit market, fall. The decrease in the policy (deposit) rate lowers the costs the
bank sustains, and is partly rewarded for, when supplying lines of credit, but the increase in credit
market tightness raises the firm’s surplus of an existing match (see equation 3.21) and the bank
(that wants to capture a share of this surplus) may aspire to negotiate an higher interest rate. The
latter effect contrasts the former one and this leads to an incomplete pass-through of the policy
rate to the interest rate on loans. This is shown in Figure 3.2, where the interest rate on loans
falls less than the deposit rate, with a response to the shock depicting an humped-shaped pattern.
3.4.2 Comparison with the complete pass-through model
We can now compare the dynamics generated by the benchmark model with those which obtain
when search and matching frictions are present only in the labor market and the interest rate pass-
through is complete, i.e., with no distinction between RDt and RLt (dashed lines). As described in
subsection 2.7, in this version of the model any source of surplus arising from a match between
firms and banks (the cost of posting credit vacancies, b, and the financial cost of a labor vacancy,
kF ) are eliminated and no banks’ bargaining power exists (z = 1). In order to keep a frictional
labor market, the search cost f is now interpreted as the entry cost to be sustained in order to
participate in the labor matching process.
As shown in Figure 3.1, the monetary policy shock is slightly more expansionary on output
(and consumption) in the complete pass-through model than in the benchmark model. Besides the
common effect developing through the demand channel and other things being equal, this depends
on the different reactions of the marginal costs which vary more in the benchmark model than
in the complete pass-through model because RLt does not fall as much as RDt does (incomplete
pass-through). The strength of the cost channel effect in the complete pass-through model hence
mitigates the increase of marginal cost and inflation. The implications of this argument on RDt are
straightforward.
In the complete pass-through model the stronger increase in output asks for a sharper increase
in labor input. The complete pass-through and the absence of credit search frictions lower the
expected cost of filling a job vacancy (which is equal to ft
qFt
instead of ft
qFt p
B
t
+RLt k
F ) and induce
firms to meet this need by expanding the extensive margin with only negligible effects on the
intensive one.11 The job vacancy filling rate hence falls more, whereas the labor market tightness
and the value of an existing match increase more. The tighter labor market and the higher profits
increase the value of an existing match so much as to allow workers to negotiate a slightly higher
wage. The introduction of credit market frictions may hence help to moderate the reaction of
wages to an expansionary policy shock.
The exercise carried out in this subsection might suggest that an incomplete pass-through
generated by credit market frictions has a limited effect on the transmission of monetary policy
shocks to output and inflation, thus confirming the results obtained by Kaufmann and Scharler
(2009) in a model where the loan rate equation is not microfounded. This conclusion would not
however be completely accurate. Kaufmann and Scharler’s claim is in fact based on the examination
of the impact responses to a monetary policy shock, which in their model are indeed identical in the
presence of “high” or “low” degrees of incompleteness in the interest rate pass-though. If we perform
the same experiment with our benchmark and complete pass-through models, the differences which
obtain in terms of impact responses are however quite different, as summarized in the following
11Remember that the production function exhibits constant (decreasing) returns to scale with respect to the
extensive (intensive) margin.
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table.
Furthermore, the values of the ratio of the standard deviations of inflation and output are also
Benchmark Complete pass-through
Output 1.738 1.853
Inflation 0.695 0.643
Table 3.1: Impact responses of output and inflation to a monetary policy shock. Percentage
deviations from steady states.
significantly different, being equal to 0.35 in the benchmark model and to 0.29 in the complete
pass-through model. Finally, our model allows us to highlight that the economic mechanism
transmitting monetary policy shocks to output and inflation is based on the reactions of several
labor and credit market variables. The magnitudes of these reactions depend on the values taken
up by some key parameters, as we now aim to show.
3.5 Determinants of the interest rate pass-through
In this section we summarize the effects on the model dynamics produced by the main parameters
influencing the degree of the loan interest rate pass-through. We focus, in particular, on the
bargaining powers of the worker over the wage (d) and of the bank over the loan rate (z), and on
the cost of posting labor and credit vacancies (kF and b, respectively).
3.5.1 Bargaining powers
The dotted lines in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 depict the dynamic behavior of the model when d =
0.05 (the median value proposed by Cooley and Quadrini, 1999).12 In this case, due to the
reduced bargaining power of the worker, the contracted hourly wage increases less than in the
benchmark model following a negative shock on the policy rate, whereas the output increase
remains substantially unchanged. This is due to the sharper fall in the interest rate on loans (to
be discussed below) which, according to the optimal condition on hours, mplt/
(
µtR
L
t
)
= mrst,
asks for a sharper fall in the marginal product of labor. As a consequence, firms adjust more on
the intensive margin and less on the extensive one. The lower increase in hiring asks for a milder
reaction of labor vacancies and lowers the reaction of workers in search. The net effect is that
the probability that a worker finds a firm increases less, whereas the probability of filling a labor
vacancy falls less. As a consequence, the labor market tightness (from the point of view of firms)
and the labor matches increase less than in the benchmark model.
In the credit market, the milder reaction of labor vacancies generates a lower increase in the
demand for lines of credit and the same occurs to the supply of credit, and hence in the credit
matches. The probability that a firm finds a bank falls less and the probability of filling a credit
vacancy increases less than in the benchmark model, so that the credit market tightness (from
the point of view of firms) displays a less positive reaction. This effect on the tightness implies a
lower increase in the surplus of an existing credit match which, as explained above, counteracts
12Under this parametrization the new values of the matching probabilities are: qB = 0.9 and pB = 0.54, qF = 0.57,
pF = 0.34. Further, the steady state rate of interest on loans and of the real wage are respectively RL = 1.019 and
w = 0.90.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock: lower d and higher z.
the decrease in the policy rate lowering the costs the bank is rewarded for when supplying lines
of credit. When the worker’s bargaining power decreases, the milder reaction of the surplus hence
produces a sharper fall of the rate of interest on loans and the pass-though becomes less incomplete.
The opposite chain of effects is produced by an increase in d.
The dashed lines in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the behavior of the model when z = 0.95.13
The lower bargaining power of the bank allows the interest rate on loans to decreases more than
in the benchmark case even though the credit market tightness rises more. To understand this,
consider that the higher z produces two effects: (i) lower bank’s expected profits induce credit
vacancy posting and credit matches to increase less than in the benchmark model following an
expansionary monetary policy shock; (ii) as in the case of a lower d, the optimal condition on hours
implies a sharper fall in the marginal product of labor, a sharper reaction of worked hours and a
lower reaction of employment. This explains the lower reaction of labor vacancies and of workers in
search, together with the associated changes in the dynamics of the other labour market variables.
In the credit market the demand for lines of credit reacts slightly less than in the benchmark
model, whereas the positive reaction of the supply of credit is much less acute. It follows that
the credit line finding rate decreases more, whereas the credit vacancy filling rate and the credit
market tightness rise more than in the benchmark model. The firm’s surplus of an existing match
the bank aims at capturing is hence higher, but it is weighted by a lower (modified) bargaining
power, ψt. Furthermore, as clarified by equation (3.21), a greater role in the determination of RLt
continues to be played by the cost sustained by the bank that the firm is willing to correspond in
the interest rate bargaining. The opposite chain of effects is produced by an increase in the bank’s
bargaining power.
The findings of this subsection can be summarized by stating that the degree of pass-through
from policy rates to loan rates increases with the firm’s bargaining powers in wage and in interest
13Under this parametrization the new values of the matching probabilities in the credit and labor market are:
qB = 0.87, pB = 0.57, qF = 0.79, pF = 0.25. Further, the steady state rate of interest on loans and of the real wage
are respectively RL = 1.012 and w = 0.94.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock: lower d and higher z.
rate bargaining.
3.5.2 Posting costs
In Figure 3.5, the dashed lines depict the dynamics of the model’s variables which react the most
when the cost of posting labor vacancies tends to zero (kF= 0.0001).14 In this case the substantial
absence of a financial cost to be sustained when posting a labor vacancy induces firms, with respect
to the benchmark model, to expand more on the extensive margin. It follows that labor vacancies
increase more and searchers decrease more; the labor market tightness increase more. As for the
credit market, it should first be noted that in the benchmark model the term (RLt qFt −RDt )kF /qFt
is negative. It can thus be interpreted as a screening cost that banks sustain in order to give credit
to producing firms. The elimination of kF hence reduces the cost that banks sustain to finance
producing firms and induces intermediaries to increase credit vacancy posting. A congestion effect
is produced: the probability for a bank to fill a credit vacancy increases less (it becomes more
difficult for the bank to fill a credit vacancy) and the probability that a firm finds a line of credit
falls less than in the benchmark model; the credit market tightness (from the point of view of firms)
increases by less. In the loan rate bargaining, the firm’s expected savings on labor vacancy posting
disappear and this mitigates the bank’s aspiration to negotiate a higher interest rate. Moreover,
the sharper decrease in the policy (deposit) rate and the vanishing of the bank’s screening costs15
further reduces the bank’s reward for the costs it sustains when supplying lines of credit. All these
effects allow the loan interest rate to fall more than under the benchmark calibration and the
degree of incompleteness in the interest rate pass-through decreases.
The last results we describe here, without however presenting any figure due the limited changes
14Under this parametrization the new values of the matching probabilities are: qB = 0.91 and pB = 0.54,
qF = 0.82, pF = 0.24. Further, the steady state rate of interest on loans and of the real wage are respectively
RL = 1.017 and w = 0.93.
15In the benchmark model these costs positively react to a monetary easening due to the decrease in the job
vacancy filling rate.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock: lower kF .
which we obtain, are those produced by an increase in the cost to be sustained by the bank when
offering lines of credit. The greater the value of b the less banks increase credit vacancies as
compared to the benchmark model; as a consequence, credit matches, and hence labor matches
and employment, react the less. This implies that firms post less vacancies and hence ask for less
lines of credit. With our parametrization, and in particular with the chosen value for the cost
f , the reaction of firms in their attempt to mitigate their (costly) search in the credit market is
stronger than that of banks and the credit market tightness increases less than in the benchmark
case. A greater b also means greater bank’s savings on future costs and hence a sharper reaction,
as compared to the benchmark model, of this component that the firm is not willing to correspond
to the bank. Both effects contribute to generate a stronger reaction of the loan interest rate to an
expansionary monetary policy shock and thus to reduce the incompleteness of the pass-through.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have extended to a cash in advance New Keynesian DSGE theoretical model
with sticky prices Wasmer and Weil’s (2004) suggestion to introduce search and matching frictions
in both the labor and the financial markets. In this economy households are depicted in a standard
fashion, and so are retail firms producing under monopolistic competition the differentiated goods
consumed by households. Before starting production, wholesale competitive firms, producing a
homogeneous good, search for credit by banks posting loan offers; the firms that match with banks
may post vacancies in the labor market, where unemployed workers are searching for jobs. The
firms that have filled their vacancies obtain from banks the funds necessary to pay for the wage
bill. They then sell production to retail firms, loans are repaid and households receive profit
income from financial intermediaries and firms, and the principal plus interest on deposits. The
wage and the interest rate on loans are determined according to a sequential Nash bargaining
procedure. A fraction of the wholesale firms producing in a given period - determined on the basis
of a separation rate specifying the fraction of labor and credit matches which are destructed at
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the end of the production period - obtains loans also in the next period. The firms matching with
banks and obtaining the loans necessary to post vacancies in the labor market may not be able
to match with workers and so to start production. They hence cannot repay their debt with the
banks and default on the corresponding loans.
The dynamic properties of the macroeconomic variables of our model with respect to a mon-
etary shock are consistent with the main cyclical evidence reported in the New Keynesian DSGE
literature and the same holds for the other labor market variables. Yet, by comparing the bench-
mark model with the model where no distinction is made between RDt and RLt (complete cost
channel model), we showed that the presence of credit market frictions moderates the reactions of
both output and wages to an expansionary policy shock. We also documented that the difference
between the impact responses of output and inflation which we obtain with the benchmark model
and with the complete cost channel model is more relevant than suggested by the recent literature.
The model also allows us to propose a novel explanation of the incomplete pass-through of
policy rate changes to bank loan rates in an economy where asymmetric informations are absent
and banks are perfectly competitive. In a model with search and matching frictions in labor and
credit markets, the interest rate pass-through is in fact necessarily incomplete if banks possess
some power in the bargaining over the loan rate of interest, if the cost of posting job vacancies
(which also influences the cost that bank have to bear before being able to finance producing firms)
is positive and if firms and bank sustain costs when searching for lines of credit and when posting
credit vacancies, respectively. Finally, as the interest rate spread increases with the share of the
firm’s savings on future costs that the bank aspires to obtain and decreases with the bank’s savings
on future costs that the firm is not willing to correspond to the bank, and since these magnitudes
depend also on the labor market tightness, the interplay of imperfections in labour and credit
markets plays an important role in determining the model’s behavior.
This conclusion might suggest that the less incomplete interest rate pass-through that empirical
investigations documented for the United States vis à vis the Euro Area before the recent financial
crisis could be explained by the lower bargaining power of banks (due to the relatively more
important role played by capital markets vis à vis banks) and the lower costs in the functioning
of the credit market which are present in the former economy. The recent financial crisis, by
disrupting credit markets and by increasing these costs more in the United States than in the Euro
Area, may have favoured the emergence of a similar degree of incompleteness of the interest bank
loan rate pass-through in the two economies.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
Data and Sources
Real GDP: Quarterly Real Gross Domestic Product, Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. Department of
Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal Reserve Economic Data of Saint Luis.
Employment: Monthly Employees, Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau
of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Economic Data of Saint Luis.
Nominal Wages: Monthly wage and salary disbursements, Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal Reserve Economic Data of Saint
Luis.
Price Index: Monthly Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, Seasonally Adjusted,
U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Economic Data of
Saint Luis.
Policy Rate: Monthly Effective Federal Funds Rate, U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of
Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Economic Data of Saint Luis.
Interest rate on loans: Quarterly Weighted-Average Effective Loan Rate for All C&I Loans, All
Commercial Banks, U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve
Economic Data of Saint Luis.
We compute the average of the monthly flows to transform the monthly time series into quar-
terly data. In line with Fernández-Villaverde (2010) we compute the real wages by deflating the
relative nominal series by the consumer price index. The inflation rate is computed as the quarter
on quarter log differences in the Consumer Price Index. Finally, the series of the real GDP, the
employment and the real wages are made stationary by the first-difference transformation.
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BVAR Construction
Consider the VAR(p) model presented in section (1.2):
Y = XB + U
The prior of the BVAR model is obtained by combining two types of priors. The first component
is determined by a diffuse (or Jeffreys’ improper) prior necessary to insure the existence of the
prior expectation of Σ:
p1 (Σ) ∝ |Σ|−
n+1
2 (A.1)
The second kind of prior relies on a set of Tp dummy observations, (Y p, Xp), whose (normal)
likelihood is:
p2(Y p|B,Σ, Xp) ∝ |Σ|−T
p
2 exp
{
−1
2
Tr(Σ−1(Y p −XpB)′(Y p −XpB))
}
(A.2)
According to Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984) and by following Lubik and Schorfheide (2005)
we employ the Minnesota approach for the coefficients of the lags of the BVAR model. The
implementation of the Minnesota prior requires to set values for parameters governing the overall
tightness of the prior (τ) and the decay factor for scaling down the coefficients of lagged values
(d). Moreover we set the length of the presample Y 0 in order to compute its mean and variance
(σ2).1 In our case for n = 6 and p = 8. The coefficients of the matrix B are assumed to be a priori
independent and normally distributed. The generic autoregressive matrix at the lag h is:
βh =

βh,11 . . . . . . βh,61
...
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . .
...
βh,61 . . . . . . βh,66

The priors on the coefficients are set in order to reflect the following beliefs:
E (βh,ij) =
{
1 if i = j and h = 1
0 otherwise
Hence, on average, we impose the following dummies:
1. for the coefficients on the first lag:
δτσ1 0 . . . 0
0 δτσ2
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 . . . 0 δτσ6
 =

τσ1 0 . . . 0
0 τσ2
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 . . . 0 τσ6
0
6×43

[
B
49×6
]
+ u′
where the shrinkage parameter δ governing the relative importance of the lags of the variables
is set equal to 1;
1We employ the default calibration proposed by the Dynare BVAR toolbox. Hence we set τ = 3, d = 0.5 and
the length of Y 0 needed to initialize the lags of the VAR model equal to first 20 observations.
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2. for those on the second lag:
[
0
6×6
]
=
 06×6
τσ12d 0 . . . 0
0 τσ22d
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 . . . 0 τσ62d
0
6×37

[
B
49×6
]
+ u′
3. for those on the third lag:
[
0
6×6
]
=
 06×12
τσ13d 0 . . . 0
0 τσ23d
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 . . . 0 τσ63d
0
6×31

[
B
49×6
]
+ u′
4. and so on for the other five lags.
The previous dummies imply:
V ar (βh,ij) =

Σu,ii
τ2h2dσ2i
if i = j
Σu,jj
τ2h2dσ2i
otherwise
Furthermore, according to Lubik and Schorfheide (2005), we employ some additional dummies,
depending on the hyperparameters which control the tightness of the prior over Σ and the degrees
of the co-persistence and persistence matrices.2
By combining (A.1) and (A.2) we obtain the final prior:
p(B,Σ) = p1(Σ)p2(Y p|B,Σ, Xp)
∝ |Σ|− (df
p+n+1+k)
2 exp
{
−1
2
Tr(Σ−1(Y p −XpB)′(Y p −XpB))
}
(A.3)
where dfp = Tp−k. By defining Bˆp = (Xp′Xp)−1Xp′Xp and Sp = (Y p−XpBˆp)′(Y p−XpBˆp),
after some computations we are able to write:
p(B,Σ) ∝ |Σ|− (df
p+n+1)
2 exp
{
−1
2
Tr(Σ−1Sp)
}
×
|Σ|− k2 exp
{
−1
2
Tr(Σ−1(B − Bˆp)′Xp′Xp(B − Bˆp))
}
2The hyperparameters ω, λ and µ of the Dynare BVAR toolbox control the tightness of the prior over Σ and the
degrees of the co-persistence and persistence prior dummies respectively; we set ω = 1, λ = 5 and µ = 2. Then the
total number of dummies is Tp = n(p+ ω + 1) + 1.
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which is equation (1.1) of the text. The previous prior density has a Normal inverted Wishart
form:3
Σ ∼ iW (Sp, df p)
vec (B) |Σ ∼ N
(
vec
(
Bˆp
)
,Σ⊗
(
Xp
′
Xp
)−1)
Now we consider the model augmented with the dummies:
Y P
TP×n
= XP
TP×k
B
k×n
+ UP
TP×n
where XP =
[
Xp
X
]
, Y P =
[
Y p
Y
]
, UP =
[
Up
U
]
and TP = T + Tp.
The posterior distribution is obtained by using the Bayes theorem:
p(B,Σ|Y,X) = p(Y |B,Σ, X)p(B,Σ)
p(Y |X) ∝ p(Y |B,Σ, X)p(B,Σ) (A.4)
Then we get:
p(B,Σ|Y,X) ∝ |Σ|− (df
P+n+1+k)
2 exp
{
−1
2
Tr(Σ−1(Y P −XPB)′(Y P −XPB))
}
or after some manipulations
p(B,Σ|Y,X) ∝ |Σ|− (df
P+n+1)
2 exp
{
−1
2
Tr(Σ−1SP)
}
×
|Σ|− k2 exp
{
−1
2
Tr(Σ−1(B − BˆP)′XP′XP(B − BˆP))
}
which is equation (1.4) of the text, where BˆP = (XP
′
XP)−1XP
′
XP , SP = (Y P −XPBˆP)′(Y P −
XPBˆP) and dfP = TP − k. The posterior density shows a Normal inverse Wishart distribution:
Σ ∼ iW
(
SP , df P
)
vec (B) |Σ ∼ N
(
vec
(
BˆP
)
,Σ⊗
(
XP
′
XP
)−1)
The Lending Rate Equation
In the following the log-linearization and the steady state versions of the lending rate equation are
provided.
The mark-up case
The log-linearization of equation (1.16) provides:
3The inverse-Wishart distribution requirement on the number of degrees of freedom, dfp ≥ n, is satisfied.
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RLRˆLt −RLΨ(RD)RˆLt −RLΨ′(RD)RDRˆDt −RDRˆDt = 0
By rearranging we have:
RL
[
1−Ψ(RD)] RˆLt = [RD +RLΨ′(RD)RD] RˆDt
by remembering that RL
[
1−Ψ(RD)] = RD we finally have:
RˆLt = (1 + ΨR) Rˆ
D
t
where ΨR = Ψ
′RD
1−Ψ . The previous equation is the (1.17) of the text.
The persistence factor case
From equation (1.18) we have:
RˆLt + ζ1
(
RˆLt − ζ0RˆLt−1
)
− RˆDt = 0
Then:
(1 + ζ1) RˆLt − ζ1ζ0RˆLt−1 = RˆDt
Finally we have:
RˆLt =
1
1 + ζ1
RˆDt +
ζ1ζ0
1 + ζ1
RˆLt−1
which is (1.19) of the text.
The monopolistic competition case
From equation (1.22) we have:
1 = (1− χ)
(
RL∗t
RLt
)1−η
+ χ
(
RLt−1
RLt
)1−η
The log-linearization of the previous equation yields:
0 = (1− χ)(1− η)
(
RL∗
RL
)−η (
RˆL∗t − RˆLt
)
− χ(1− η)
(
RL
RL
)−η (
RˆLt − RˆLt−1
)
Since RL∗ = RL, by solving with respect to RˆLt we obtain:
RˆL∗t =
1
1− χRˆ
L
t −
χ
1− χRˆ
L
t−1 (A.5)
Rearranging equation (1.23) we have:
RL∗t Et
∞∑
l=0
χlβlC−σt+l(R
L
t+l)
ηLt+l
Pt+l
= ΞEt
∞∑
l=0
χlβlC−σt+lR
D
t+l(R
L
t+l)
ηLt+l
Pt+l
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The log-linearization of the left side of the previous equation yields:
L
P
(RL)1+ηC−σ
1− χβ Rˆ
L∗
t +
L
P
(RL)1+ηC−σ
∞∑
l=0
χlβl
(
EtLˆt+l − EtPˆt+l + ηEtRˆLt+l − σEˆtCt+l
)
By remembering that ΞRD = RL the right side provides:
L
P
(RL)1+ηC−σ
∞∑
l=0
χlβl
(
EtLˆt+l − EtPˆt+l + ηEtRˆLt+l − σEtCˆt+l + EtRˆDt+l
)
By equating and simplifying the two sides we have:
RˆL∗t = (1− χβ)
∞∑
l=0
χlβlEtRˆ
D
t+l (A.6)
By iteration solution equation (A.6) can be written as:
RˆL∗t = (1− χβ)RˆDt + χβRˆL∗t+1 (A.7)
By using equation (A.5) into (A.6) we have:
1
1− χRˆ
L
t −
χ
1− χRˆ
L
t−1 = (1− χβ)RˆDt +
χβ
1− χRˆ
L
t+1 −
χ2β
1− χRˆ
L
t
By solving with respect to the RˆLt we obtain:
RˆLt =
βχ
1 + βχ2
EtRˆ
L
t+1 +
χ
1 + βχ2
RˆLt−1 +
(1− βχ)(1− χ)
1 + βχ2
RˆDt
which is equation (1.25) of the text.
The search and matching case
The first order condition and the envelope theorem of the bank’s problem in the search and
matching framework are:
for V Bt :
kBRDt
qBt
− (RLt −RDt )wtNt = βEt
λt+1
λt
∂JBt+1
∂LNt
(A.8)
for LNt−1:
∂JBt
∂LNt−1
= (1− ρ)(RLt −RDt )wtNt + β(1− ρB)Et
λt+1
λt
∂JBt+1
∂LNt
(A.9)
By replacing (A.8) into (A.9) we obtain:
∂JBt
∂LNt−1
= (1− ρB)k
BRDt+1
qBt
(A.10)
By updating equation (A.10) and then by replacing into (A.8), we then get:
kBRDt
qBt
= (RLt −RDt )wtNt + (1− ρB)βEt
λt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
qBt+1
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which is equation (1.27) of the text. The surpluses of a bank and of a firm are:
SBt = B
m
t −But (A.11)
and
SFt = F
m
t − Fut (A.12)
The value of a unfilled credit vacancy is:
But = −kBRDt + qBt Bmt + (1− qBt )βEt
λt+1
λt
But+1 (A.13)
Since the free entry condition, But = 0 ∀ t, the value of a filled credit vacancy is equal to the bank
surplus:
Bmt = S
B
t =
kBRDt
qBt
. (A.14)
or by remembering the equation (1.27) SBt = (RLt −RDt )wtNt + (1− ρB)βEt
λt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
qBt+1
.
The values of a filled and unfilled credit vacancy are respectively:
Fmt =
Y wt
µt
− wtRLt Nt + βEt
λt+1
λt
[
(1− ρB + ρBpBt+1)Fmt+1 + ρB(1− pBt+1)Fut+1
]
(A.15)
Fut = βEt
λt+1
λt
[
pBt+1F
m
t+1 + (1− pBt+1)Fut+1
]
(A.16)
Then the surplus of the firm is:
SFt = F
m
t − Fut =
Y wt
µt
− wtRLt Nt + (1− ρB)βEt
λt+1
λt
(1− pBt+1)SFt+1 (A.17)
The optimal condition of the problem (1.28) of the text is:
(1− z)γBt SFt + zγFt SBt = 0 (A.18)
where γBt =
∂SBt
∂RLt
= wtNt and γFt =
∂SFt
∂RLt
= −wtNt. From the previous equation we have:
SFt =
z
(1− z)
kBRDt
qBt
. (A.19)
By replacing equation (A.19) one period ahead in the firms’ surplus definition (A.17) we obtain:
SFt =
Y wt
µt
− wtRLt Nt + (1− ρB)
z
(1− z)βEt
λt+1
λt
(1− pBt+1)
kBRDt+1
qBt+1
(A.20)
By replacing equations (A.20) and (A.14) into (A.18), and rearranging we obtain:
(1− z)Y wt
µt
− (1− z)wtRLt Nt + (1− ρB)zβEt
λt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
qBt+1
− (1− ρB)zβEtλt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
θCt+1
= z
kBRDt
qBt
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By using the the credit creating condition and by solving with respect to the interest rate on loans
we obtain:
RLt =
(1− z)
wtNt
Y wt
µt
+
z
wtNt
[
RDt wtNt − (1− ρB)βEt
λt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
θCt+1
]
which is equation (1.31) of the text. By using equations (1.6) and (1.9) of the text, the previous
equation can be written in the following way:
RLt =
(1− z)
α
RLt + zR
D
t −
z(1− ρB)
wtNt
1
RDt
Et
Pt+1
Pt
kBRDt+1
θCt+1
Then, the log-linearization of the previos equation is:
RLRˆLt =
(1− z)
α
RLt Rˆ
L
t + zR
D
t Rˆ
D
t +
−z(1− ρ
B)
wN
RD
RD
kB
θC
[
EtPˆt+1 − Pˆt − wˆt − Nˆt − RˆDt + EtRˆDt+1 − EtθˆCt+1
]
By solving with respect to RˆLt we have:
RˆLt =
αz
RL (α− 1 + z)
[
RD +
(1− ρB)βpB
wN
kB
qB
]
RˆDt +
+
αz(1− ρB)pBkB
RL (α− 1 + z)wNqB
[
Etθˆ
C
t+1 − EtRˆDt+1 +
(
wˆt + Nˆt − Etpˆit+1
)]
which is equation (1.32) of the text.
From the steady state version of equation (A.15) we are able to obtain:
(Fm − Fu) =
Y w
µ
− wRLN − (1− β)Fu
(1− β) + βρB (1− pB) (A.21)
From he steady state version of equation equation (A.16) we have:
(Fm − Fu) = (1− β)F
u
βpB
(A.22)
By equating equations (A.21) and (A.22), and by assuming that the unmatched value of firms, Fu,
is equal to a no zero flow cost c¯, we have:
(1− β) c¯
βpB
=
Y w
µ
− wRLN − (1− β) c¯
(1− β) + βρB (1− pB)
By solving with respect to credit line finding rate we get:
pB =
c(1− β)(1− β + βρB)
β
[(
Y w
µ
− wRLN
)
− (1− β)(1− ρB)c
]
which is equation (1.33) of the text.
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The identity principle of polynomials
Kaufmann and Sharler (2009) estimate
1
1 + ζ1
= 0.95 from which it is possible to get ζ1 = 0.053.
Moreover, they estimate
ζ0ζ1
1 + ζ1
= 0.03 which implies ζ0 = 0.6.
The steady state version of equation (1.18) is
RL =
(
1
Σ0
) 1
[1+(1−ζ0)ζ1] (
RD
) 1
[1+(1−ζ0)ζ1]
By computing the sample mean of RLt and RDt we can compute Σ0 =
R¯D(
R¯L
)[1+(1−ζ0)ζ1] = 0.9807.
Further, if we assume ζ0 = 0 we obtain a formulation consistent with Chowdhury et al. (2006):
RL =
(
1
Σ0
) 1
1+ζ1 (
RD
) 1
1+ζ1 (A.23)
In this case we are able to compute Σ0 =
R¯D(
R¯L
)1+ζ1 = 0.9792. Furthermore, equation (A.23) can
be rewritten as RL = a
(
RD
)b where a = ( 1
Σ0
) 1
1+ζ1
and b =
1
1 + ζ1
.
The steady state version of equation (1.16) is
RL =
1
Ψ0
(
RD
)1−κ
(A.24)
The previous equation can be rewritten as RL = c
(
RD
)d where c = 1
Ψ0
and d = 1− κ.
Equations (A.23) and (A.24) have the same form. Hence, by the identity principle of polynomials,
it has to be a = c and b = d, or
(
1
Σ0
) 1
1+ζ1
=
1
Ψ0
and
1
1 + ζ1
= 1− κ. Hence, given the values of
Σ0 and ζ1 we are able to compute Ψ0 = 0.9717 and κ = 0.05.
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Data and Sources
Real GDP: Quarterly Real Gross Domestic Product, Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. Department of
Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal Reserve Economic Data of Saint Luis.
Employment: Monthly Employees, Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau
of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Economic Data of Saint Luis.
Nominal Wages: Monthly wage and salary disbursements, Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal Reserve Economic Data of Saint
Luis.
Price Index: Monthly Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, Seasonally Adjusted,
U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Economic Data of
Saint Luis.
Policy Rate: Monthly Effective Federal Funds Rate, U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of
Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Economic Data of Saint Luis.
Interest rate on loans: Quarterly Weighted-Average Effective Loan Rate for All C&I Loans, All
Commercial Banks, U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve
Economic Data of Saint Luis.
Credit market tightness: Quarterly Net Percentage of Domestic Respondents Tightening Stan-
dards for Commercial and Industrial Loans Small Firms, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and Federal Reserve Economic Data of Saint Luis.
The quarterly net percentage of Domestic Respondents Tightening Standards for commercial
and industrial loans small firms - the series that we interpret as the tightness index of the credit
market - is provided by the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices from
1990:Q2. This index reports the evaluation of the U.S. banks about the conditions of the credit
market according to the more or less tight banks’ standards applied to the small firms. Hence the
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tightness of the credit market is evaluated from the point of view of the firms. The survey is based
on the responses from 57 domestic banks and 23 U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks. The
small business’ definition by the U.S. Small Business Administration varies by industry, ranging
from fewer than 100 employees (e.g. for the wholesale trade) and fewer than 1500 workers (e.g. for
the telecommunications). Hence, even when considering only those with fewer than 100 employees
(including nonemployer firms)1 we are able to represent about 99.5 % of the total U.S. firms. Then
the previous tightness index can be considered a good proxy of the thickness in the credit market
for all U.S. businesses.
We compute the average of the monthly flows to transform the monthly time series into quar-
terly data. In line with Fernández-Villaverde (2010) we compute the real wages by deflating the
relative nominal series by the consumer price index. The inflation rate is computed as the quarter
on quarter log differences in the Consumer Price Index. Finally, the series of the real GDP, the
employment and the real wages are made stationary by the first-difference transformation.
Agents’ problems, first order conditions and bargaining on in-
terest rate on loans
Households
The CIA constraint is:
PtCt ≤Mt + PtwtNt −Dt (B.1)
The amount of money carried over to the following period is:
Mt+1 = Mt + PtwtNt −Dt − PtCt + ΠFt + ΠBt +RDt Dt (B.2)
Substituting the binding version of (B.1) into (B.2) we have: Mt+1 = ΠFt +ΠBt +RDt Dt. Calculating
this equation a period backward and substituting the result into (B.1) we have the intertemporal
budget constraint that can be expressed in real terms in the following way:
Ct = wtNt +
ΠFt−1
Pt
+
ΠBt−1
Pt
− Dt
Pt
+RDt−1
Dt−1
Pt
(B.3)
The household solves the problem:
JHt = max
[
ϕtU(Ct, Nt) + βEtJHt+1
]
s.t. (B.3)
where U(Ct, Nt) = Ct
1−σ
1−σ − ϑtϑ¯N
1+φ
t
1+φ . The separability of the utility function allows us to make
the usual assumption that consumption risks are fully pooled within the household. All house-
holds hence solve the same problem by choosing the optimal levels of consumption, deposits and
employment. The first order conditions then are:
for Ct: λt = ϕtC−σt (B.4)
for Dt: λt = RDt βEt
Pt
Pt+1
λt+1 (B.5)
1See the statistics about the business size from the U.S. Census Bureau.
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for Nt: wt = ϕtϑtϑ¯
Nφt
λt
(B.6)
The latter two conditions yield the Euler equation (2.2) and the definition of the real wage (2.3)
of the text respectively.
Wholesale firms
Wholesale firms solve the problem:
max
(
Y wt
µt
−RLt wtNt
)
s.t. Y wt = AtN
α
t
The first order condition with respect to Nt is:
1
µt
=
wtR
L
t
mplt
(B.7)
which is equation (2.5) of the text. Hence, the previous equation represents the real marginal costs,
mct, of firms.
Retail firms
The retail firms solve the following problem:
maxEt
∞∑
l=0
ωlβl
λt+1
λt
[(
Pit
Pt+l
)
−mct+l
]
Yit+l
s.t. Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt
In a symmetric equilibrium, the standard first order condition for Pit = P ∗t is:
P ∗t
Pt
=
ε
ε− 1
Et
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβlMCt+l
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε
C1−σt+l
Et
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβl
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε−1
C1−σt+l
(B.8)
which is equation (2.6) of the text.
Banks
The bank solves the following problem:
JBt = max
[
(RLt −RDt )wtNtLNt − kBRDt V Bt +RDt
Xt
Pt
+ βEt
λt+1
λt
JBt+1
]
s.t. LNt = (1− ρB)LNt−1 + qBt V Bt
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The first order condition and the envelope theorem yield:
for V Bt :
kBRDt
qBt
− (RLt −RDt )wtNt = βEt
λt+1
λt
∂JBt+1
∂LNt
(B.9)
for LNt−1:
∂JBt
∂LNt−1
= (1− ρB)(RLt −RDt )wtNt + β(1− ρB)Et
λt+1
λt
∂JBt+1
∂LNt
(B.10)
By replacing (B.9) into (B.10) we obtain:
∂JBt
∂LNt−1
= (1− ρB)k
BRDt
qBt
(B.11)
By updating equation (B.11) and then by replacing into (B.9), we then get:
kBRDt
qBt
= (RLt −RDt )wtNt + (1− ρB)βEt
λt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
qBt+1
(B.12)
which is equation (2.15) of the text.
Loan Interest Rate Bargaining
The loan interest rate Nash bargaining is:
max
RLt
(SFt )
z(SBt )
1−z (B.13)
where:
SBt = B
m
t −But (B.14)
and
SFt = F
m
t − Fut (B.15)
The value of a unfilled credit vacancy is:
But = −kBRDt + qBt Bmt + (1− qBt )βEt
λt+1
λt
But+1 (B.16)
Since the free entry condition, But = 0 ∀ t, the value of a filled credit vacancy is equal to the bank
surplus:
Bmt = S
B
t =
kBRDt
qBt
. (B.17)
or by remembering the equation (B.12): SBt = (RLt −RDt )wtNt + (1− ρB)βEt λt+1λt
kBRDt+1
qBt+1
.
The values of a firm when it has, or not, a credit match are respectively:
Fmt =
Y wt
µt
− wtRLt Nt + βEt
λt+1
λt
[
(1− ρB + ρBpBt+1)Fmt+1 + ρB(1− pBt+1)Fut+1
]
(B.18)
Fut = βEt
λt+1
λt
[
pBt+1F
m
t+1 + (1− pBt+1)Fut+1
]
(B.19)
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Then the surplus of the firm is:
SFt = F
m
t − Fut =
Y wt
µt
− wtRLt Nt + (1− ρB)βEt
λt+1
λt
(1− pBt+1)SFt+1 (B.20)
The optimal condition of the problem (B.13) is:
(1− z)γBt SFt + zγFt SBt = 0 (B.21)
where:
γBt =
∂SBt
∂RLt
= wtNt (B.22)
and:
γFt =
∂SFt
∂RLt
= −wtNt (B.23)
The the optimal condition becomes:
(1− z)SFt = zSBt (B.24)
From the previous equation we have:
SFt =
z
(1− z)
kBRDt
qBt
. (B.25)
By replacing equation (B.25) one period ahead in the firms’ surplus definition (B.20) we obtain:
SFt =
Y wt
µt
− wtRLt Nt + (1− ρB)
z
(1− z)βEt
λt+1
λt
(1− pBt+1)
kBRDt+1
qBt+1
(B.26)
By replacing equations (B.26) and (B.17) into (B.24) we obtain:
(1− z)
[
Y wt
µt
− wtRLt Nt + (1− ρB)
z
(1− z)βEt
λt+1
λt
(1− pBt+1)
kBRDt+1
qBt+1
]
= z
kBRDt
qBt
Rearranging:
(1− z)Y wt
µt
− (1− z)wtRLt Nt + (1− ρB)zβEt
λt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
qBt+1
− (1− ρB)zβEtλt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
θCt+1
= z
kBRDt
qBt
By using the the credit creating condition (B.12) we obtain:
0 =
(1− z)Y wt
µt
− (1− z)wtRLt Nt + z
(
RDt −RLt
)
wtNt − (1− ρB)zβEtλt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
θCt+1
By solving with respect to the interest rate on loans we finally have:
RLt =
(1− z)
wtNt
Y wt
µt
+
z
wtNt
[
RDt wtNt − (1− ρB)βEt
λt+1
λt
kBRDt+1
θCt+1
]
(B.27)
which is equation (2.24) of the text.
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Market Clearing
For each agent it must be:
Xit = WtNit −Dit − PtCit +RDt Dit + ΠFit + ΠBit (B.28)
where Xit = Mit+1 −Mit and ΠFit = ΠRit + ΠSPit . By aggregating and by remembering that the
total labor demand
∫
LNjtNtdj = L
N
t Nt the ARC is:
Xt
Pt
= wtNtLNt −
Dt
Pt
− Ct +RDt
Dt
Pt
+
ΠRt
Pt
+
ΠBt
Pt
+
ΠSPt
Pt
(B.29)
The aggregate banks’ balance sheet and profit function are
Dt
Pt
+
Xt
Pt
= wtNtLNt + k
BV Bt and
ΠBt
Pt
= RLt wtNtL
N
t −RDt wtNtLNt −RDt kBV Bt +RDt
Xt
Pt
respectively. By replacing them into equation
(B.29) and by remembering that
ΠSPt
Pt
= kBV Bt we have:
Xt
Pt
= wtNtLNt −
Dt
Pt
−Ct+RDt
Dt
Pt
+
ΠRt
Pt
+RLt wtNtL
N
t −RDt wtNtLNt −RDt kBV Bt +RDt
Xt
Pt
+kBV Bt
0 = −Ct +RDt
Dt
Pt
+RDt
Xt
Pt
−RDt wtNtLNt −RDt kBV Bt +
ΠRt
Pt
+RLt wtNtL
N
t
0 = −Ct + Π
R
t
Pt
+RLt wtNtL
N
t
Finally we have:
Ct =
ΠRt
Pt
+RLt wtNtL
N
t (B.30)
The total real aggregate wholesale production is
∫
LNjtY
w
t
Pwt
Pt
dj = Y wt
Pwt
Pt
∫
LNjtdj = L
N
t
Y wt P
w
t
Pt
.
Then the real profits of retail firms are
ΠRt
Pt
= Y dt − LNt
YtP
w
t
Pt
where Y dt is the aggregate demand
for goods. Further the equilibrium in the good market implies Y dt = Yt. Then the ARC becomes:
Ct = Yt − LNt
YtP
w
t
Pt
+RLt wtNtL
N
t (B.31)
Since its competitiveness the wholesale sector do zero profits. Then it must be: LNt
YtP
w
t
Pt
=
LNt R
L
t wtNt. By replacing the latter condition into (B.31) we finally have:
Ct = Yt (B.32)
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Steady state model and endogenous entry condition
We report the steady state version of the model used in the estimation phase in order to rewrite
the model only in terms of parameters. The parameters σ, β, α , N , ε are calibrated whereas c,
kB , z, ρB and ξ are estimated. The steady state system is here recursively derived.
From equation (B.5) we obtain the value of the discount factor: RD =
1
β
.
From the production function we get the steady state output Y w = ANα.
Since the price dispersion is f = 1 then Y = Y w. The aggregate resource constraint is: C = Y .
From equation (B.4) the marginal utility of consumption is: λ = C−σ.
From the steady state marginal product of labor we have: mpl = αANα−1.
From equation (B.7), the real marginal costs are mc =
1
µ
=
ε− 1
ε
.
The steady state credit line finding rate and the steady state condition for the endogenous entry
of firms are derived as follows. From equation (B.18) we have:
Fm =
Y w
µ
− wRLN + β [(1− ρB + ρBpB)Fm + ρB(1− pB)Fu]
(1− β)Fm = Y
w
µ
− wRLN − βρB (1− pB) (Fm − Fu)
By subtracting in the both sides of the previous equation the term (1− β)Fu we have:
(1− β) (Fm − Fu) = Y
w
µ
− wRLN − βρB (1− pB) (Fm − Fu)− (1− β)Fu
Then we obtain:
(Fm − Fu) =
Y w
µ
− wRLN − (1− β)Fu
(1− β) + βρB (1− pB) (B.33)
From equation (B.19) we have:
Fu = β
[
pBFm + (1− pB)Fu]
Fu − βFu = βpBFm − βpBFu
Finally we have:
(Fm − Fu) = (1− β)F
u
βpB
(B.34)
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By equating equations (B.33) and (B.34), and by assuming that the unmatched value of firms, Fu,
is equal to a no zero flow cost c¯, we have:
(1− β) c¯
βpB
=
Y w
µ
− wRLN − (1− β) c¯
(1− β) + βρB (1− pB)
By solving with respect to credit line finding rate we get:
(1− β) c¯ [(1− β) + βρB (1− pB)]+ (1− β) c¯βpB
βpB
=
Y w
µ
− wRLN
[
(1− β) + βρB (1− pB)+ βpB] (1− β) c¯ = (Y w
µ
− wRLN
)
βpB
[
(1− β)2 + β (1− β) (ρB + pB − ρBpB)] c¯ = (Y w
µ
− wRLN
)
βpB
[
(1− β)2 + β (1− β) ρB
]
c¯ =
(
Y w
µ
− wRLN
)
βpB − β (1− β) (1− ρB) c¯pB
Finally being wRL = mc ·mpl, we have:
pB =
c(1− β)(1− β + βρB)
β
[(
Y w
µ
−mc ·mplN
)
− (1− β)(1− ρB)c
] (B.35)
which is equation (2.26) of the text. Furthermore, since SF = Fm − Fu from equations (B.25)
and (B.34) we have:
(1− β) c
βpB
=
z
(1− z)
kBRD
qB
. This yields: pB =
cqB
kBRD
(1− z)(1− β)
zβ
or
kB =
cqB
pBRD
(1− z)(1− β)
zβ
. If kB = 0 the left side of the previous equation must be equal to zero.
There are three possibilities: c = 0, qB = 0 or z = 1. We build the steady state system useful to
solve and estimate the log-linearized version of the model such that variations of kB modify the
values of qB whereas the deep parameters c and z do not change. Hence, if kB → 0 then qB → 0
and we are able to evaluate the role of z and c in affecting the bargained loan rate dynamics.
Moreover it is useful to note that the marginal effect of the separation rate on the credit line finding
rate is:
∂pB
∂ρB
=
β(1− β)c
[
β
(
Y w
µ
− wRLN
)
− β(1− β)(1− ρB)c
]
− c(1− β)(1− β + βρB)(1− β)βc
β2
[(
Y w
µ
− wRLN
)
− (1− β)(1− ρB)c
]2
(B.36)
The denominator is always positive. Then, the marginal effect is positive if the numerator is also
positive:
β2(1− β)c
(
Y w
µ
− wRLN
)
− β2(1− β)2c2(1− ρB)− c2(1− β)3β − β2(1− β)2c2ρB > 0
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β2(1− β)c
(
Y w
µ
− wRLN
)
− β2(1− β)2c2 − c2(1− β)3β > 0
β(1− β)c
{
β
(
Y w
µ
− wRLN
)
− (1− β)c [β − (1− β)2]} > 0
β(1− β)c
[
β
(
Y w
µ
− wRLN
)
− (1− β)c (1− β + β2)] > 0
Then an increase of the quit rate rises the credit line finding rate if:
β
(
Y w
µ
− wRLN
)
> (1− β)(1− β + β2)c.
The steady state version of equation (B.27) is:
RL =
(1− z)
wN
Y w
µ
+ zRD − z
wN
(
1− ρB)βkBRD pB
qB
.
By using the steady state version of equations (B.7) and (B.12) we are able to write:
RL =
(1− z)
α
RL + zRD − z
(
RL −RD) (1− ρB)βpB
[1− (1− ρB)β] .
By solving with respect to RL we have: RL =
z
{
1 + (1−ρ
B)βpB
[1−(1−ρB)β]
}
{
1− (1−z)α + z(1−ρ
B)βpB
[1−(1−ρB)β]
}RD.
From equation (B.7), the real wage is w =
mc ·mpl
RL
.
From equation (B.6), the constant attached to the CRRA specification of the utility function is
ϑ¯ =
wλ
Nφ
.
From the steady state version of equation (B.12) we have: qB =
kBRD
[
1− (1− ρB)β]
(RL −RD)wN .
From the definitions of the searchers and of the dynamics of the lines of credit we get the steady
state of the lines of credit: LN =
pB
(ρB + pB − pBρB) .
The steady state value of firms searching for credit is sF = 1− (1− ρB)LN .
From the dynamics of the lines of credit we get the steady state of the number of credit vacancies
V B =
ρBLN
qB
.
The steady state credit market tightness is straightforwardly obtained as θC =
sF
V B
.
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The Linearized Model
In this section we compute the aggregate log-linearized version of the symmetric equilibrium of the
model.
From equation (B.5), the log-linearized Euler equation is: λˆt = RˆDt + Pˆt−EtPˆt+1 +Etλˆt+1. Since
pi = 0, we can write: EtPˆt+1 − Pˆt = Et
(
Pˆt+1 − Pˆt
)
= pˆit+1 and so:
λˆt = RˆDt − Etpˆit+1 + Etλˆt+1 (B.37)
From equation (B.4), the log-linearized version of the marginal utility of consumption equation is:
λˆt = ϕˆt − σCˆt (B.38)
From equation (B.6) we compute the log-linearized version equation of the real wage wˆ = ϕˆt +
ϑˆt + φNˆt − λˆt or wˆ = ϕˆt + ϑˆt + φNˆt + σCˆt − ϕˆt. It yields:
wˆ = ϑˆt + φNˆt + σCˆt (B.39)
From the dynamics of the firms searching for a line of credit, sFt = 1− (1− ρB)LNt−1, we compute:
sF sˆFt = −(1− ρB)LN LˆNt−1. This implies that searchers are:
sˆFt = −
(1− ρB)LN
sF
LˆNt−1 (B.40)
Since qBt V Bt = pBt sFt = Ht the equations of the dynamics of the lines of credit reduce to LNt =
(1 − ρ)LNt−1 + Ht. Then by remembering the equation of the firms searching for credit, the log-
linearized version of the previous equation is:
LˆNt = (1− ρB)LˆNt−1 + ρBHˆt (B.41)
The log-linearized version of the unemployment’s definition Ut = 1−Nt is: UUˆt = −NNˆt. Being
U = 1−N we can hence write it as:
Uˆt = − N1−N Nˆt (B.42)
Log-linearizing the production function Y wt = AtNαt we obtain:
Yˆ wt = Aˆt + αNˆt (B.43)
Considering the aggregate resource constraint Yt = Ct we straightforwardly derive:
Yˆt = Cˆt (B.44)
As shown by Galí (2008) the price dispersion across firms in a neighborhood of zero inflation steady
state is equal to zero up to a first order approximation (fˆt = 0). Then we have:
Yˆ wt = Yˆt (B.45)
From equation mplt = αAtNα−1t we may write the marginal productivity of labor as:
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m̂plt = Aˆt + (α− 1) Nˆt (B.46)
In order to describe the derivation of the flexible prices output we can note that when prices are
flexible the first order condition of retail firms reduce to mct =
1
µt
=
ε− 1
ε
which is a constant
term. Hence, from equations (B.6) and (B.7) by solving end equating with respect to the real
wage, and remembering log-linearizations (B.46) and (B.38) we have:
ϑˆt + φNˆt + σYˆ
f
t = Aˆt + (α− 1) Nˆt − RˆLt
ϑˆt + φ
(
Yˆ ft
α − Aˆtα
)
+ σYˆ ft = Aˆt + (α− 1)
(
Yˆ ft
α − Aˆtα
)
− RˆLt[
1+φ+α(σ−1)
α
]
Yˆ ft =
(
1+φ
α
)
Aˆt − RˆLt − ϑˆt
Yˆ ft =
[
1+φ
1+φ+α(σ−1)
]
Aˆt −
[
α
1+φ+α(σ−1)
] (
RˆLt + ϑˆt
)
where Yˆ ft represents the flexible prices output. Finally the quasi flexible equilibrium output is:
Yˆ qft = Yˆ
f
t +
[
α
1 + φ+ α(σ − 1)
](
RˆLt + ϑˆt
)
(B.47)
From equation (B.7) and by remembering equations (B.39), (B.43), (B.44) and (B.46) the real
marginal costs can be rewritten in the following way:
m̂ct = RˆLt + ϑˆt + φNˆt + σYˆt − Aˆt − (α− 1) Nˆt
m̂ct = RˆLt + ϑˆt + φ
(
Yˆt
α − Aˆtα
)
+ σYˆt − Aˆt − (α− 1)
(
Yˆt
α − Aˆtα
)
m̂ct = RˆLt + ϑˆt +
[
1+φ+α(σ−1)
α
]
Yˆt −
(
1+φ
α
)
Aˆt
m̂ct = RˆLt + ϑˆt +
[
1+φ+α(σ−1)
α
]
Yˆt −
[
1+φ+α(σ−1)
α
] (
1+φ
1+φ+α(σ−1)
)
Aˆt
m̂ct = RˆLt + ϑˆt +
[
1+φ+α(σ−1)
α
] (
Yˆt − Yˆ qft
)
The latter equation can be rewritten in terms of output gap, xt = Yˆt − Yˆ qft , as:
m̂ct = RˆLt + ϑˆt +
[
1 + φ+ α(σ − 1)
α
]
xt (B.48)
or also m̂ct = −µˆt.
The derivation of the Phillips curve is standard (e.g., Walsh 2003). Define Qt =
P ∗t
Pt
and rewrite
equation (B.8) as:
Et
∞∑
l=0
ωlβl
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε−1
C1−σt+l Qt =
ε
ε− 1Et
∞∑
l=0
ωlβlMCt+l
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε
C1−σt+l
The linearization of the left hand side of this equation yields
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C1−σ
1− ωβ Qˆt + C
1−σ∑∞
l=0 ω
lβl
[
(1− σ)EtCˆt+l + (ε− 1)
(
Pˆt+l − Pˆt
)]
and linearization of the right
hand side gives:
C1−σEt
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβl
[
m̂ct+l + ε
(
Pˆt+l − Pˆt
)
+ (1− σ) Cˆt+l
]
. Equating these two equations and sim-
plifying we get: Qˆt + Pˆt = (1− ωβ)Et
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβl
(
Pˆt+l + m̂ct+l
)
. By forward solution this equa-
tion can be rewritten as:
Qˆt = (1− ωβ) m̂ct + ωβ
(
Qˆt+1 + pˆit+1
)
(B.49)
The Calvo’s assumption that only the share (1−ω) of firms can adjust their prices at time t and the
Dixit-Stiglitz price aggregator lead to the economy’s average price index: 1 = (1− ω) (Qt)1−ε +
ω
(
Pt−1
Pt
)1−ε
. Approximating this equation around the steady state with zero inflation we obtain
Qˆt =
ω
1− ω pˆit. Substituting this equation into (B.49) we derive the standard New Keynesian
Phillips Curve:
pˆit = βEtpˆit+1 +
(1− ωβ) (1− ω)
ω
m̂ct + ψˆt (B.50)
where ψˆt represents a cost push shock.
The NKPC can be rewritten in terms output gap by using equation (B.48):
pˆit = βEtpˆit+1 + κ
(
RˆLt + ϑˆt
)
+ κτxt + ψˆt (B.51)
which is equation (2.9) of the text, where τ =
[
1+φ+α(σ−1)
α
]
and κ =
(1− ωβ) (1− ω)
ω
.
Linearizing equation (B.12) we have:
kBRD
qB
(
RˆDt − qˆBt
)
= RLwN
(
RˆLt + wˆt + Nˆt
)
−RDwN
(
RˆDt + wˆt + Nˆt
)
+
+ (1− ρB)β k
BRD
qB
(
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt + EtRˆDt+1 − EtqˆBt+1
) (B.52)
By using equations (B.5) and (B.7) into (B.27) the lending rate can be written in the following
way:
RLt =
(1− z)
α
RLt + zR
D
t − z
(1− ρB)
wtNt
1
RDt
Et
Pt+1
Pt
kBRDt+1
θCt+1
Then, the log-linearization yields:
RLRˆLt =
(1− z)
α
RLt Rˆ
L
t + zR
D
t Rˆ
D
t +
−z (1− ρ
B)
wN
RD
RD
kB
θC
[
EtPˆt+1 − Pˆt − wˆt − Nˆt − RˆDt + EtRˆDt+1 − EtθˆCt+1
]
By solving with respect to RˆLt we have:
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RˆLt = Λ1Rˆ
D
t + Λ2
[
Etθˆ
C
t+1 − EtRˆDt+1 +
(
wˆt + Nˆt − Etpˆit+1
)]
+ υˆt (B.53)
where Λ1 = αzRL(α−1+z)
[
RD + (1−ρ
B)pB
wN
kB
qB
]
and Λ2 = αzRL(α−1+z)
(1−ρB)pB
wN
kB
qB
.
From equation θCt = sFt /V Bt we may write the credit market tightness as:
θˆCt = sˆ
F
t − Vˆ Bt (B.54)
From equation Ht = ςt(V Bt )ξ(sFt )1−ξ the credit matches are:
Hˆt = ςˆt + ξVˆ Bt + (1− ξ) sˆFt (B.55)
The log-linearized monetary policy rule is:
RˆDt = ρRRˆ
D
t−1 + (1− ρR) [δpipˆit + δxxt] + νˆt (B.56)
The log-linearization of equation pBt = Ht/sFt straightforwardly gives the credit line finding rate:
pˆBt = Hˆt − sˆFt (B.57)
The log-linearization of equation qBt = Ht/V Bt straightforwardly gives the credit vacancy filling
rate:
qˆBt = Hˆt − Vˆ Bt (B.58)
From equation νt = ν
ρν
t−1e
νt the process of the monetary policy shock is:
νˆt = ρν νˆt−1 + νt (B.59)
From equation At = A
ρA
t−1e
νt the process of the technology shock is:
Aˆt = ρAAˆt−1 + At (B.60)
From equation ςt = ς
ρς
t−1e
ςt the process of the credit market shock is:
ςˆt = ρς ςˆt−1 + ςt (B.61)
From equation ϕt = ϕ
ρϕ
t−1e
ϕt the process of the preference shock on the wedge between consumption
and leisure is:
ϕˆt = ρϕϕˆt−1 + 
ϕ
t (B.62)
From equation ϑt = ϑ
ρϑ
t−1e
ϑt the process of the preference shock on leisure is:
ϑˆt = ρϑϑˆt−1 + ϑt (B.63)
From equation ψt = ψ
ρψ
t−1e
ψt the process of the cost push shock on inflation dynamics is:
ψˆt = ρψψˆt−1 + 
ψ
t (B.64)
From equation υt = υ
ρυ
t−1e
υt the process of the exogenous shock in interest rate on loans’ equation
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is:
υˆt = ρυυˆt−1 + υt (B.65)
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
Agents’ problems, first order conditions and bargainings
Households
The CIA constraint is:
PtCt ≤ Bt +WthtNt + (1−Nt)wuPt −Dt (C.1)
The amount of money carried over to the following period is:
Bt+1 = Bt +WthtNt + (1−Nt)wuPt −Dt − PtCt + ΠFt + ΠSt + ΠBt +RDt Dt (C.2)
Substituting the binding version of (C.1) into (C.2) we have: Bt+1 = ΠFt + ΠSt + ΠBt + RDt Dt.
Calculating this equation a period backward and substituting the result into (C.1) gives the in-
tertemporal budget constraint that can be expressed in real terms in the following way:
Ct = wthtNt + wu(1−Nt) +
ΠFt−1
Pt
+
ΠSt−1
Pt
+
ΠBt−1
Pt
− Dt
Pt
+RDt−1
Dt−1
Pt
(C.3)
The household solves the problem:
Gt = max [U(Ct, ht) + βEtGt+1]
s.t. (C.3)
where U(Ct, ht) =
C1−σt
1−σ − ϑh
1+φ
t
1+φ . The separability of the utility function allows us to make the
usual assumption that consumption risks are fully pooled within the household. All households
solve the same problem. The first order conditions then are:
for Ct: λt = C−σt
for Dt: λt = RDt βEt
Pt
Pt+1
λt+1
The latter condition yields the Euler equation (3.1) of the text.
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Wholesale firms
Wholesale firms solve the problem:
FVt = max
[
− f
λt
sFt +
Y wt
µt
−RLt wthtNt −RLt kF qFt V Ft + βEt
λt+1
λt
FVt+1
]
s.t. Y wt = Ah
α
t Nt
V Ft = p
B
t s
F
t
Nt = (1− ρ)Nt−1 + qFt V Ft
Denoting ft = fλt , the first order condition and the envelope theorem yield:
for sFt :
ft
qFt p
B
t
+RLt k
F =
Ahαt
µt
−RLt wtht + βEt
λt+1
λt
∂FVt+1
∂Nt
(C.4)
for Nt−1:
∂FVt
∂Nt−1
= (1− ρ)
(
Ahαt
µt
−RLt wtht
)
+ (1− ρ)βEtλt+1
λt
∂FVt+1
∂Nt
(C.5)
Replacing (C.4) into (C.5) we obtain:
∂FVt
∂Nt−1
= (1− ρ)
(
ft
qFt p
B
t
+RLt k
F
)
(C.6)
Updating equation (C.6) and then replacing into (C.4), we then get:
ft
qFt p
B
t
+RLt k
F =
Ahαt
µt
−RLt wtht + (1− ρ)βEt
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)
(C.7)
which is equation (3.7) of the text.
Real Wage and Hours Bargaining
In this and next sections we compute the bargainings on the real wage and on hours worked. The
real wage Nash bargaining is:
max
wt
(SFt )
1−d(SWt )
d
where the surplus of the firm is:
SFt = S
J
t − SVt (C.8)
with:
SJt =
∂FVt
∂Nt
=
Ahαt
µt
−RLt wtht + βEt
λt+1
λt
[
ρSVt+1 + (1− ρ)SJt+1
]
(C.9)
and:
SVt = −ft + pBt
[
qFt
(−RLt kF + SJt )+ (1− qFt )βEtλt+1λt SVt+1
]
+ (1− pBt )βEt
λt+1
λt
SVt+1 (C.10)
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From (C.9) and (C.10) and using the free-entry condition, SVt = 0 ∀ t it is possible to obtain
equation (3.7) of the text. Further from (C.10) and the free-entry condition we have:
SJt =
ft
qFt p
B
t
+RLt k
F (C.11)
Then, replacing (C.11) and the free-entry condition into (C.8) we get that SFt = SJt , or, using
(C.7):
SFt =
Ahαt
µt
−RLt wtht + (1− ρ)βEt
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)
(C.12)
The worker’s surplus is the difference between value the worker enjoys when being matched and
that when not being matched:
SWt = S
M
t − SNt (C.13)
SMt is equal to the wage obtained in period t net of labor (hours) disutility, g(ht) = ϑ
h1+φt
1+φ , plus
the expected values of the possible states of the worker entering the following period: the worker
can still be in a match with a firm which has not separated from a bank and enjoy the value SMt+1,
or be in search because at least one separation occurred. In the latter case, the worker obtains
SMt+1 if both matches (credit and labor) are generated and SNt+1 otherwise. Then we have:
SMt = wtht −
g(ht)
λt
+ βEt
λt+1
λt
{
(1− ρ)SMt+1 + ρ[pFt+1SMt+1 + (1− pFt+1)SNt+1]
}
where g(ht) = ϑ
h1+φt
1+φ .
SNt is given by the sum of unemployment benefits (expressed in terms of consumption goods)
and the discounted value for a worker entering the following period without being employed in a
match:
SNt = w
u + βEt
λt+1
λt
[
pFt+1S
M
t+1 + (1− pFt+1)SNt+1
]
Using the last two equations in (C.13) we obtain:
SWt =
(
wtht − g(ht)
λt
− wu
)
+ (1− ρ)βEtλt+1
λt
(1− pFt+1)SWt+1 (C.14)
The optimality condition of the Nash bargaining is:
(1− d)δFt SWt + dδWt SFt = 0 (C.15)
where:
δFt =
∂SFt
∂wt
= −RLt ht (C.16)
and:
δWt =
∂SWt
∂wt
= ht (C.17)
Further, the surplus of a worker in the next period is:
SWt+1 =
d
(1− d)RLt+1
SFt+1 =
d
(1− d)RLt+1
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)
(C.18)
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Replacing (C.12), (C.14), (C.16), (C.17) and (C.18) into (C.15) we obtain:
RLt (1− d)
[(
g(ht)
λt
+ wu − wtht
)
− (1− ρ)βEtλt+1
λt
(1− pFt+1)SWt+1
]
+
+d
[
Ahαt
µt
−RLt wtht + (1− ρ)βEt
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)]
= 0 (C.19)
Rearranging the previous equation we have:
wtht =
d
d+ (1− d)RLt
[
Ahαt
µt
− rLt wtht + (1− ρ)βEt
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)]
+
+
(1− d)RLt
d+ (1− d)RLt
[(
g(ht)
λt
+ wu
)
− (1− ρ)βEtλt+1
λt
(1− pFt+1)SWt+1
]
We denote RWt = rLt wt is the interest paid by the firm on the real wage borrowed from a bank
and χt =
d
d+ (1− d)RLt
. Further mrst = ϑ
hφt
λt
. Then, using (C.18), we can write SWt+1 =
χt+1
1− χt+1S
F
t+1. Finally, the bargained real wage is:
wt = (1− χt)
(
mrst
1 + φ
+
wu
ht
)
+
+χt
[
mplt
αµt
−RWt + (1− ρ)β
1
ht
Et
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1θ
L
t+1
pBt+1
+RLt+1k
F pFt+1
)]
+
+χt(1− pFt+1)
[
(1− ρ)β 1
ht
Et
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)][
1− χtχt+1(1− χt)(1− χt+1)χt
]
We hence obtain a variation of the conventional sharing rule (Trigari, 2006) where the relative
share χt depends not only on the bargaining power, but also on the effect of the wage on the
firms’s surplus (relative allocational effect). From (C.19) it is also possible to obtain:
RLt wtht = (1− d)RLt
[(
g(ht)
λt
+ wu
)
− (1− ρ)βEtλt+1
λt
(1− pFt+1)SWt+1
]
+
+d
[
Ahαt
µt
+ (1− ρ)βEtλt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)]
Using (C.18) and recalling that mrst = ϑ
hφt
λt
and mplt = αAhα−1t , we get:
wt = (1− d)
(
mrst
1 + φ
+
wu
ht
)
− (1− ρ)
ht
βEt
λt+1
λt
d(1− pFt+1)
RLt+1
(
ft
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)
+
+
d
RLt
[
mplt
αµt
+
1
ht
(1− ρ)βEtλt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)]
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Rearranging the previous equation we have:
wt = (1− d)
(
mrst
1 + φ
+
wu
ht
)
+
+
d
RLt
[
mplt
αµt
+
1
ht
(1− ρ)βEtλt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)(
1− R
L
t (1− pFt+1)
RLt+1
)]
which is equation (3.11) of the text.
The hours Nash bargaining is:
max
ht
(SFt )
1−d(SWt )
d
The optimality condition is:
(1− d)τFt SWt + dτWt SFt = 0 (C.20)
where:
τFt =
∂SFt
∂ht
=
(
mplt
µt
− wtRLt
)
(C.21)
and:
τWt =
∂SWt
∂ht
= (wt −mrst) (C.22)
Replacing (C.21) and (C.22) into (C.20) and recalling that SWt =
d
(1− d)RLt
SFt we obtain:
(1− d)
(
mplt
µt
− wtRLt
)
d
(1− d)RLt
SFt + d(wt −mrst)SFt = 0
Simplifying this equation we have:
mplt
µtRLt
= mrst
Using the definitions of the labor marginal productivity and of the marginal rate of substitution
we obtain the condition on bargained hours:
ht =
(
ϑµtR
L
t
αAλt
) 1
α−1−φ
which is equation (3.13) of the text.
Retail firms
The retail firms solve the following problem:
maxEt
∞∑
l=0
ωlβl
λt+1
λt
[(
Pit
Pt+l
)
Yit+l −mct+lYit+l
]
s.t. Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt
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In a symmetric equilibrium, the standard first order condition for Pit = P ∗t is:
P ∗t
Pt
=
ε
ε− 1
Et
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβlmct+l
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε
C1−σt+l
Et
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβl
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε−1
C1−σt+l
which is equation (3.14) of the text.
Banks
The bank solves the following problem:
JVt = max
[
(RLt −RDt )wthtLNt + (RLt qFt −RDt )kFLVt +RDt
Xt
Pt
− b
λt
V Bt + βEt
λt+1
λt
JVt+1
]
s.t. LVt = q
B
t V
B
t
LNt = (1− ρ)LNt−1 + qFt qBt V Bt
Denoting bt = bλt , the first order condition and the envelope theorem yield:
for V Bt :
bt
qFt q
B
t
− (RLt qFt −RDt )
kF
qFt
− (RLt −RDt )wtht = βEt
λt+1
λt
∂JVt+1
∂LNt
(C.23)
for LNt−1:
∂JVt
∂LNt−1
= (1− ρ)(RLt −RDt )wtht + β(1− ρ)Et
λt+1
λt
∂JVt+1
∂LNt
(C.24)
By replacing (C.23) into (C.24) we obtain:
∂JVt
∂LNt−1
= (1− ρ)
[
bt
qFt q
B
t
− (RLt qFt −RDt )
kF
qFt
]
(C.25)
By updating equation (C.25) and then by replacing into (C.23), we then get:
bt
qFt q
B
t
−(RLt qFt −RDt )
kF
qFt
= (RLt −RDt )wtht+(1−ρ)βEt
λt+1
λt
[
bt+1
qFt+1q
B
t+1
− (RLt+1qFt+1 −RDt+1)
kF
qFt+1
]
(C.26)
which is equation (3.18) of the text.
Loan Interest Rate Bargaining
The loan interest rate Nash bargaining is:
max
RLt
(SBt )
1−z(SFt )
z
where:
SBt = S
C
t − SV Bt (C.27)
with:
SCt =
∂JVt
∂LNt
= (RLt −RDt )wtht + βEt
λt+1
λt
[
(1− ρ)SCt+1 + ρSV Bt+1
]
(C.28)
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and:
SV Bt = −bt + qBt
{
−kFRDt + qFt
(
RLt k
F + SCt
)
+ (1− qFt )βEt
λt+1
λt
SV Bt+1
}
+ (1− qBt )βEt
λt+1
λt
SV Bt+1
(C.29)
From (C.28) and (C.29) and using free-entry condition, SV Bt = 0 ∀ t, it is possible to obtain
equation (3.18) of the text. Further, from (C.29) and the free-entry condition we have:
SCt =
bt
qFt q
B
t
− (RLt qFt −RDt )
kF
qFt
(C.30)
Then, replacing (C.30) and the free-condition into (C.27) we get SBt = SCt or, using (C.26):
SBt = (R
L
t −RDt )wtht + (1− ρ)βEt
λt+1
λt
[
bt+1
qFt+1q
B
t+1
− (RLt+1qFt+1 −RDt+1)
kF
qFt+1
]
(C.31)
The optimality condition is:
(1− z)γBt SFt + zγFt SBt = 0 (C.32)
where:
γBt =
∂SBt
∂RLt
= wtht + (RLt −RDt )
(
Wt ht + 
H
t wt
)
(C.33)
and:
γFt =
∂SFt
∂RLt
=
mplt
µt
Ht − wtht −RLt
(
Wt ht + 
H
t wt
)
(C.34)
with:
Wt =
∂wt
∂RLt
= − d
(RLt )2
[
mplt
αµt
+ (1− ρ)β 1
ht
Et
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)]
(C.35)
and:
Ht =
∂ht
∂RLt
=
1
α− 1− φ
(
ϑµtR
L
t
αAλt
) 1
α−1−φ−1 ϑµt
αAλt
Ht =
1
α− 1− φ
(
ϑµtR
L
t
αAλt
) 1
α−1−φ 1
RLt
or:
Ht =
1
α− 1− φ
ht
RLt
(C.36)
Substituting (C.12), (C.31), (C.33), (C.34), (C.35) and (C.36) into (C.32) we obtain:
(1− z)γBt
[
Ahαt
µt
−RLt wtht + (1− ρ)βEt
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)]
+
+zγFt
{
(RLt −RDt )wtht + (1− ρ)βEt
λt+1
λt
[
bt+1
qFt+1q
B
t+1
− (RLt+1qFt+1 −RDt+1)
kF
qFt+1
]}
= 0
132 Appendix to Chapter 3
Rearranging:
(1− z)γBt
[
Ahαt
µt
+ (1− ρ)βEtλt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)]
+
+zγFt
{
−RDt wtht + (1− ρ)βEt
λt+1
λt
[
bt+1
qFt+1q
B
t+1
− (RLt+1qFt+1 −RDt+1)
kF
qFt+1
]}
=
= RLt wt[(1− z)γBt − zγFt ]
Denoting ψt =
(1−z)γBt
[(1−z)γBt −zγFt ] , the bargained loan interest rate is:
RLt = ψt
1
wt
[
mplt
αµt
+
(1− ρ)β
ht
Et
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1θ
C
t+1
qFt+1q
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)]
+
+(1− ψt) 1
wt
{
wtR
D
t −
(1− ρ)β
ht
Et
λt+1
λt
[
bt+1
qFt+1q
B
t+1
− (RLt+1qFt+1 −RDt+1)
kF
qFt+1
]}
which is equation (3.21) of the text.
Market clearing
Considering the aggregate money carried over to the following period in real terms and writing
profits gross of taxes we have:
Xt
Pt
= wthtNt − Ct + (1−Nt)wu +
(
ΠFLt
Pt
− TF
)
+
(
ΠBLt
Pt
− TB
)
+
(
ΠSLt
Pt
− TS
)
− DtPt +RDt DtPt
Taking into account the government budget constraint, T = TF +TB+TS = (1−Nt)wu, it follows
that:
Xt
Pt
= wthtNt − Ct + Π
F
t
Pt
+ Π
B
t
Pt
+ Π
S
t
Pt
− DtPt +RDt DtPt
We recall that the bank balance sheet is: Dt/Pt = wthtLNt + kFHt −Xt/Pt. Hence:
Xt
Pt
= wthtNt −Ct + Π
F
t
Pt
+ Π
B
t
Pt
+ Π
S
t
Pt
−
(
wthtL
N
t + k
FHt − XtPt
)
+RDt
(
wthtL
N
t + k
FHt − XtPt
)
Or:
Ct = wthtNt +
ΠFt
Pt
+ Π
B
t
Pt
+ Π
S
t
Pt
− (wthtLNt + kFHt)+RDt (wthtLNt + kFHt)−RDt Xt/Pt
We use the bank’s profits,
(
RLt −RDt
)
wthtL
N
t +
(
RLt q
F
t −RDt
)
kFHt +RDt (Xt/Pt), to get:
Ct = wthtNt +
ΠFt
Pt
+
(
RLt −RDt
)
wthtL
N
t +
(
RLt q
F
t −RDt
)
kFHt +
+
ΠSt
Pt
− (wthtLNt + kFHt)+RDt (wthtLNt + kFHt)
Substituting the profits of the specialized firm: Π
S
t
Pt
= kFV Ft and recalling that Ht = V Ft we have:
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Ct =
ΠFt
Pt
+
(
RLt −RDt
)
wthtL
N
t +
(
RLt q
F
t −RDt
)
kFHt +
+wthtNt + kFHt −
(
wthtL
N
t + k
FHt
)
+RDt
(
wthtL
N
t + k
FHt
)
By simplifying:
Ct =
ΠFt
Pt
+RLt
(
wthtL
N
t + q
F
t k
FHt
)
+
(
wthtNt − wthtLNt
)
Substituting the profits of retail firms,Π
F
t
Pt
= Y dt − Y
w
t
µt
, we obtain:
Ct = Y dt − Y
w
t
µt
+
(
RLt
) (
wthtL
N
t + q
F
t k
FHt
)
+ (wtht)
(
Nt − LNt
)
Wholesale firms make zero profits. Hence:
Y wt
µt
−RLt qFt kFV Ft = RLt wthtNt or Y
w
t
µt
= RLt
(
wthtNt + qFt k
FV Ft
)
Using this equation and recalling again that Ht = V Ft :
Ct = Y dt −RLt
(
wthtNt + qFt k
FHt
)
+
(
RLt
) (
wthtL
N
t + q
F
t k
FHt
)
+ (wtht)
(
Nt − LNt
)
Ct = Y dt +
(
1−RLt
)
wtht
(
Nt − LNt
)
The dynamics of employment and of the lines of credit are:
Nt − (1− ρ)Nt−1 = qFt V Ft
LNt − (1− ρ)LNt−1 = qFt Ht = qFt V Ft
Being (1− ρ) < 1, we may use the lag operator Γ to write:
[1− (1− ρ)Γ]Nt = qFt V Ft
[1− (1− ρ)Γ] LNt = qFt V Ft
Or:
Nt = [1− (1− ρ)Γ]−1 qFt V Ft =
∑∞
i=0(1− ρ)iqFt−iV Ft−i
LNt = [1− (1− ρ)Γ]−1 qFt V Ft =
∑∞
i=0(1− ρ)iqFt−iV Ft−i
It is hence: Nt = LNt
It follows that the aggregate resurce constraint is:
Ct = Y dt
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Further the equilibrium in the good market, Y dt = Yt, implies:
Ct = Yt
The symmetric equilibrium of the model
The symmetric equilibrium of the model is provided by the following equations which, for the
reader’s convenience, are listed according to the sequence we follow, in the next section, in order
to recursively determine the steady state of the model.
Consumption Euler equation:
λt = RDt βEt
Pt
Pt+1
λt+1 (C.37)
Unemployment:
Ut = 1−Nt (C.38)
Employment dynamics:
Nt = (1− ρ)Nt−1 +Mt (C.39)
Job vacancies:
V Ft = p
B
t s
F
t (C.40)
Credit line finding rate:
pBt = Ht/s
F
t (C.41)
Credit vacancy filling rate:
qBt = Ht/V
B
t (C.42)
Lines of credit financing wages:
LNt = (1− ρ)LNt−1 + qFt Ht (C.43)
Searchers:
sWt = 1− (1− ρ)Nt−1 (C.44)
Labor market tightness:
θLt = V
F
t /s
W
t (C.45)
Job vacancy filling rate:
qFt = Mt/V
F
t (C.46)
Job finding rate:
pFt = Mt/s
W
t (C.47)
Credit market tightness:
θCt = s
F
t /V
B
t (C.48)
Labor market matches:
Mt = η(V Ft )
ξ(sWt )
1−ξ (C.49)
Financial matches:
Ht = υ(V Bt )
ζ(sFt )
1−ζ (C.50)
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Production function:
Y wt = Ah
α
t Nt (C.51)
Aggregate resources constraint:
Yt = Ct (C.52)
Y wt = Ytvt (C.53)
Marginal utility of consumption:
λt = C−σt (C.54)
Marginal effect of the loan rate of interest on hours worked:
Ht =
∂ht
∂RLt
=
1
α− 1− φ
ht
RLt
(C.55)
Condition on hours worked:
ht =
(
ϑµtR
L
t
αAλt
) 1
α−1−φ
(C.56)
Marginal productivity of labor:
mplt = αAhα−1t (C.57)
Marginal rate of substitution:
mrst = ϑ
hφt
λt
(C.58)
Job creating condition:
ft
qFt p
B
t
+RLt k
F =
Ahαt
µt
−RLt wtht + (1− ρ)βEt
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)
(C.59)
Bargained real wage:
wt = (1− d)
(
mrst
1 + φ
+
wu
ht
)
+
+
d
RLt
[
mplt
αµt
+
1
ht
(1− ρ)βEtλt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)(
1− R
L
t (1− pFt+1)
RLt+1
)]
(C.60)
Marginal effect of the loan interest rate on the real wage:
Wt =
∂wt
∂RLt
= − d
(RLt )2
[
mplt
αµt
+ (1− ρ)β 1
ht
Et
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1
qFt+1p
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)]
(C.61)
Credit creating condition:
bt
qFt q
B
t
−(RLt qFt −RDt )
kF
qFt
= (RLt −RDt )wtht+(1−ρ)βEt
λt+1
λt
[
bt+1
qFt+1q
B
t+1
− (RLt+1qFt+1 −RDt+1)
kF
qFt+1
]
(C.62)
Marginal effect of the loan interest rate on the banks’ surplus:
γBt =
∂SBt
∂RLt
= wtht + (RLt −RDt )
(
Wt ht + 
H
t wt
)
(C.63)
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Marginal effect of the loan interest rate on the firms’ surplus:
γFt =
∂SFt
∂RLt
=
mplt
µt
Ht − wtht −RLt
(
Wt ht + 
H
t wt
)
(C.64)
Bargained loan interest rate:
RLt = ψt
1
wt
[
mplt
αµt
+
(1− ρ)β
ht
Et
λt+1
λt
(
ft+1θ
C
t+1
qFt+1q
B
t+1
+RLt+1k
F
)]
+ (C.65)
+(1− ψt) 1
wt
{
wtR
D
t −
(1− ρ)β
ht
Et
λt+1
λt
[
bt+1
qFt+1q
B
t+1
− (RLt+1qFt+1 −RDt+1)
kF
qFt+1
]}
Modified relative bargaining power of banks:
ψt =
(1− z)γBt
[(1− z)γBt − zγFt ]
(C.66)
Price rule:
P ∗t
Pt
=
ε
ε− 1
Et
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβlmct+l
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε
C1−σt+l
Et
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβl
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε−1
C1−σt+l
(C.67)
Real marginal costs:
mct =
1
µt
(C.68)
Monetary rule:
RDt = (R
D
t−1)
ρR
(
Pt
Pt−1
)(1−ρR)δpi
(Yt)(1−ρR)δY νt (C.69)
Monetary policy shock:
νt = ν
ρν
t−1e
ενt (C.70)
Steady States
We fix the steady state values of the following variables (see setion 3 of the text): RD, RL, N ,
qF , pB , qB , and h. The other steady state variables (and some parameters) are here recursively
derived.
Given RD, from equation (C.37) we obtain the value of the discount factor: β =
1
RD
.
Given N , from equation (C.38) we get that the steady state unemployment is: U = 1−N .
Given qF and equation (C.39), being M = V F qF , we obtain the steady state value of the job
vacancies posted by firms: V F = ρN/qF .
We can then compute: M = V F qF = ρN .
From equations (C.39) and (C.40) we have: ρN = qF pBsF . From equations (C.43) and being
H = qBV B we have: ρLN = qF qBV B and hence V B =
ρLN
qF qB
. Furthermore, since equations
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(C.41) and (C.42) imply pBsF = qBV B = H, we also obtain sF =
H
pB
and N = LN .
From equation (C.44) we obtain: sW = 1− (1− ρ)N .
From equation (C.45) we have the steady state labor market tightness: θL =
V F
sW
.
From equation (C.39) and beingM = pF sW = V F qF we get the job finding rate: pF =
ρN
sW
(being
pF = θLqF , it can also be directly calculated once θL is obtained).
The steady state credit market tightness is straightforwardly obtained from equation (C.48): θC =
sF
V B
.
From equations (C.46) and (C.49) we get the scale parameter η = qF
(
sW
V F
)ξ−1
= qF (θL)1−ξ.
From equations (C.42) and (C.50) we get the scale parameter υ = qB
(
sF
V B
)ζ−1
= qB
(
θC
)ζ−1.
Being N calibrated, and setting Y w = 1, from the production function (C.51) we get the produc-
tivity factor A =
Y w
Nhα
.
Since the price dispersion is v = 1 then Y = Y w. The aggregate resource constraint (C.53) is:
Y = C.
From equation (C.54) the marginal utility of consumption is: λ = C−σ.
Given RL, from equation (C.55) we obtain: H =
1
α− 1− φ
h
RL
.
Given h we can solve the condition for optimal hours (C.56) with respect to the constant ϑ and
obtain: ϑ =
αAλ
RLµ (h)1+φ−α
.
From equation (C.57) we obtain the steady state marginal product of labor: mpl = αAhα−1.
From equation (C.58) we obtain the steady state marginal rate of substitution: mrs = ϑ
hφ
λ
.
We calibrate the replacement rate $ and write the steady state relationship wu = $wh (to be
determined below).
Solving the job creating condition (C.59) for f/λ we have:
f
λ
=
qF pB
[1− β(1− ρ)]
[
Ahα
µ
−RL {[1− β(1− ρ)] kF + wh}]
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We now insert this equation into the steady state version of the real wage (obtained from equation
C.60), w = (1 − d)
(
mrs
1 + φ
+
wu
h
)
+
d
RL
[
mpl
αµ
+
(1− ρ)β
h
(
f
λqF pB
+RLkF
)(
1− RL(1−pF )
RL
)]
,
and use the definition of the reservation wage, wu = $wh, to obtain:
w = (1− d)
(
mrs
1 + φ
+
$wh
h
)
+
+
d
RL
[
mpl
αµ
+
(1− ρ)β
h
(
1
[1− β(1− ρ)]
[
Ahα
µ
−RL {[1− β(1− ρ)] kF + wh}]+RLkF) pF]
Solving this equation with respect to the real wage we get:
w =
[1− β(1− ρ)]
[1− β(1− ρ)] [1− (1− d)$] + (1− ρ)βdpF
{
(1− d) mrs
1 + φ
+
d
RL
[
mpl
αµ
+
(1− ρ)βpF
h [1− β(1− ρ)]
Ahα
µ
]}
We can then compute wu = $wh and
f
λ
=
qF pB
[1− β(1− ρ)]
[
Ahα
µ
−RL {[1− β(1− ρ)] kF + wh}].
From equation (C.61) we have: W = − d
(RL)2
[
mpl
αµ
+ (1− ρ)β 1
h
(
f
λqF pB
+RLkF
)]
.
Given RL. we can solve the credit creating condition (C.62) with respect to b/λ and obtain:
b
λ
=
qBqF (RL −RD)
[1− β(1− ρ)] wh+ q
B(RLqF −RD)kF
From equation (C.63) the marginal effect of the interest rate on loans on the surplus of the banks
is: γB = wh+ (RL −RD) (Wh+ Hw)
Furthermore, from equation (C.64) the marginal effect of the interest rate on loans on the surplus
of the firms is: γF =
mpl
µ
H − wh−RL (Wh+ Hw)
In order to obtain the relative bargaining power in the loan interest rate bargaining, first rewrite
equation (C.65) as RL = ψX+(1−ψ)T , where: X = 1
w
[
mpl
αµ
+
(1− ρ)β
h
(
f
λqF pB
+RLkF
)]
and
T =
1
w
{
wRD − (1− ρ)β
h
[
b
λqF qB
− (R
LqF −RD)kF
qF
]}
. Solving for ψ we can then calculate:
ψ =
(
RL − T )
(X − T ) .
From equation (C.66) we have ψ =
[(1− z)γB ]
[(1− z)γB − zγF ] . By solving with respect to z we obtain the
firm’s bargaining power in the loan interest rate bargaining: z =
γB(ψ − 1)
[γB(ψ − 1) + ψγF ]
From equation (C.68) we have:
1
mc
.
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The Linearized Model
In this section we compute the aggregate log-linearized version of the model.
From equation (C.37), the log-linearized Euler equation is: λˆt = RˆDt + Pˆt−EtPˆt+1 +Etλˆt+1. Since
pi = 0, we can write: EtPˆt+1 − Pˆt = Et
(
Pˆt+1 − Pˆt
)
= pˆit+1 and so:
λˆt = RˆDt − Etpˆit+1 + Etλˆt+1 (C.71)
From equation (C.54), the log-linearizing version equation of the marginal utility of consumption
is: λλˆt = −σC−σCˆt. We may then write the Lagrange multiplier as:
λˆt = −σCˆt (C.72)
From equation (C.40), the log-linearized version of the job vacancies is:
Vˆ Ft = pˆ
B
t + sˆ
F
t (C.73)
From equation (C.39) we get: NNˆt = (1 − ρ)NNˆt−1 + MMˆt. Being M = ρN . The employment
dynamics is hence:
Nˆt = (1− ρ)Nˆt−1 + ρMˆt (C.74)
From equation (C.44) we compute: sW sˆWt = −(1− ρ)NNˆt−1. This implies that searchers are:
sˆWt = −
(1− ρ)N
sW
Nˆt−1 (C.75)
The log-linearized version of equation (C.38) is: UUˆt = −NNˆt. Being U = 1 − N we can hence
write unemployment as:
Uˆt = − N1−N Nˆt (C.76)
Log-linearizing equation (C.51) we obtain:
Yˆ wt = αhˆt + Nˆt (C.77)
The derivation of the Phillips curve is standard (e.g., Walsh 2003). Define Qt =
P ∗t
Pt
and rewrite
equation (C.67) as:
Et
∞∑
l=0
ωlβl
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε−1
C1−σt+l Qt =
ε
ε− 1Et
∞∑
l=0
ωlβlmct+l
(
Pt+l
Pt
)ε
C1−σt+l
The linearization of the left hand side of this equation yields
C1−σ
1− ωβ Qˆt + C
1−σ∑∞
l=0 ω
lβl
[
(1− σ)EtCˆt+l + (ε− 1)
(
Pˆt+l − Pˆt
)]
and linearization of the right
hand side gives:
C1−σEt
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβl
[
m̂ct+l + ε
(
Pˆt+l − Pˆt
)
+ (1− σ) Cˆt+l
]
. Equating these two equations and sim-
plifying we get: Qˆt + Pˆt = (1− ωβ)Et
∑∞
l=0 ω
lβl
(
Pˆt+l + m̂ct+l
)
. By forward solution this equa-
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tion can be rewritten as:
Qˆt = (1− ωβ) m̂ct + ωβ
(
Qˆt+1 + pˆit+1
)
(C.78)
The Calvo’s assumption that only the share (1−ω) of firms can adjust their prices at time t and the
Dixit-Stiglitz price aggregator lead to the economy’s average price index: 1 = (1− ω) (Qt)1−ε +
ω
(
Pt−1
Pt
)1−ε
. Approximating this equation around the steady state with zero inflation we obtain
Qˆt =
ω
1− ω pˆit. Substituting this equation into (C.78) we derive the standard New Keynesian
Phillips Curve:
pˆit = βEtpˆit+1 +
(1− ωβ) (1− ω)
ω
m̂ct (C.79)
where, from equation (C.68), m̂ct = −µ̂t.
From equation (C.53) we straightforwardly derive the log-linearized aggregate resource constraint:
Yˆt = Cˆt (C.80)
As shown by Galí (2008) the price dispersion across firms in a neighborhood of zero inflation steady
state is equal to zero up to a first order approximation (vˆt = 0). Then we have:
Yˆ wt = Yˆt (C.81)
The log-linearization of equation (C.59) provides:
− f
λqF pB
(
λˆt + qˆFt + pˆ
B
t
)
+ kFRLRˆLt =
Ahα
µ
(
αhˆt + µˆt
)
−RLwh
(
RˆLt + wˆt + hˆt
)
+
−(1− ρ)β f
λqF pB
(
λˆt + EtqˆFt+1 + Etpˆ
B
t+1
)
+ (1− ρ)βRLkF
(
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt + EtRˆLt+1
)
Rearranging we get the job creating condition:
Ahα
µ
(
αhˆt + µˆt
)
−RLwh
(
RˆLt + wˆt + hˆt
)
= kFRL
[
RˆLt − (1− ρ)β
(
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt + EtRˆLt+1
)]
+
− f
λqF pB
[(
λˆt + qˆFt + pˆ
B
t
)
− (1− ρ)β
(
λˆt + EtqˆFt+1 + Etpˆ
B
t+1
)]
(C.82)
Linearizing equation (C.60) we have:
wwˆt = (1− d)
(
mrs
1 + φ
m̂rst − w
u
h
hˆt
)
+
d
RL
mpl
αµ
(
m̂plt − RˆLt − µˆt
)
+
−d(1− ρ)β
RLh
f
λqF pB
(
RˆLt + hˆt + λˆt + Etqˆ
F
t+1 + Etpˆ
B
t+1
)
+
+
d(1− ρ)β
h
kF
(
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt + EtRˆLt+1 − RˆLt − hˆt
)
+
+
d(1− ρ)β
RLh
f
λqF pB
(
EtRˆ
L
t+1 + hˆt + λˆt + Etqˆ
F
t+1 + Etpˆ
B
t+1
)
−d(1− ρ)β
h
kF
(
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt − hˆt
)
+
−d(1− ρ)β
RLh
fpF
λqF pB
(
EtRˆ
L
t+1 + hˆt + λˆt + Etqˆ
F
t+1 + Etpˆ
B
t+1 − EtpˆFt+1
)
+
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+
d(1− ρ)β
h
kF
(
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt − hˆt + EtpˆFt+1
)
Rearranging we get:
wwˆt = (1− d)
(
mrs
1 + φ
m̂rst − w
u
h
hˆt
)
+
d
RL
mpl
αµ
(
m̂plt − RˆLt − µˆt
)
+
+
d(1− ρ)β
h
(
f
RLλqF pB
+ kF
)(
EtRˆ
L
t+1 − RˆLt
)
+
−d(1− ρ)β
RLh
fpF
λqF pB
(
EtRˆ
L
t+1 + hˆt + λˆt + Etqˆ
F
t+1 + Etpˆ
B
t+1 − EtpˆFt+1
)
+
+
d(1− ρ)β
h
kF pF
(
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt − hˆt + EtpˆFt+1
)
The bargained real wage is hence:
wˆt =
(1− d)
w
(
mrs
1 + φ
m̂rst − w
u
h
hˆt
)
+
d
wRL
mpl
αµ
(
m̂plt − RˆLt − µˆt
)
+ (C.83)
+
d(1− ρ)β
wh

(
f
RLλqF pB
+ kF
)(
EtRˆ
L
t+1 − RˆLt
)
+
−pF
 fRLλqF pB
(
EtRˆ
L
t+1 + hˆt + λˆt + Etqˆ
F
t+1 + Etpˆ
B
t+1 − EtpˆFt+1
)
+
−kF
(
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt − hˆt + EtpˆFt+1
)


From equation (C.55) we obtain the log-linearized version of the marginal effect of the loan interest
rate on worked hours: H ˆHt =
1
α− 1− φ
h
RL
(
hˆt − RˆLt
)
. We hence have:
ˆHt = hˆt − RˆLt (C.84)
From equations (C.43) we obtain: LN LˆNt = (1 − ρ)LN LˆNt−1 + qH
(
qˆFt + Hˆt
)
. Being ρLN = qH
the the log-linearized lines of credit financing wages are:
LˆNt = (1− ρ)LˆNt−1 + ρ
(
qˆFt + Hˆt
)
(C.85)
Linearizing equation (C.62) we have:
− b
λqF qB
(
λˆt + qˆFt + qˆ
B
t
)
− kFRLRˆLt +
RDkF
qF
(
RˆDt − qˆFt
)
=
= RLwh
(
RˆLt + wˆt + hˆt
)
−RDwh
(
RˆDt + wˆt + hˆt
)
− (1−ρ)β b
λqF qB
(
λˆt + EtqˆFt+1 + Etqˆ
B
t+1
)
+
−(1− ρ)βRLkF
(
λˆt+1 − λˆt + RˆLt+1
)
+ (1− ρ)βR
DkF
qF
(
λˆt+1 − λˆt + RˆDt+1 − qˆFt+1
)
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Rearranging we get the log-linearized credit creating condition:
RDkF
qF
[(
RˆDt − qˆFt
)
− (1− ρ)β
(
λˆt+1 − λˆt + RˆDt+1 − qˆFt+1
)]
=
wh
[
RL
(
RˆLt + wˆt + hˆt
)
−RD
(
RˆDt + wˆt + hˆt
)]
+ (C.86)
+
b
λqF qB
[(
λˆt + qˆFt + qˆ
B
t
)
− (1− ρ)β
(
λˆt + EtqˆFt+1 + Etqˆ
B
t+1
)]
+
+kFRL
[
RˆLt − (1− ρ)β
(
λˆt+1 − λˆt + RˆLt+1
)]
The log-linearization of equation (C.65) provides:
wRL
(
wˆt + RˆLt
)
=
ψmpl
αµ
(
ψˆt + m̂plt − µˆt
)
+
+
ψ(1− ρ)β
h
θCf
λqF qB
(
ψˆt − hˆt + EtθˆCt+1 − λˆt − EtqˆFt+1 − EtqˆBt+1
)
+
+
ψ(1− ρ)β
h
RLkF
(
ψˆt − hˆt + Etλˆt+1 − λˆt + EtRˆLt+1
)
+ wRD
(
wˆt + RˆDt
)
+
−ψwRD
(
ψˆt + wˆt + RˆDt
)
+
(1− ρ)β
h
b
λqF qB
(
hˆt + λˆt + EtqˆFt+1 + Etqˆ
B
t+1
)
+
+
ψ(1− ρ)β
h
b
λqF qB
(
ψˆt − hˆt − λˆt − EtqˆFt+1 − EtqˆBt+1
)
+
+
(1− ρ)β
h
RLkF
(
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt − hˆt + EtRˆLt+1
)
+
− (1− ρ)β
h
RDkF
qF
(
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt − hˆt + EtRˆDt+1 − EtqˆFt+1
)
+
−ψ(1− ρ)β
h
RLkF
(
ψˆt + Etλˆt+1 − λˆt − hˆt + EtRˆLt+1
)
+
+
ψ(1− ρ)β
h
RDkF
qF
(
ψˆt + Etλˆt+1 − λˆt − hˆt + EtRˆDt+1 − EtqˆFt+1
)
Rearranging we obtain the linearized loan interest rate:
RˆLt =
ψmpl
αµwRL
(
ψˆt + m̂plt − µˆt
)
+
+
ψ(1− ρ)β
hwRL
 θ
Cf
λqF qB
(
ψˆt − hˆt + EtθˆCt+1 − λˆt − EtqˆFt+1 − EtqˆBt+1
)
+
+RLkF
(
ψˆt − hˆt + Etλˆt+1 − λˆt + EtRˆLt+1
)
+ (C.87)
+
(1− ψ)
wRL
wR
D
(
wˆt + RˆDt
)
+
(1− ρ)β
h

b
λqF qB
(
hˆt + λˆt + EtqˆFt+1 + Etqˆ
B
t+1
)
+
+RLkF
(
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt − hˆt + EtRˆLt+1
)
+
−R
DkF
qF
(
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt − hˆt + EtRˆDt+1 − EtqˆFt+1
)

+
− ψ
wRL
{
wRD − (1− ρ)β
h
[
b
λqF qB
−
(
RLkF − R
DkF
qF
)]}
ψˆt − wˆt
The log-linearization of equation (C.66) gives: ψψˆt = −
(1− z)2 (γB)2
[(1− z)γB − zγF ]2 γˆ
B
t +
(1− z)γBzγF
[(1− z)γB − zγF ]2 γˆ
F
t +
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(1− z)γB
[(1− z)γB − zγF ] γˆ
B
t . Since it is ψ =
(1− z)γB
[(1− z)γB − zγF ] and 1−ψ =
−zγF
[(1− z)γB + zγF ] , it follows
that: ψˆt = −ψγˆBt −(1− ψ) γˆFt + γˆBt . From this equation we derive the modified relative bargaining
power of the bank:
ψˆt = (1− ψ)
(
γˆBt − γˆFt
)
(C.88)
Equation (C.63) is log-linearized in the following way:
γB γˆBt = wh
(
wˆt + hˆt
)
+RLWh
(
RˆLt + ˆ
W
t + hˆt
)
−RDWh
(
RˆDt + ˆ
W
t + hˆt
)
+
+RLHw
(
RˆLt + ˆ
H
t + wˆt
)
−RDHw
(
RˆDt + ˆ
H
t + wˆt
)
Rearranging we get:
γB γˆBt = wh
(
wˆt + hˆt
)
+
(
RLRˆLt −RDRˆDt
) (
Wh+ Hw
)
+
+hW
(
RL −RD) (ˆWt + hˆt)+ wH (RL −RD) (ˆHt + wˆt)
We can hence write the marginal effect of the loan interest rate on the bank’s surplus as:
γˆBt =
wh
γB
(
wˆt + hˆt
)
+
(
RLRˆLt −RDRˆDt
)
γB
(
Wh+ Hw
)
+
+
(
RL −RD)
γB
[
hW
(
ˆWt + hˆt
)
+ wH
(
ˆHt + wˆt
)]
(C.89)
Equation (C.64) is log-linearized in the following way:
γF γˆFt =
mpl
µ
H
(
m̂plt − µˆt + ˆHt
)
− wh
(
wˆt + hˆt
)
+
−RLWh
(
RˆLt + ˆ
W
t + hˆt
)
−RLHw
(
RˆLt + ˆ
H
t + wˆt
)
Rearranging we obtain the marginal effect of the loan interest rate on the firm’s surplus:
γˆFt =
mpl
γFµ
H
(
m̂plt − µˆt + ˆHt
)
− wh
γF
(
wˆt + hˆt
)
+ (C.90)
−R
L
γF
{
RˆLt
(
Wh+ Hw
)
+
[
Wh
(
ˆWt + hˆt
)
+ Hw
(
ˆHt + wˆt
)]}
From equation (C.61) we obtain :
W ˆWt = −
d
(RL)2
mpl
αµ
(
m̂plt − µˆt − 2RˆLt
)
+
d
(RL)2
(1− ρ)β
h
f
λqF pB
(
hˆt + λˆt + EtqˆFt+1 + Etpˆ
B
t+1 + 2Rˆ
L
t
)
+
− d
RL
(1− ρ)β
h
kF
(
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt + EtRˆLt+1 − 2RˆLt − hˆt
)
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Rearranging we derive the log-linearized version of the marginal effect of the loan interest rate on
the real wage:
ˆWt =
1
W
d
(RL)2

(1− ρ)β
h
 fλqF pB
(
hˆt + λˆt + EtqˆFt+1 + Etpˆ
B
t+1 + 2Rˆ
L
t
)
+
−RLkF
(
Etλˆt+1 − λˆt + EtRˆLt+1 − 2RˆLt − hˆt
)
+
−mpl
αµ
(
m̂plt − µˆt − 2RˆLt
)
 (C.91)
The condition on worked hours (C.56) yields: hhˆt =
1
α− 1− φ
(
ϑ
µRL
αAλ
) 1
α−1−φ (
µˆt + RˆLt − λˆt
)
.
Recalling that h =
(
ϑ
µRL
αAλ
) 1
α−1−φ
we may write:
hˆt =
1
α− 1− φ
(
µˆt + RˆLt − λˆt
)
(C.92)
From equation (C.57) we may write the marginal productivity of labor as:
m̂plt = (α− 1) hˆt (C.93)
From equation (C.58) we get the marginal rate of substitution:
m̂rst = φhˆt − λˆt (C.94)
From equation (C.68) we obtain the real marginal cost:
m̂ct = −µˆt (C.95)
From equation (C.48) we may write the credit market tightness as:
θˆCt = sˆ
F
t − Vˆ Bt (C.96)
From equation (C.45), the labor market tightness is:
θˆLt = Vˆ
F
t − sˆWt (C.97)
From equation (C.50), the credit matches are:
Hˆt = ζVˆ Bt + (1− ζ) sˆFt (C.98)
From equation (C.49), the labor market matches are:
Mˆt = ξVˆ Ft + (1− ξ) sˆWt (C.99)
From equation (C.69) we may write the monetary rule as:
RˆDt = ρRRˆ
D
t−1 + (1− ρR)
(
δpipˆit + δY Yˆt
)
+ log νt (C.100)
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The log-linearization of equation (C.46) straightforwardly gives the job vacancy filling rate:
qˆFt = Mˆt − Vˆ Ft (C.101)
The log-linearization of equation (C.47) straightforwardly gives the job finding rate:
pˆFt = Mˆt − sˆWt (C.102)
The log-linearization of equation (C.41) straightforwardly gives the credit line finding rate:
pˆBt = Hˆt − sˆFt (C.103)
The log-linearization of equation (C.42) straightforwardly gives the credit vacancy filling rate:
qˆBt = Hˆt − Vˆ Bt (C.104)
From equation (C.70) the monetary policy shock is:
log νt = ρν log νt−1 + ενt (C.105)

